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Abstract 
Once a niche financial instrument, sukuk, often referred to as Islamic bonds, have become a 
mainstream alternative source of capital for corporations. This thesis addresses three related 
research questions about corporate sukuk issuance: i) what motivates firms to issue sukuk rather 
than conventional bonds?; ii) what determines issuers’ choice of sukuk structure?; and iii) how 
effective are key external issuance parties in certifying the quality and Shariah compliance of 
sukuk issuance? 
Recognising the similarities between sukuk and project finance, the analysis of the 
motivations for firms’ choice of sukuk builds on the literature that views agency cost mitigation 
as the primary rationale for the use of complex asset-based structured finance. Using a deal-level 
sample of 230 corporate bonds issued in Malaysia from 2001 to 2014, results from logistic 
regressions provide strong evidence in support of agency cost motivation for sukuk issuance. 
First, sukuk issuers have higher free cash flow and growth opportunities than conventional bond 
issuers. The positive relation between these agency cost proxies and sukuk choice is significant 
both statistically and economically, supporting agency cost predictions. Second, consistent with 
agency cost of debt arguments, the analysis of the choice of sukuk structure indicates that sukuk 
issuers with higher growth opportunities and financial distress are more likely to pledge collateral 
and use a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in their issuance.  
This thesis employs a sample of 3,462 sukuk tranches on the question of the certification 
effect of key external issuance parties. The results show that sukuk endorsed by a Shariah 
advisory committee and those with Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) as the lead arranger are 
associated with lower yield spreads. These results are robust to alternative model specifications 
and when potential self-selection is controlled for. In economic terms, certification by Shariah 
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advisory committees and IFIs translates into a reduction in sukuk spread by 0.74 and 2.37 
percentage points, respectively. The reputation of certifying agents is also associated with lower 
sukuk spreads, with a stronger result documented for highly opaque (private) sukuk issuers. On 
average, private firms save an annual financing cost of MYR0.396 million by appointing a top 
five bank as the lead arranger for their sukuk issuance, and MYR0.495 million by having their 
sukuk issuance endorsed by a top five Shariah advisor. Further test reveals that the certification 
effects of Shariah certifiers, particularly for equity-like sukuk, are more significant following the 
call in 2008 by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) for IFIs and Shariah advisors to ensure sukuk structuring closely adheres to Shariah 
standards. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
The legitimisation of sukuk1 in their modern form can be ascribed to a decision 
issued by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) during their fourth annual plenary session in February 1988. 
The IIFA ruled that a pool of assets can be represented in a written security certificate or 
bond, which can be sold at the market price on the condition that the asset represented 
by the bond consists of a majority of physical assets and financial rights (Wilson, 2004).  
Sukuk reconcile the concept of securitisation and Islamic commercial law on the 
provision and use of financial instruments in a risk-mitigation structure (El-Qorchi, 
2005). A standard sukuk issuance involves the securitisation of project assets by the 
firm, where a syndicate of banks forms the primary capital source. Depending on the 
types of investments, sukuk can be structured in several ways. The Accounting and 
Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), a leading standard-
setting body for the Islamic financial market, identifies 14 permissible sukuk structures, 
seven of which are common. Based on the nature of the asset transaction and return 
payment, these structures can be broadly classified into contracts of exchange (debt-
like), which offer fixed returns (murabahah, istisna, salam, and ijarah), and participatory 
                                                 
1 The word ‘sukuk’, commonly refers to Islamic equivalent of bonds, is literally the Arabic plural word for 
sakk, which means certificates or written document. 
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contracts (equity-like) which allow profit and risk sharing (mudarabah, musharakah, and 
wakalah).  
The key parties involved in the issuance process include i) the lead bank or lead 
arranger, who is responsible for advising the issuer, designing, and monitoring the sukuk 
contract; and ii) Shariah advisors, recognised experts in Islamic and conventional 
finance, who are formally appointed to screen and certify the Shariah compliance of 
sukuk issuance. The Shariah compliance requirement ensures that a sukuk issuance is 
not only viable technically, but also free from elements that allow for exploitation of one 
party against another, which is prohibited in Islam.  
Malaysia has been the leading market for sukuk, following the issuance of the 
world’s first sukuk by Shell MDS in 1990. However, it was not until early 2001 when a 
series of landmark sukuk were issued by local and international institutions in Malaysia 
and Gulf countries that sukuk received global attention.2 From just 95 issues between 
1990 and 2001, the number of sukuk issued worldwide reached 3,543 by the fourth 
quarter of 2013 amounting to a total value of US$488 billion. Two-thirds of these sukuk 
were issued in Malaysia.3 
Notwithstanding the impressive growth in the number and volume of sukuk 
issuance, the complexity of sukuk structure and the spectre of Shariah non-compliance 
risk remain core impediments to the growth of the sukuk market. While replicating the 
return profile of conventional fixed income securities, sukuk must comply with Islamic 
                                                 
2 The first international sovereign sukuk was issued by the Government of Bahran in June 2001, followed 
by the first international corporate sukuk issuance by Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad (Malaysian-based firm) 
in December 2001.  
3 See Thomson Reuters Zawya Sukuk Perceptions and Forecast Study 2014 available at 
http://www.zawya.com/ifg-publications/Sukuk_2014-250914100032X/ 
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finance principles.4 However, there has been legal uncertainty about the extent Shariah 
principles underlying sukuk are enforceable within the existing legal framework based 
on conventional law (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). This legal consideration often results in 
a costly issuance arrangement due to additional legal procedures and extensive 
documentation (El-Gamal, 2006). 
Facing difficulties in enforcing Islamic finance rulings under the conventional 
legal regime, several contract mechanisms have been innovated to ensure marketability 
of sukuk. However, these have provoked concerns over Shariah compliance. For 
instance, the practice of bay al-inah (sale and repurchase of similar assets) in sale-based 
contracts (murabahah), which is prevalent in Malaysia, was criticised by most Islamic 
finance scholars as a backdoor to interest-based financing (Rosly and Sanusi, 2001; Al-
Amine, 2008). The market’s confidence in sukuk was further eroded following the 
criticisms by Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani, the chair of the Shariah board for the 
AAOIFI, who famously said that approximately about 85 percent of sukuk did not 
comply with Islamic commercial law.5 This criticism was mainly targeted at the practice 
of purchase undertaking and liquidity-facility contracts in equity-like sukuk, which 
according to Sheikh Usmani, has violated the risk-sharing principle.6 
                                                 
4 The primary condition for a Shariah-compliant financial instrument relates to the prohibition of riba 
(usury) and excessive gharar (uncertainty). The two prohibitions imply that a sukuk contract cannot 
represent a pure debt obligation as charging a ‘premium’ over loaned money is not allowed in Islam, and 
the element of risk or uncertainty in the contract should be at a level which is manageable by the 
contracting parties (El-Gamal, 2006). 
5 The members of the AAOIFI Shariah board are among the world’s leading Shariah scholars whose 
pronouncement is likely to influence market behaviour. 
6 A purchase undertaking (principal guarantee) as well as liquidity facility are two popular contracts 
offered by sukuk issuers for the purpose of credit enhancement. The majority of Islamic finance jurists 
agree that both terms lead a financing contract becomes null and void as they violate the risk and profit 
sharing concepts in partnership principles (Dusuki, 2010). 
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The fact that the sukuk market continues to thrive, despite the adoption of Shariah-
questionable mechanisms, presents a number of interesting research questions which this 
thesis aims to address. These questions are expounded in Section 1.3. The remainder of 
this introductory chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the research 
motivations. Section 1.4 provides a brief discussion of the research methodology 
adopted in the thesis, which is followed by Sections 1.5 and 1.6 where the main findings 
and contributions of the thesis are respectively discussed. Finally, Section 1.7 outlines 
the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Research Motivations 
With a greater flexibility in contract design and the Islamic principles used, the 
sukuk market has been depicted as a successful financial innovation and close to being a 
mainstream asset class.7 In Malaysia, sukuk issuance now rivals conventional bond 
issuance (BNM and SC, 2009). The increasing use of sukuk as an alternative means of 
raising capital market funds has captured the interest of media, academics, and 
regulators, resulting in a proliferation of writings. To illustrate, Google Scholar returns 
only 163 hits for ‘sukuk’ search between 2001 and 2005, but the number of hits 
increases to 4,530 between 2006 and 2014.  
While the encouraging development of the sukuk market can in part be attributed 
to local government support and the large amount of under-utilised Shariah-compliant 
                                                 
7 See The Wall Street Journal, 5 November 2013 at http://online.wsj.com/ad/article/assetmanagement-
sukuk 
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liquidity (Jobst, 2007; DeLorenzo, 2011), less is understood about why firms choose to 
issue sukuk instead of conventional bonds. 
Previous studies that attempt to identify the determinants of sukuk issuance are 
confined to testing traditional capital structure theories. For example, testing the trade-
off theory, Shahida and Saharah (2013) find tax exemption by the government positively 
influences firms’ decision to issue sukuk. Mohamed et al. (2015) provide support for the 
pecking order theory by documenting a positive relation between growth opportunities 
and sukuk issuance. Examining the determinants of issuers’ choice of sukuk structure, 
Azmat et al. (2014a) and Mohamed et al. (2015) find limited applicability of trade-off 
and pecking order theories to sukuk issuance.8 The latter concludes that sukuk offer 
some ‘benefits’ owing to their unique features. Another strand of research examines the 
stock market reaction to sukuk issuance, but the evidence on whether sukuk create value 
for the issuing firms is mixed.9 
By applying only these conventional theories in an examination of the 
determinants of sukuk issuance, previous studies have overlooked the implication of the 
complex and tightly enforced contract structures of sukuk. A limitation of the trade-off 
and pecking order theories is that they primarily concern the question of the optimal debt 
to equity ratio given considerations of the trade-off between cost and benefit, and the 
value-relevant information. The innovation of asset-based finance like sukuk concerns 
the optimal form of financial structure that allows firms to surmount the limitations in 
capital raising caused by capital market imperfections.  
                                                 
8 The structures of sukuk are classified as those that are secured against real assets (SARA), i.e., ijarah 
sukuk, debt-based (murabahah), and Islamic joint venture (IJV) in Azmat et al. (2014a), and broadly 
classified as exchange-based (debt-like) and partnership-based (equity-like) in Mohamed et al. (2015). 
9See for example Mohd Ashhari et al. (2009), Ibrahim and Minai (2009), Godlewski et al. (2013), Alam et 
al. (2013), and Modirzadehbami and Mansourfar (2011). 
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The guidelines and regulations on sukuk issuance published by Shariah-setting 
bodies indicate that sukuk in many ways resemble project finance − an asset-based and 
highly-tailored financing. This resemblance motivates this thesis to extend the empirical 
implications of firms’ use of project finance to corporate sukuk issuance. The security 
design literature suggests agency cost mitigation as a primary rationale for the design of 
such financial contracts. Specifically, the mechanics of sukuk contracts – securitisation 
of well-identified assets and extensive contracting – make them exceptionally proficient 
in curtailing management discretion, hence minimising agency problems (John and 
John, 1996; Subramanian et al., 2008).  
Depending on the firm’s (originator) financing and investment needs, sukuk 
contracts can be designed to apply either the debt-like or equity-like principle, and to 
either include collateral provisions and a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or not. The 
choice of these structures could further explain issuers’ approach to minimising agency 
conflicts. The agency literature notes the role of debt-like financing in disciplining 
excess cash flow management (Jensen, 1986), and the bonding mechanism intrinsic to 
collateral and the bankruptcy-remoteness of the SPV as practical solutions for adverse 
investment incentives (Stulz and Johnson, 1985; Esty, 2003).  
Our motivation also lies in the increasing concern about the complexity of sukuk 
structure and the spectre of Shariah non-compliance risk among sukuk investors. The 
latter, which is aptly termed ‘Shariah risk’, 10 continues to present a significant risk in 
sukuk issuance. Preserving Shariah principles in sukuk contract has been complicated by 
two impediments in the market. The first is the lack of standardisation due to varying 
                                                 
10 Shariah risk, arising from a financial contract not being in compliance with established Shariah 
principles and standards, is defined as the potential loss of asset value resulting from non-compliance of 
sukuk terms with Islamic law (Tariq and Dar, 2007). 
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Shariah interpretations, which has constrained universal recognition of whether the 
financial practice is ‘Shariah-compliant’ or not.11 Second, the challenge of marketing 
sukuk to conventional investors as well as uncertainty over the enforceability of Shariah-
based contracts under the conventional law have caused a dilution in the adherence of 
sukuk structuring to Shariah principles (Muhammad and Sairally, 2013). Indeed, several 
financial engineering innovations have come to pass to ensure the viability of the sukuk 
market.  
From a financial intermediation perspective, the nature of sukuk investment and its 
innovative features demand sophisticated screening and monitoring. Like project 
finance, sukuk are often arranged to fund high leverage and opaque (infrastructure) 
projects. Relative to conventional debt holders, sukuk holders arguably face greater 
uncertainty since the quality of the project asset is private information known only to the 
firm’s insiders (Webb, 1991). The asset-based/asset-backed nature of sukuk also renders 
complex and extensive contracting. This setting suggests that the role of sukuk arrangers 
extends beyond certifying that the issue price is consistent with private information, as 
in conventional securities (Cook et al., 2003).  
Although the above challenges facing the sukuk market have been widely 
discussed in academic research and business press, little effort has been undertaken to 
test their empirical implications. An investigation into the risks associated with sukuk 
issuance and the certification mechanisms is timely and promising in light of the 
increasing global demand for sukuk (Ibrahim, 2015).  
                                                 
11 There are four schools of Islamic thought (i.e., Shafi’i, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali) from which Islamic 
jurists base their opinion on particular ruling. The four schools of Islamic thought, named after their 
founders, differ in opinion on practical methodologies of how a specific issue in Muslim community 
should be addressed. However, the guidance provided by the jurists of each school is derived from their 
interpretation on the similar source of Shariah (Abdal-Haqq, 2002). 
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1.3 Research Aims and Questions 
Capital market imperfections – costly screening, monitoring, and funding 
investments – make the financial structure and external certification an important 
consideration for firms seeking capital market funds. This thesis aims to examine the 
market-based rationale for corporate sukuk issuance as a response to these market 
imperfections. To achieve this research aim, three research questions are raised. The first 
question is what motivates firms to engage in a complex financing arrangement like 
sukuk (RQ1)? This thesis argues that the increasing importance of sukuk can be best 
explained in the context of the use of complex financing structures, such as project 
finance, with which sukuk share a number of common features. A review of related 
literature suggests that agency problems are the primary motivation for the issuance of 
such financial instruments. Therefore, rather than applying just the standard capital 
structure theories to test the motivations for firms’ choice of sukuk, the empirical 
examination of this thesis also draws upon the agency theory of project finance.  
Flexibility in contract design is a salient feature of sukuk where the arrangement 
can vary in terms of security structure and the Islamic principles used. Hence, what 
determines issuers’ choice of a particular sukuk structure? This is the second research 
question (RQ2) this thesis seeks to address. An analysis of issuers’ choice of sukuk 
structure will further our understanding of firms’ motivation for sukuk issuance. To the 
best of our knowledge, Azmat et al. (2014a) and Mohamed et al. (2015) are the only 
published empirical works on the determinants of issuers’ choice of sukuk structure, 
particularly the choice between debt-like and equity-like structure. This thesis expands 
their analysis to include the choice of collateral structure and the decision to create a 
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special purpose vehicle (SPV). For informed analysis, the security choice literature is 
reviewed both from the information and agency theory perspectives. This includes 
existing studies on the choice between debt and equity, the use of secured or 
collateralised debt, and the creation of an SPV in asset-backed securitisation.  
An implication of contractual flexibility is the lack of standardisation in the sukuk 
market. The lack of standardisation in Shariah rulings on the permissibility of certain 
structures or provisions poses the greatest concern due to potential Shariah non-
compliance risk, which is an important form of operational and regulatory risk in this 
setting (Yusuf and Delorenzo, 2007). The complex arrangement and risky nature of 
sukuk investment present another practical challenge to the parties involved in 
marketing sukuk to conventional investors. In light of these key challenges, the third 
research question asks how effective are key external issuance parties in certifying the 
Shariah compliance and investment quality of a sukuk issuance (RQ3)?  
Existing research highlights the link between lead arrangers’ reputation and 
potential mitigation of agency cost in loan deals (Do and Vu, 2010; Gatti et al., 2013). 
Evidence suggests that reputable lead arrangers have greater screening and monitoring 
capability, and are more committed to ex post monitoring. Drawing on this literature, we 
test the effect of lead arrangers’ reputation on sukuk pricing. 
The unique institution of sukuk provides an ideal opportunity to test the pricing 
effect of Shariah certification. The analysis in this regard builds on recent work by 
Godlewski et al. (2014) and Azmat et al. (2014b) which suggests that the certification 
role of Shariah advisors is analogous to that of conventional auditors in the equity 
market. From a monitoring perspective, Azmat et al. (2014b) propose that having 
Shariah conscious investors in the sukuk contracts can minimise Shariah non-
10 
 
compliance risk. We test this proposition using IFIs’ participation as the sukuk arranger 
since IFIs are known for their fiduciary duty to observe financial operations in a 
Shariah-compliant manner (Safieddine, 2009).  
 
1.4 Research Design 
This thesis uses corporate sukuk issued in Malaysia as its research sample, which 
has the largest market for domestic sukuk worldwide.12 The sample period spans over 14 
years, from 2001 to 2014. 
A deal-level sample is constructed to examine the first and second research 
questions so that each unit of observation represents a new deal or issuance, but not the 
tranches of the same deal.13 The final sample consists of 128 sukuk and 102 
conventional bonds. From the 128 sukuk deals, debt-like and secured structures make up 
77.3 percent and 48.4 percent, respectively, and 19.5 percent of sample sukuk issues 
have an SPV. The logistic regression is used to test the relation between agency cost 
proxies and the choice of sukuk vs. conventional bonds, and the choice of the following 
sukuk structures: (i) debt-like vs. equity-like; (ii) secured vs. unsecured; and (iii) SPV 
vs. no SPV. To ensure that the inference drawn from sukuk structure choice analysis is 
free from sample selection bias, the two-step Heckman (1979) procedure is employed.  
We use a tranche-level sample to test the certification effect of key external parties 
involved in sukuk issuance (RQ3) since sukuk yield spreads, the response variable in the 
regression model, varies across tranches. The final sample consists of 3,482 sukuk 
                                                 
12 International Islamic Financial Market (IFIM) Sukuk Report (4th edition), November 2014, 
http://www.iifm.net/documents/iifm-sukuk-report-4th-edition 
13 A sukuk deal typically has multiple tranches of the same issuance structure. 
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tranches of which 57 percent are issued by private firms. A careful approach is adopted 
in constructing reputation proxies for Shariah advisors and lead arrangers which take 
into account the stability of their reputation over time. This analysis provides an 
appropriate and useful starting point to explore this relatively new field of research in 
the sukuk literature. Issuance terms and firm-specific characteristics are controlled in the 
regression models. For robustness checks, potential lender-firm selection bias, private 
firms’ effect, and alternative measures of sukuk holders’ risk perception are considered 
in the estimation. Finally, the structural shift in Shariah certification effect following the 
2008 AAOIFI pronouncement is examined by estimating the partitioned pre- and post-
2008 subsamples.    
 
1.5 Summary of Main Findings 
The principal findings of this thesis are consistent with most of the hypotheses 
developed. First, we find firms with higher free cash flow and profitability are more 
likely to issue sukuk than conventional bonds, as are firms with higher growth 
opportunities. The results are robust when we compare the likelihood of firms issuing 
debt-like sukuk with conventional bond issuers, hence supporting the agency cost 
hypothesis for firms’ choice of sukuk. 
Second, on issuers’ choice of sukuk structure, we find sukuk issuers with higher 
agency cost of free cash flow are somewhat indifferent between debt-like and equity-like 
structures. This finding is in contrast with the conventional idea that debt structure plays 
a more effective disciplinary role than equity-like contracts in restricting managerial 
discretion on free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). In line with the agency cost of debt 
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argument, firms with higher growth opportunities and financial distress are more likely 
to pledge collateral and use an SPV for their sukuk issuance. This evidence suggests that 
using collaterals and SPVs reduces agency costs arising from underinvestment 
incentives.  
Third, several other factors appear to be important determinants of sukuk issuance. 
For example, we observe the importance of political support for firms’ decision to issue 
sukuk. In line with the Malaysian government’s initiative to transform Malaysia into a 
hub for Islamic capital market, the results indicate that sukuk issuance is promoted 
through government-sponsored investment institutions’ shareholding in firms. With 
regard to the sukuk structure choice, we find smaller and younger firms are more likely 
to use debt-like structure and collateral provision in their sukuk issuance, providing a 
cost effective solution for firms that are informationally opaque.  
Fourth, the results on external parties’ certification effects on sukuk pricing show 
that sukuk issues endorsed by a Shariah advisory committee and where the lead arranger 
is an IFI have 0.744 and 2.368 percentage points lower spread, respectively. This 
translates into an annual financing cost savings of MYR0.148 and MYR0.471 million 
respectively for the average tranche issuance amount. The certification effects of these 
external parties are robust to a correction for the self-selection bias and alternative model 
specifications. Supporting reputable banks’ effectiveness in reducing the impact of 
information asymmetry, sukuk issuances originated by private firms which have a top 
five bank as the lead arranger have an average 1.33 percentage points lower spread. This 
reduction in the spread is equivalent to an MYR0.396 million annual financing cost 
savings. There is also a reputation effect of Shariah advisors on such firms, where the 
endorsement of sukuk issuance by a top five Shariah advisor reduces the spread further 
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by 1.67 percentage points (worth MYR0.495 million). Testing the impact of the 2008 
AAOIFI pronouncement, results show that sukuk certifiers play a far more significant 
role in minimising Shariah non-compliance risk in the post-2008 period, especially for 
equity-like sukuk. 
 
1.6 Contributions 
This thesis contributes to recent developments in the literature on corporate sukuk 
issuance in the following ways. First, our careful analysis of the theoretical and technical 
features of sukuk provides a refined distinction between sukuk and conventional debt 
instruments. This analysis implies that an empirical analysis of sukuk issuance decision 
should consider both traditional capital structure and asset-backed security theoretical 
perspectives. By documenting the importance of agency cost motivation in explaining 
the corporate decision to issue sukuk, this study sheds new light on the puzzle why firms 
choose such a costly and complex financing structure (El-Gamal, 2006). This finding 
also adds to the project finance literature which argues that the mechanics of such a 
highly structured financing work in a symbiotic way to reduce agency costs (Esty, 2003; 
John and John, 1991).  
Second, this thesis extends the sukuk structure choice analysis of Azmat et al. 
(2014a) and Mohamed et al. (2015) by considering issuers’ choice of collateral and SPV 
structures in sukuk issuance. This extension allows us to draw richer inferences on the 
influence of capital market imperfections on sukuk contract design. 
Third, this thesis advances the sukuk literature in its certification effect analysis. 
Specifically, it tests the value impact of certifying agents involved in sukuk issuance on 
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sukuk yield spread. The benefit of looking at the spread is that it directly reflects the 
additional yield an investor expects to earn from being exposed to Shariah compliance 
risk. This approach has the added benefit of circumventing the problem of small sample 
size typically encountered in event studies on sukuk (e.g., Godlewski et al., 2014) since 
it does not require the issuer to be a listed firm.  
The certification analysis of this thesis also adds new insights into security 
certification in the context of ethical investments. The analysis indicates that issuers’ 
compliance with the accepted ethical principles is priced by investors. Further, while 
endorsement by Shariah advisors becomes a currency to complete a sukuk deal, this 
thesis provides the first evidence showing the effectiveness of IFI arrangers in mitigating 
sukuk holders’ concern about Shariah non-compliance risk. 
On a broader level, the analysis of the effect of banks’ reputation on sukuk pricing 
contributes to the thin literature on the certification role of financial intermediaries in 
complex structured finance. To the best of our knowledge, Gatti et al. (2013) is the only 
study that tests the certification effect of arranging banks in project finance. Our 
empirical specification capitalises on the unique institution of sukuk to suggest that 
Shariah-regulated financial intermediaries can certify Shariah compliance.  
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 presents the 
institutional framework within which the principles governing sukuk, their concept, and 
characteristics are discussed. Chapter 3 provides a review of related literature, and 
Chapter 4 develops the theoretical framework and testable hypotheses. Chapter 5 
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discusses the data and research methods adopted to test the hypotheses. Chapter 6 
presents the empirical findings of firms’ decision to issue sukuk and the certification 
effects of key external parties involved in the sukuk issuance. A summary and 
conclusions are provided in Chapter 7, which outlines the limitations and future areas of 
research on sukuk issuance. 
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Chapter 2 
Institutional Background of the Sukuk Market 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the sukuk market in which the underlying principles, 
characteristics, and mechanics of the financial instrument are discussed. It begins with a 
discussion of the relevant Islamic finance principles that govern the design of sukuk in Section 
2.2. Section 2.3 outlines the characteristics of sukuk, the types of sukuk structures widely 
practiced in the market, the issuance process, and the key parties involved in a sukuk issuance. 
Section 2.5 addresses the Shariah compliance issues and challenges currently faced by the sukuk 
market, followed by a discussion of the Malaysian sukuk market from which the sample is based 
in Section 2.6. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 2.7. 
 
2.2 Islamic Commercial Law 
‘Shariah compliance’ is a unique institution of Islamic financial instruments where its 
verification is based on Islamic commercial law. Islamic commercial law, as a part of the general 
Islamic law, is derived from various sources. The primary source is the Shariah, which is the 
divine revelation received by Prophet Muhammad (i.e., the Quran) and his conducts and sayings 
(i.e., prophetic tradition or Sunnah). Shariah concerns the dimensions existing in man-to-God (the 
Unity Creator) and inter-human relations, encompassing worship, individual conduct, and social 
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norms. Hence, it is a fundamentally religious precept prescribing what is good and permitted 
(lawful) and what is harmful and forbidden (unlawful) (DeLorenzo and McMillen, 2012). The 
second source is the fiqh (jurisprudence), which represents a vast collection of juridical opinions 
offered by Muslim jurists from various Islamic legal schools (madhab) with respect to the 
application of the Shariah in their respective environment and context throughout the past 14 
centuries. The third is fatwa, which is an Islamic legal pronouncement issued by Muslim scholars 
to address a specific need of the society at a specific time. An example is a fatwa permitting the 
use of securities’ certificates to represent a pool of assets which forms the basis for sukuk. Issuing 
a fatwa involves the application of the Shariah and fiqh.  
The Islamic finance literature highlights two Shariah prohibitions in Islamic commercial 
law, namely riba (usury) and gharar (excessive uncertainties). Muslim scholars reason that 
prohibitions of riba and gharar are meant to protect man’s wealth and property from exploitation 
through unfair transactions, thus preserving social justice and stability (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 
2011).14 The following subsections discuss these major prohibited elements in detail and derive 
their implications for sukuk design. 
 
2.3.1 The prohibition of riba 
Riba literally means increase, augment, or addition, and is often referred to as interest in 
most discussions on Islamic finance. A broad definition of riba is, “any unlawful or undeserved 
gain derived from the quantitative inequality of the counter-values” (Warde, 2010, p. 52). Mews 
and Abraham (2007) point out that riba is better understood as usury, which is consistent with its 
                                                 
14 Besides these major prohibitions, Shariah also defines non-permissible commodities and activities. Clearly, 
Islamic financing is not available to firms engaged in casinos, prostitution, and intoxicants production. 
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classical understanding of charging illegal or exorbitant (usurious) rates of interest for the use of 
money. 
The scriptures of the Abrahamic religions provide evidence that the prohibition of riba is 
not only confined to Islam but is also present in Christianity and Judaism. This historical record 
indicates that engaging in the practice of usury has been prevalent since ancient times. Hence, 
God, through His revelation to the messengers, renounces such an unjust practice in the society. 
In the Quran, prohibition of riba is revealed on several occasions during the life of Prophet 
Muhammad. For example, in surah (chapter) al-Baqarah (verses 275 and 279), God asserts that: 
profit making from trade is permissible but riba is forbidden; a Muslim entitles only to the 
principal in a loan transaction; and taking riba is equivalent to wrongful appropriation of property 
belonging. Based on the recorded ahadith (plural of prophetic sayings) of Prophet Muhammad, 
riba is further classified into two types: i) riba al-fadl, which results from an unlawful increase in 
one of the counter values; and ii) riba al-nasia, which is an excess amount charged according to 
the duration of a loan contract.15 
Over the centuries, there have been ongoing discussions among Muslim scholars on the 
juristic meaning of prohibited riba as dictated in the Quran and Sunnah. The discussion extends 
to whether the prohibition of riba applies to interest charging on loans and other debt securities 
used in modern days.16 The majority of contemporary Muslim scholars hold the opinion that 
usury in debts (riba ad-duyun) falls under the category of riba al-nasia, and is thus forbidden 
(Warde, 2010). The additional payment charged over the amount of money lent as a function of 
duration is unjustifiable income because, in Islam, money is considered as potential capital rather 
than capital or commodity. In other words, money by itself cannot generate a return on a given 
                                                 
15 Muslim jurists from the four schools of thoughts classify riba into several categories. 
16 A summary of this debate is provided by Warde (2010). 
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amount of time unless it is invested in business transactions.17 However, this does not mean that 
the time value of money is ruled out. Islamic commercial law recognises the time value of money 
when money acts as capital and in terms of the pricing of assets and their usufructs (Ahmad and 
Hassan, 2006). In line with this philosophy, to justify the return payment to the investors, sukuk 
contracts are designed in a manner that resembles trades such that the return gained is the profit 
from a sale, leasing, or business venture. This underlying requirement renders sukuk a form of 
asset-backed financing, different from pure debt obligations in conventional finance. 
 
2.3.2 The prohibition of gharar 
Gharar literally means, ‘uncertainty, ambiguity, hazard, or peril’.18 Technically, gharar 
constitutes undue risk due to incomplete information about a contract (El-Gamal, 2006). The 
word ‘gharar’ is not explicitly mentioned in the Quran, but its prohibition is indicated by the 
Sunnah through various narrated sayings (ahadith) of Prophet Muhammad wherein he forbade 
sales when the element of gharar (bay al gharar) or uncertainty about the object of the transaction 
is present.   
Based on a set of ahadith on gharar, Vogel and Hayes (1998) arrange prohibited 
transactions in a risk spectrum from pure speculation to uncertain outcome and future benefit to 
inexactitude. They deduce that risks associated with gharar arise either due to parties’ lack of 
                                                 
17 In a pure lending relationship, the form of loan advocated under this philosophy is that of qard al-hasan or a 
benevolent loan – the loan given for personal use or welfare purpose where only the principal amount is returned on 
its maturity. 
18 The concept of ‘uncertainty’ (distinguishable from ‘risk’) is discussed at length by (Knight, 1921). "Uncertainty 
must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of risk, from which it has never been properly 
separated... The essential fact is that 'risk' means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, while at other 
times it is something distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and crucial differences in the bearings 
of the phenomena depending on which of the two is really present and operating... It will appear that a measurable 
uncertainty, or 'risk' proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is not in 
effect an uncertainty at all." 
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knowledge about the object of transaction, the absence of the object at the time of the transaction, 
or because the object evades the parties’ control. Classical Muslim jurists divide gharar into 
major gharar and minor gharar. Since gharar is a question of degree, the validity of a contract is 
thus identified through a cost-benefit analysis. The general principle is that a transaction is 
deemed valid in instance where there is minor gharar, or if gharar is inevitable without incurring 
excessive costs (El-Gamal, 2006).  
Muslim scholars note that the main reason for the prohibition of gharar is not to eliminate 
the uncertainty and risk inherent in business transactions, but to eliminate the ambiguity that 
allows one party to take advantage by deceiving another (Warde, 2010; Saleem, 2012). This 
prohibition coincides with the objective of Shariah in commercial transactions − ensuring a 
satisfactory outcome, promoting balance between the private interests, and creating communal 
prosperity (Lahsasna and Hassan, 2011).  
Contemporary Muslim jurists apply classical opinions and conditions laid out by early 
Muslim scholars to address the issue of gharar in financial contracts. In general, the transaction 
guideline emphasises the clarity of the object of transaction, parties involved, price, and other 
elements that may affect the transaction (Hassan and Lewis, 2007). These conditions clearly 
renounce outright speculation. In the context of the sukuk arrangement, the prohibition of gharar 
is manifested through several requirements. First, since return and risk of a sukuk contract 
correspond to assets or business performance, the identified set of assets must be economically 
viable so that the issuer is able to service the contract. Second, the funding raised must be put to 
use as planned or earmarked for a particular purpose. Finally, the conditions of the contract, 
descriptions of assets and transactions involved, the obligations of the issuer, and the rights of the 
investors must be clearly spelled out in the terms of the contract (Ebrahim et al. 2016). 
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2.3 What is Sukuk? 
The introduction of sukuk began in the 1990s following the decision (fatwa) issued by 
OIC’s International Islamic Fiqh Academy in February 1988 (Wilson, 2004). The fatwa states 
that, “any combination of assets (or the usufruct of such assets) can be represented in the form of 
written financial instruments which can be sold at a market price” provided that a large fraction 
of assets is represented by tangible assets.19 
 ‘Sukuk’ is an Arabic plural word for sakk, which means certificate, legal instrument, deed, 
and checks (Ariff et al., 2012). This financial instrument is often referred to as the Islamic 
equivalent of conventional bonds. The design and execution of sukuk contracts are significantly 
influenced by Islamic commercial law. Hence, while sukuk replicate the characteristics of 
conventional bonds – fixed periodic return, tradable on the secondary market, and redeemable at 
a certain date – they are fundamentally different in contract structures and underlying principles 
(Warde, 2010).  
 
2.3.1 Sukuk defined 
Various definitions of sukuk have been offered by different Islamic finance standard setting 
institutions. In May 2003, the AAOIFI issued a Shariah standard and guideline for investment 
sukuk in which sukuk are defined as, “certificates of equal value representing, after closing 
subscription, receipt of the value of the certificates and putting it to use as planned, common title 
to shares and rights in tangible assets, usufructs and services, or equity of a given project or 
equity of a special investment activity” (AAOIFI, Shariah Standards 1425-6 H No 17 at 296). 
                                                 
19 Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), Sukuk Guidebook, November 2009, 9. 
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The International Islamic Financial Market (2009) further defines sukuk as commercial papers 
that provide their holders with ownership in an underlying asset. The Malaysian-based 
international standard setting body for Islamic finance industry, the Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB), defines sukuk as, “certificates with each sakk representing a proportional 
undivided ownership right in tangible assets, or a pool of predominantly tangible assets, or a 
business venture (such as a mudarabah). These assets may refer to a specific project or 
investment activity in accordance with Shariah rules and principles (Islamic Financial Services 
Board, 2009, p.3).”20 In sum, the above definitions establish that sukuk are a type of asset-backed 
security structured in manners that comply with Islamic commercial law.  
 
2.3.2 Generic features of sukuk issuance 
The following lists the standard structural features of sukuk derived from sukuk issuance 
guidelines and offering circulars: 
a) Underlying asset: The presence of assets underlying the financial contract is central to 
sukuk as a Shariah-compliant security. The regulation on sukuk issuance emphasises 
the use of tangible assets, particularly for the sale- and lease-based sukuk. Sukuk 
issuers are required to disclose information on the underlying asset from which the 
profits to be paid to sukuk investors are generated. In the sukuk offering circular or 
prospectus, descriptions of the underlying asset are laid out under the ‘identified asset’ 
clause.  
                                                 
20 Standard IFSB-7, January 2009. 
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b) Multi-tranche: The ‘tranching’ of sukuk involves splitting the offering into multiple 
classes of securities called tranches or facilities, each of which may carry different 
risk profiles to investors. As such, every tranche is priced and rated independently. 
c) Extensive contract and documentation: The use of assets and commercial transaction 
principles (e.g., sale, lease, and joint venture) in the sukuk contract necessitates 
extensive documentation detailing the contractual provisions and cash flows of the 
investment. Apart from the financial contract between the capital providers and the 
issuer, sukuk issuance involves a set of non-financial contracts or transaction 
documents depending on the type of investment and Islamic principle structures used. 
Taking the example of sale-based sukuk issued for construction funding, this 
arrangement would require a sale and purchase agreement, a lease agreement, as well 
as a maintenance agreement. The existence of transaction documents ensures the 
validity and enforceability of sukuk, specifying the obligations of the issuer or rights 
and priority of the investors in the contract. 
d) Special purpose vehicle (SPV): As in an asset-backed security, an SPV, a legal entity 
that is separate from the originator, is created by the sukuk originator for the sole 
purpose of executing the investment project. The SPV serves as i) an intermediary 
between sukuk investors and the originator; ii) a bankruptcy remote entity; and iii) an 
entity responsible for acquiring the sukuk assets and transferring their ownership to 
the investors.  
e) Syndicated financing: A syndicate of commercial and investment banks, either Islamic 
or conventional, represents the primary source of financing for sukuk. This feature 
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provides sukuk the benefit of effective monitoring and flexibility in financing 
renegotiation known to be the area of banks’ expertise.  
f) Security or collateral: As in conventional financing arrangement, primary capital 
providers may require that the issuing firm pledges security interest or collateral 
assets. A package of collateral security covering the project and cash flows is 
provided to secure the obligations of the sukuk issuer under sale and purchase as well 
as lease agreements (Finnerty, 2013). Most, if not all arranging banks require the 
issuer to open designated accounts, particularly the debt service reserve account 
(DSRA) with the appointed security trustee. The DSRA serves as a cash buffer 
whenever the cash available for debt service is less than the scheduled payment.  
g) Guarantee and purchase undertaking: Albeit questionable from the Islamic 
commercial law perspective, most sukuk issued include a purchase undertaking by the 
originator to provide cash flows security to the investors (Dusuki, 2010). The Shariah 
ruling issued by the AAOIFI allows the use of third-party guarantee in sukuk as a 
benevolent act or on the basis of service charge for the actual expense.  
h) Covenant: Sukuk issuance typically includes a broad range of financial and 
operational covenants to ensure the soundness of the investment project. For example, 
financial covenants require that the originator maintains specific financial ratios. 
Further, as the return payment for sukuk is linked to the cash flow generated by the 
underlying asset(s), the arranging bank typically includes a covenant that controls 
asset disposal and dividend policy of the originator under the restrictive (negative) 
covenant clause.  
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2.3.3 Sukuk, a pseudo project finance 
Standard and Poor’s define ‘project finance’ as a hybrid between a structured, asset-backed, 
and conventional corporate financing (S&P, 2007). The formal definition and standard features of 
sukuk explicated in previous sections indicate that sukuk fit this definition. To achieve the 
economic effect of conventional debt finance, sukuk reconcile the concept of securitisation and 
Islamic commercial law on the provision and use of financial instruments in a risk-mitigation 
structure (El-Qorchi, 2005). For ease of exposition, Table 2.1 compares and contrasts some of the 
key features of sukuk and conventional debt. 
Financing a well-identified project with an assignable cash flow is the key function of 
sukuk, similar to project finance. Owing to the prohibition of riba, sukuk contracts are required to 
be based on underlying assets (i.e., tangible assets or business venture). In contrast to 
conventional debt, sukuk represent the investor’s right to a proportionate share of cash flow 
derived from the identified assets rather than a debt claim. As such, the economic and technical 
feasibility of sukuk investment is an important element considered by sukuk holders apart from 
the general creditworthiness of the originator.  
The use of investment assets to secure future cash flow makes sukuk akin to the financial 
arrangement used in infrastructure and project financing. In fact, sukuk funding has been used as 
a policy tool by governments to coordinate the expanding Shariah-compliant funds and 
infrastructure and industrial development policy in the Muslim world (Bassens et al., 2012).  
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Table 2.1: Comparison between sukuk and conventional debt 
  
 
The asset- or transaction-based sukuk structure often results in a complex series of cash 
flows which necessitate the involvement of multiple contractual arrangements (El-Gamal, 2006; 
Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). As in project finance, sukuk involve financial and non-financial 
contracts. Under a financial contract, a syndicate of banks forms the primary source of financing 
where the project-related contracts and identified assets serve as lenders’ security. The existence 
of a network of non-financial contracts helps ensure the viability of the investment (Corielli et al., 
2010). Non-financial contracts typically include ‘sale and purchase agreements’ and 
‘maintenance agreements’ managed by the SPV.  
Dimension Sukuk Conventional debt
Cash flow Derived from the project's 
assets
Debt claim
Financing vehicle Either a single- or multi-
purpose entity
A multi-purpose entity
Financial structures Highly-tailored Common structures which are 
easily duplicated
Non-financial 
contracts
Yes No
Basis for credit 
valuation
Creditworthiness of the 
originator and feasibility of the 
project's assets, cash flow and 
contractual arrangements
Creditworthiness of the 
originator
Investment 
decisions
Highly transparent to creditors Relatively opaque to creditors
Transaction costs Highly costly due to extensive 
documentation and longer 
gestation period
Low costs due to routinized 
mechanisms and short 
turnaround time
Size of capital or 
leverage
Require high leverage to cover 
high transaction costs
Relatively flexible
Recourse to the 
originator
Either limited or with recourse 
to the originator
Full recourse to the originator
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Extensive documentation detailing and governing the object and transaction process is an 
important characteristic of sukuk as a corollary of gharar (undue risk) prohibition (Ebrahim et al., 
2016; Jobts, 2011). The sukuk contracting process also applies tough scrutiny on capital 
investment decisions. In particular, the ‘cash flow waterfall’ provision as part of the contractual 
structure precisely dictates the order and timing of the cash flows from one account to another, 
and across a number of contingencies (McMillen, 2000). This mechanism provides sukuk holders 
greater transparency of the originator’s conduct with respect to the investment. Nevertheless, a 
well-constructed and tightly enforced contract that sukuk entail require significant lead times and 
incur high transaction costs.  
Finally, although the theoretical link between sukuk and project finance clearly exists, 
sukuk may be issued to finance established projects with recourse not limited to the project 
assets.21 Such arrangements ultimately make sukuk a type of pseudo project finance (McMillen, 
2009).  
 
2.3.4 Classification of sukuk structures 
Sukuk provide flexibility in terms of security design, allowing the issuer to tailor the 
financial contract according to the underlying investment project so as to achieve the desired 
leverage and investment outcome. The AAOIFI identifies as many as 14 types of sukuk 
structures. Of these approved structures, five are widely used in the sukuk market: murabahah; 
istisna; ijarah; mudarabah; and musharakah. These five structures can be broadly classified based 
on their payment mode (see Figure 2.1): debt-like sukuk, which pay a predetermined fixed return, 
                                                 
21 ‘Pure’ non-recourse financing is similarly rare in contemporary project finance in light of creditors’ concern over 
credit risk if projects are abandoned or ceased (Farrell, 2003). As in project finance, sukuk arrangements often 
involve credit support either through third-party guarantees or undertakings by the originator itself, although the 
latter is debatable from a Shariah perspective. 
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and equity-like sukuk, which pay a return based on the realisation of the asset or investment 
according to a predetermined profit sharing ratio. The subsections that follow describe each of 
these structures in detail and illustrate their mechanics with the aid of cash flow structure 
diagrams.     
 
Figure 2.1: Classification of sukuk structures  
 
Sale-based sukuk 
Two common sale-based sukuk issued in the market are murabahah and istisna sukuk. Sale-
based sukuk involve a sale and purchase transaction for the financing of an asset, where the issuer 
is the seller of the identified commodity, and the subscriber is the buyer of the commodity. While 
murabahah sukuk are issued to finance the purchase of a commodity on a deferred and instalment 
basis, istisna sukuk are issued to obtain advanced financing for real estate and manufacturing 
projects.  
To assist in understanding the execution of sale-based sukuk contracts, Figure 2.2 
illustrates an example of cash flows under the murabahah sukuk structure. The operation of 
Sukuk 
Debt-like Sukuk Equity-like Sukuk 
Lease Principle Sale Principle Partnership Principle 
 Murabahah Istisna Ijarah  Mudarabah  Musharakah 
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murabahah sukuk contracts begins with the issuance of sukuk certificates by the SPV to the 
investors. The SPV uses the proceeds raised from the sukuk issuance to purchase the identified 
assets or commodities for spot payment and delivery. Pursuant to the originator’s agreement to 
purchase the asset on a deferred payment term, the SPV sells the asset to the originator with 
delivery taking place on the spot at cost price plus a pre-agreed markup representing the profit 
from the sale transaction. The periodic payment made by the originator (cost plus profit) serves 
as the income stream for the investors. 
 
Figure 2.2: Structure and cash flows of murabahah sukuk 
 
Lease-based sukuk 
Fixed return payments to investors are justified under the lease-based contract since the 
income realised is in the form of rent. Leasing structure in Islamic finance is known as ijarah, 
which is defined as the transfer of ownership of permitted usufruct for a known period in 
exchange for a compensation (Saleem, 2012). Ijarah is applicable in a transaction where an asset 
(e.g., equipment) is hired by another party, and when a transfer of the usufruct of an asset or a 
property (the right of enjoying the benefit of an asset) to another party in exchanged for a rent 
payment (Usmani, 2002). Hence, ijarah sukuk are the financial obligation issued by a lessor 
4. Sale of asset 
3. Purchase  
of asset  
 
 
5. Deferred payment 
6. Periodic  
distribution 
2. Sukuk proceeds 
1. Certificate issue 
Investors 
(buyer) 
SPV/ 
Trustee 
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which can be backed by physical assets or cash flows from the lease receivable from a lessee 
(Jobst, 2007). Unlike a conventional leasing, in an ijarah contract, the lessor must own the leased 
asset throughout the leasing period and is not allowed to charge compound interest on the delay 
of scheduled payments or if the lessee defaults (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011).  
Figure 2.3 illustrates an example of cash flows of lease-based sukuk. Once the desired 
amount of proceeds is raised through the issuance, the originator enters into a sale and purchase 
agreement with the SPV, pursuant to which tangible assets are purchased by the SPV at a price 
equivalent to the principal amount of the sukuk. The SPV then declares an English law trust over 
the acquired assets and thereby acts as a trustee on behalf of the investors who have a beneficial 
ownership interest in the assets. Under the lease agreement (ijara), the SPV as the trustee leases 
the assets back to the originator for a term agreed as the maturity of the sukuk. The periodic 
rental payment by the originator as the lessee of the assets is equivalent to the periodic 
distribution amount payable by the SPV to the investors. Upon maturity, under a sale undertaking 
and purchase agreement, the SPV sells, and the originator buys back the assets at a price 
equivalent to the principal amount plus any accrued and unpaid periodic distribution amount to 
the investors.  
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Figure 2.3: Structure and cash flows of ijarah sukuk 
 
Partnership-based sukuk 
Partnership in Islamic business contracts is widely accepted and promoted by Shariah 
scholars as it is viewed as the most viable means of promoting mutuality and justice in a business 
environment (Sarker, 1999). Modern partnership-based or equity-like sukuk have features that 
mostly resemble those of equity. However, unlike equity financing, partnership-based sukuk are 
the funding of a specific project for a finite period (Ariff et al., 2012).  
Partnership-based sukuk are commonly structured based on mudarabah and musharakah 
principles. In a mudarabah (silent partnership) contract, the investor (rabb al-mal) provides the 
capital for financing a business project or venture, and the issuer or manager (mudarib) is 
responsible for investing the capital as planned and managing the business project. The profit-
sharing ratio is set ex ante and applies once the project generates income. The investor, as the 
silent partner in this contract, receives a profit as a reward for the capital contributed, and the 
manager receives a profit share as a reward for her effort (Omar et al., 2013). The silent partner 
will bear any loss incurred unless the loss is due to the manager’s misconduct or violation of the 
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terms of the contract. The mudarabah principle clearly dictates that if the manager does not 
contribute any capital, he is thus not liable for the loss.  
In a musharakah contract, both the issuer and the investor contribute capital and 
management expertise to finance a business venture. However, in the case of sukuk, as the issuer 
typically manages the musharakah project, the contract can be referred to as a joint venture 
business arrangement. Unlike mudarabah contracts, every party in musharakah contracts has 
similar rights and liabilities. Therefore, the investor in a musharakah contract has the right to 
participate in the managerial decision making (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). Profit realised from 
the business venture will be shared by all contracting parties on the basis of a predetermined ratio 
according to the respective amount of contribution in capital and management. It is interesting to 
note the risk sharing concept in a partnership contract − the Shariah principle of partnership 
establishes that loss, if any, is to be borne according to the amount of capital contributed.  
Figure 2.4 depicts an example of partnership-based sukuk under the mudarabah principle. 
The execution of the contract begins with the issuance of sukuk by an SPV and the subscription 
by investors. Under a mudarabah agreement, the issuance proceeds raised serve as the mudarabah 
capital to be channelled to the investment projects identified by the originator. Profits generated 
by the investment project are distributed between the originator and the SPV according to the pre-
agreed profit sharing ratio. The SPV receives and holds the profits as a trust and thereby makes 
periodic payments to the investors. Upon maturity, the venture will be dissolved with the 
originator’s purchase of mudarabah investment interests from the SPV. The proceeds from this 
purchase undertaking are then used by the SPV to pay the principal amount contributed by the 
investors.      
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Figure 2.4: Structure and cash flows of mudarabah sukuk 
 
 
2.3.5 Sukuk issuance process and parties involved 
In the pre-issuance phase, the originator, also known as the project sponsor – the firm that 
seeks to raise capital through sukuk – identifies the assets or projects and sets up an SPV to 
facilitate the transaction. The SPV represents as an issuer on behalf of the originator and a trustee 
of sukuk assets on behalf of the sukuk holders (Bassens et al., 2012). The originator will then 
appoint a lead arranger, either a commercial bank or an investment bank, which serves as the 
financial advisor and the manager of the contract. The lead arranger works closely with the 
originator in designing the sukuk contract and preparing the issuance proposal. Table 2.2 shows 
the list of top 10 banks and their respective market share in the debt market in Malaysia for the 
14-year period. CIMB, Maybank, and AmInvestment have been taking top spots in the 
Bloomberg league table for domestic sukuk arrangers. These conventional banks were joint lead 
arrangers for foreign sukuk issuers, including Islamic Development Bank, Sabana REIT, and HM 
Treasury UK Sovereign Sukuk PLC.  
The next step involves the appointment of a Shariah advisor. In light of the flexibility in the 
design of sukuk contracts, market regulators have mandated a formal inclusion of sukuk 
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screening by recognised Shariah experts to ensure that the proposed terms and mechanisms under 
the specified structure comply with Islamic commercial law. 
 
Table 2.2: Top 10 sukuk lead arrangers for the 2001 – 2014 period 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
The Shariah advisor reviews and provides a letter of opinion or pronouncement on the 
compliance status of the sukuk (Ariff et al., 2012). The Shariah advisors’ pronouncement is 
authoritative to the extent that their refusal to endorse a structure would lead to an amendment of 
the contract by the lead arranger. Over the years, the market has perceived the importance of 
Shariah advisors’ reputation as a credible signal of Shariah compliance of sukuk (Godlewski et 
al., 2014). Table 2.3 lists the top 10 Shariah advisors in the sukuk market based on the number of 
deals endorsed. Dr. Mohammad Daud Bakar, who is currently chairing the Shariah Advisory 
Council (SAC) at the Central Bank of Malaysia, has personally endorsed the highest number of 
sukuk issues in Malaysia. Sheikh Dr. Nizam al Yaqubi, one of leading scholars in Islamic 
Arranger Volume (MYR Million) No. of Sukuk Market Share (%)
CIMB Investment Bhd. 128,344.31 962 29.84
Maybank Investment Bank Bhd. 84,872.41 780 19.73
AmInvestment Bank Bhd. 72,113.47 649 16.77
RHB Investment Bank Bhd. 46,339.12 706 10.79
HSBC Bank Bhd. 23,252.34 316 5.41
Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd. 9,815.25 115 2.28
Standard Chartered Bank Bhd. 7,951.63 126 1.85
OCBC Bank Malaysia Bhd. 7,480.31 158 1.74
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd. 6,058.87 257 1.41
United Oversease Bank Bhd. 4,353.00 103 1.01
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finance, is recognised by Bloomberg as, “the gatekeeper to the $1 trillion market for managing 
Muslim wealth.”22 
Further, the lead arranger may invite other banks as a primary subscriber and form a 
syndicate. As in a syndicated loan arrangement, the lead arranger may appoint a joint lead 
manager or co-manager on behalf of its client to share the monitoring and administration tasks of 
the contract.  
In line with capital market regulators’ effort to safeguard the interest of investors, the lead 
arranger on behalf of the originator will appoint a third-party trust company or trustee. The role 
of the trustee, as spelled out in the trust deed agreement, is to ensure that the SPV discharges its 
payment obligation in a timely manner. The trustee generally plays a passive role in the issuance 
process, but an active part in the event that the SPV breaches the return payment obligations. 
Upon confirmation of sukuk terms, the lead arranger and a team of lawyers (solicitors) 
conduct due diligence on the originator. Once all necessary information for legal documentation 
is verified, and the due diligence process comes to the conclusion that the proposed sukuk 
structure is feasible, the lead arranger prepares and submits an issuance application to the capital 
market authority for issuance approval.  
Following issuance approval, the lead arranger and the originator jointly prepare an 
information memorandum and put sukuk into circulation. An information memorandum contains 
detailed information about the originator as well as the terms of the sukuk.23 During the 
marketing phase, sukuk terms and structures may be negotiated and then finalised with potential 
investors, with advice from the Shariah advisor (Ariff and Mohammed, 2012). The lead arranger 
then formally appoints other financial institutions that agree to participate in the financing 
                                                 
22See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a.DsH16oTM6U 
23 Typical sukuk terms presented in an information memorandum include details of the parties involved in the 
proposed transaction, facility description, details on utilisation of proceed, and so forth.  
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syndicate and allocates the remaining sukuk shares to them. Following completion of the above 
steps, the sukuk deal becomes operational and is made binding upon the originator, the SPV, and 
the certificate holders to the contract. 
 
Table 2.3: Top 10 Shariah advisors for the 2001 – 2014 period 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
 
2.5 Shariah Non-compliance Concerns Surrounding Sukuk Practice 
The religious dimension is an integral part of the marketing effort of the Islamic capital 
market. In structuring sukuk contracts, a dividing line needs to be drawn between financial 
innovations and deviations from Shariah principles. Rosly (2010) outlines four parameters 
Shariah scholars need to observe in determining whether a financial contract is Shariah-
compliant, and argues that they must be considered as complementary to one another. The first 
parameter is the contract (‘aqad) approach, where an instrument is deemed Shariah-compliant if it 
Shariah Advisor Country No. of Sukuk
Dr. Mohammad Daud Bakar Malaysia 349
Sheikh Dr. Nizam Mohammed Saleh Yaqubi Bahrain 233
Sheikh Dr. Yousef Abdullah Al Shubaily Saudi Arabia 190
Dr. Mohammad Hashim Kamali Malaysia 186
Sheikh Dr. Shafaai Musa Malaysia 186
Dr. Ahcene Lahsasna Malaysia 117
Dr. Ismail Mohammed Abu Hassan Malaysia 116
Dr. Hj. Harussani Hj. Zakaria Malaysia 104
Dr. Mohammad Deen Mohd.  Napiah Malaysia 89
Dr. Hj. Mohd. Na'im Hj. Mokhtar Malaysia 75
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has fully satisfied the technical requirements of the contract.24 Maqasid al-Shariah is the second 
parameter used to evaluate Shariah compliance of a contract in terms of its socio-economic costs 
and benefits. This approach is derived from two general purposes of Shariah, namely, “the 
securing of benefit and the repelling of harm” (Rosly, 2010, p. 135). Accounting and financial 
reporting approaches are the third parameter necessary to ensure that a financial contract is free 
of ambiguities (gharar) and fraud or short-changing (tatfeef) through complete disclosure. The 
fourth and final parameter is the legal documentation of a contract, where Shariah compliance 
screening aims to ensure that the rights and obligations of contracting parties expressed are 
enforceable in a way that is consistent with the Islamic principles of sukuk. 
Operating side by side with the conventional bond market, balancing the religious 
requirements and market realities remains a challenging task faced by sukuk practitioners 
(Muhammad and Sairally, 2013). The lure of the enormous potential of Islamic capital markets 
and the breadth of the concept of sukuk have allowed for experimentation and errors in contract 
design. The innovation and practice of several questionable contract mechanisms25 have raised 
strong criticisms among Shariah scholars. A widely cited criticism is the one made by Sheikh 
Muhammad Taqi Usmani, the president of AAOIFI Shariah board, in November 2007 that almost 
85 percent of sukuk (equity-like structure) contracts in the market do not comply with Shariah 
principles. His criticism concerns mainly with the following three questionable practices: i) sukuk 
holders do not have ownership in the underlying assets; ii) the regular return payment to sukuk 
holders is not based on the performance of the underlying assets; and iii) the use of purchase 
undertaking and liquidity facility to guarantee the principal amount and return payment to the 
                                                 
24 The technical requirements of the contract may vary from one contract to another. For example, as illustrated by 
Laldin (2013), the bank is required to disclose the price and the markup for the asset in a murabahah contract, 
whereas this is not required in a salam contract.  
25The formal guidelines provided by the Shariah authority in Islamic finance, such as the AAOIFI and IFSB, only 
address the general requirements and features of sukuk contracts. 
38 
 
investors. Concerns about the prevalence of these practices were also raised by other prominent 
Shariah scholars, leading to the release of AAOIFI Shariah resolution on sukuk in 2008, which 
clarifies the permissible structure as well as the nature of issuer-investor rights and obligations.  
The Shariah compliance issues accompanying the development of the sukuk market have 
attracted a significant amount of research which can be divided into three discussions: i) asset-
based versus asset-backed – an issue of investors’ ownership right in the sukuk assets; iii) 
purchase-undertaking and liquidity-facility in equity-like sukuk; and iii) bay al-inah (sale with an 
immediate repurchase) in debt-like sukuk.  
From an Islamic finance perspective, asset-backed sukuk are closer to the principle of 
Shariah, both in form and substance, because they involve a genuine legal transfer of the asset, 
and the return distribution to investors is directly linked to the performance of the asset (Radzi 
and Lewis, 2015). Nevertheless, asset-backed sukuk remain unpopular despite increasing 
advocacy for their practice. Based on the data of sukuk deals retrieved from Bloomberg, only 11 
out of 618 deals of sukuk issued between 2001 and 2014 were categorised as asset-backed. 
Researchers attribute this trend to investors’ aversion and unwillingness to be exposed to real 
economic risks associated with the underlying assets as well as enforceability issues due to 
inconsistency between Shariah and conventional law (Dusuki and Mokhtar, 2010).  
In contrast, asset-based sukuk grant only beneficial ownership in the assets. Thus, 
underlying assets in this type of sukuk contract serve more as creditors’ securities rather than the 
source of cash flows. In most cases, returns are derived from other contracts devised to ensure a 
smooth payment to the investors (Maurer, 2009). Dusuki and Mokhtar (2010) report the use of 
assets in asset-based sukuk meets the ownership requirement only in form but not in substance. 
Assessing 47 selected sukuk issuance term sheets, they note that most sukuk contracts violate the 
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Shariah-compliant requirement that sukuk must represent ownership in the underlying assets. In 
particular, they find that secured sukuk holders only have a security interest in the collateral, but 
not an ownership interest in the assets. 
The second controversy relates to the use of purchase undertaking and liquidity facility in 
mudarabah and musharakah sukuk which, according to Shariah scholars, violates the PLS 
principle (Dusuki, 2010). A purchase undertaking agreement provides assurance to the investors 
that, upon maturity or in the event of default, the originator will buy back the underlying assets at 
a price equivalent to the principal amount (nominal value) contributed by the investors.  On the 
other hand, liquidity-facility provision is an undertaking by the originator to make up for any 
shortfall in the actual return below the expected rate. The use of these two mechanisms renders 
sukuk similar to conventional fixed income securities in terms of the return distribution. In its 
2008 resolution, the AAOIFI clarified that mudarabah and musharakah structures are intended to 
be similar to equity-based instruments. Therefore, the return on investors’ capital cannot be 
guaranteed and pre-determined. 
The third controversial practice, bay al-inah, has been widely practiced in the Malaysian 
market in murabahah sukuk in order to create indebtedness. The bay al-inah contract involves the 
sale of an asset by the borrower to the creditor in exchange for cash (spot payment), to be 
followed immediately by a sale of the same asset by the creditor at a higher price on a deferred-
payment basis. The Shariah authorities of the Central Bank of Malaysia and the Securities 
Commission Malaysia adopt the ruling of the Shafi’i school which recognises the validity of bay 
al-inah. However, according to the majority of Shariah scholars in the Middle East who base their 
opinion on the Hanafi school, this practice is not acceptable since it violates the sale principle due 
to the absence of ownership interest in the assets (Rosly and Sanusi, 2001). More directly, most 
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scholars reject bay al-inah because it is a clear trick to circumvent the religious prohibition of riba 
– the profit earned by the creditor from the difference between the spot and deferred payments is 
deemed similar to the interest earned on a conventional debt contract. To attract greater global 
interest in the Malaysian sukuk market, the capital market regulators of Malaysia have been 
advocating other alternative mechanisms to create indebtedness in sale-based sukuk structures, 
notably tawarruq.26 
With a series of controversies involving dubious Shariah-practices in the sukuk market, it is 
tempting to question the incentives for Shariah advisors, who are ultimately responsible for 
screening and endorsing the contract, to consent to a ‘dilution’ of Shariah compliance in sukuk. 
The preceding discussion in this chapter indicates that the compromises made by Shariah 
advisors may well be in part a response to high investor demand for securities of this type. 
Indeed, in an interview with Reuters following the controversial pronouncement by Sheikh Taqi 
Usmani, the AAOIFI board member Sheikh Mohamed Ali Elgari responded that, “some Shariah 
boards have overlooked the repurchase clause (referring to equity-like sukuk) to allow the 
industry to develop, but it is now time to review standards.”27 It is also important to note that 
practitioners’ efforts in dealing with the market reality in Shariah-compliant manners have been 
complicated by the lack of Shariah resolutions on the practical aspects of sukuk arrangements 
(Al-Amine, 2008). This shortcoming in the Shariah authority has created uncertainties as to what 
is Shariah-compliant and what is not, thereby exposing the market to Shariah compliance risk.  
 
 
                                                 
26 Unlike bay al-inah, tawarruq is a tri-partite transaction where a broker or an intermediary is appointed by both 
issuer and creditor to exercise the sale and purchase of sukuk assets. Such an arrangement is approved by the 
AAOIFI.  
27See http://www.arabianbusiness.com/most-sukuk-not-islamic-body-claims-197156.html#.VhZOgZckrwA 
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2.6 The Sukuk Market in Malaysia  
Malaysia is perhaps the best example of a vibrant and resilient sukuk market. Following 
two landmark sukuk issues at the beginning of 2000s,28 the sukuk market in Malaysia has been 
actively operating side by side with the conventional bond market. With the exception of Shariah 
compliance regulation for sukuk issuance, both markets are governed by the same capital market 
regulations, providing the same degree of clarity, certainty, and protection for the market 
participants (DeLorenzo, 2011).  
An active corporate sukuk market, which is an area continued to be led by Malaysia, is the 
fruit of the regulatory initiatives by the Securities Commission of Malaysia and Bank Negara 
Malaysia (the Central Bank of Malaysia). The sukuk promotion initiative is a part of the 
government strategy to establish Malaysia as an international hub for Islamic capital market as 
outlined in the first ten-year Capital Market Master Plan (CMP1). The steady development of the 
sukuk market in Malaysia is further supported by the confluence of the increasing demand for 
Shariah-compliant investment securities by Islamic banking and finance operators and country 
infrastructure and industrial developments (Bassens et al., 2012). 
Moving to the global hub position, the Securities Commission has played a significant role 
in ensuring appropriate accounting, tax, and issuance frameworks. Amendments to the Income 
Tax Act 1967 (ITA) and the Stamp Act (1949) provide tax neutrality where the profit derived and 
paid to investors from sukuk is treated in a similar way as interest from conventional bond 
issuance (Krasicka and Nowak, 2012). For a sukuk issuance to be approved by the Securities 
Commission, the issuers are required to provide complete information on both corporate 
                                                 
28 Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad, a plantation based conglomerate in Malaysia, issued the world first corporate sukuk 
worth USD150 million in 2001. The government of Malaysia issued the world first sovereign sukuk worth USD600 
million in the following year. 
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background and transaction details, and follow the documentation standards set out in issuance 
guidelines. These requirements correspond to the Securities Commission’s effort to improve 
transparency, and hence investor protection. Issues that satisfy these requirements can expect 
speedy approval from the Securities Commission.29  
It is also widely recognised by Islamic finance academics and practitioners that Malaysian 
Shariah committees adopt a relatively liberal interpretation of Shariah jurisprudence (fiqh) in 
Islamic finance (Bassens et al., 2012). The Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of Securities 
Commission, the Shariah standard setting body for the Islamic capital market in Malaysia, refers 
to all methodologies discussed by Islamic jurists from the four schools of Islamic thought (i.e., 
Shafi’i, Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali) in their reasoning.30 This approach has allowed for active 
financial innovations in the initial development phase of the sukuk market. As practitioners 
become increasingly aware of sukuk structures, the Securities Commission periodically revises 
the Shariah-compliant related guidelines for sukuk with the aim of convergence with AAOIFI’s 
international standard for Islamic finance practice.  
A well-planned and an orderly development approach have helped Malaysia maintain its 
lead on sukuk issuance with the lion’s share of 80.9 percent in terms of the total number of 
domestic sukuk issued worldwide for the 2001 to 2014 period.31 At the local market level, the 
number of corporate sukuk issuance has rivalled that of conventional bonds both in issuance 
number and volume (BNM and SC, 2009).  
 
                                                 
29 The standard time frame for approval is within 14 working days from the date of receipt of required issuance 
documentations (Securities Commission, 2003). 
30 The four schools of Islamic thought, named after their founders, differ in their opinion on practical methodologies 
of how a specific issue in Muslim community should be addressed. However, the guidance provided by the jurists of 
each school is derived from their interpretation on the similar sources of Shariah (Abdal-Haqq, 2002). 
31 International Islamic Financial Market (IFIM) Sukuk Report (4th edition), November 2014, 
http://www.iifm.net/documents/iifm-sukuk-report-4th-edition 
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2.7 Chapter Summary 
The prohibitions of riba and gharar have had important implications for the regulation, 
design, and execution of sukuk contracts. In particular, the requirement of asset-backing renders 
sukuk a financing instrument which offers investors a rate of return that is tied to the profitability 
of the underlying asset(s), in contrast to conventional debt where the return is based on pure debt 
obligations. The cash flows and obligations of parties involved in sukuk contracts are also clearly 
earmarked in manners that comply with the Shariah prohibition of ambiguities in transactions. As 
one can see clearly, the application of the two major prohibitions in sukuk seek to promote 
transparency in commercial transactions and attenuate potential predatory practices that may 
make one party worse off. 
Articulating from both the theoretical and generic features of sukuk, this chapter showed 
that sukuk in many ways resemble project finance. This resemblance provides an interesting 
ground to test whether corporate adoption of sukuk financing is motivated by similar reasons 
conjectured for project finance. This test is the objective of the first enquiry of this thesis. 
Further, controversies surrounding sukuk structuring practice point to several shortcomings 
of the sukuk market in preserving Shariah compliance. Of importance, there remain uncertainties 
as to what is considered Shariah-compliant and what is not due to the lack of Shariah resolutions 
on the practical aspects of sukuk structuring. Standardising Shariah resolutions on sukuk have 
been complicated by the fact that sukuk are a flexible financial instrument of which design is not 
restricted to standard structures, and that Shariah scholars often differ in their opinions 
concerning the acceptability of certain structures.  
The institutional background of sukuk thus suggests the importance of credible certification 
of Shariah compliance as well as of the feasibility of sukuk to both the supply and demand sides 
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of the market. Certification effects in the sukuk market form the objective of the second enquiry 
of this thesis. 
Malaysia provides an excellent laboratory for the empirical examination of firms’ choice of 
sukuk given its active dual corporate bond market. An assessment of the certification role of 
principal parties involved in sukuk issuance in Malaysia is timely as the market is promoting the 
global convergence of the Shariah standards practice in order to attract international sukuk 
issuance (Jobst et al., 2008). 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
 
3.1  Introduction 
In the absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs, Modigliani and Miller (1958, henceforth 
MM) illustrate that a firm’s decision on financing structure does not affect its value. Although 
the source of funds that a firm may choose to finance an investment is irrelevant to the status 
of the investment (worth undertaking or not), MM acknowledge that the preference for one 
type of financing over another is relevant under certain circumstances. They contribute an 
early idea as to what makes financial instruments differ from each other:  
“… we would expect the market to place very heavy weight on current and recent past 
earnings in forming expectations as to future returns. Hence, if the owners of a firm 
discovered a major investment opportunity which they felt would yield much more than 
(the cost of capital), they might well prefer not to finance it via common stock at the 
then ruling price, because this price may fail to capitalise the new venture. Another 
reason … managers are concerned with more than simply furthering the interest of the 
owners. Such other objectives of the management … are much more likely to be served 
by some types of financing arrangements than others” (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 
pp. 292 – 293). 
An implication of this statement is that the decision to issue a particular type of security 
is a rational response to the firm’s management to prevailing market conditions and 
managerial objectives. MM’s theoretical work, however, provides no guidance on the 
determinants of the optimal capital structure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Relaxing the 
assumption of a perfect capital market, later theoretical works extend MM’s propositions to 
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consider the effect of market frictions, and show that factors such as agency costs, taxes, 
transaction costs, and bankruptcy costs motivate the use of a particular security.  
This chapter provides a review of the literature on security choice and the role of key 
parties involved in the issuance process in minimising the impact of capital market frictions. 
It is organised into four sections. Section 3.2 presents a discussion of previous studies on the 
determinants of sukuk issuance. To aid our understanding of the factors that motivate the 
corporate use of sukuk, Section 3.3 discusses the literature on asset-based structured finance 
with a primary focus on project finance, which sukuk resemble most in terms of the technical 
structures. This is followed by an overview of the literature on financing structure choice in 
Section 3.4 and on the impact of external agents’ certification on security pricing in Section 
3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 summarises and concludes this chapter. 
 
3.2  Determinants of Sukuk Issuance 
Empirical research on issuers’ motivation to issue sukuk remains distinctly thin and has 
thus far been confined to testing traditional capital structure theories, in particular, the pecking 
order and trade-off theories. To the best of our knowledge, Nagano (2010) provides the first 
empirical contribution to our understanding of this issue. Referring to the debt-equity hybrid 
feature of sukuk, Nagano (2010) argues that the choice of sukuk is influenced by factors that 
explain both debt and equity issuance. He thus predicts that the information cost arising from 
the profit sharing feature of sukuk is between that of conventional debt and common equity. 
This prediction leads him to test whether there is a funding hierarchy where sukuk is chosen 
prior to common equity but is subordinated to normal debt finance, as implied by the pecking 
order theory. Contrary to the prediction, results from a panel tobit analysis of a sample of 76 
listed sukuk issuers in Malaysia suggest that sukuk are chosen prior to conventional bonds 
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and are independent of a firm’s internal fund (profitability). Nagano (2010) interprets this 
finding to suggest that the decision to issue sukuk does not always depend on information 
cost. His analysis instead indicates that firm size and previous sukuk issues are two important 
determinants of firms’ current sukuk issuance decision.  
Shahida and Saharah (2013) extend Nagano’s (2010) study to consider the influence of 
leverage and tax incentives on sukuk issuance. Based on the agency explanation offered by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), they deduce that existing leverage would best represent firms’ 
current funding ability in a test of the pecking order theory as it reduces the need for external 
equity. Using a sample of 79 public listed firms that issued bonds from 2001 to 2010, they 
find both measures of internal funding availability, profitability and leverage, do not 
significantly explain firms’ sukuk issuance decision. Their results are consistent across three 
different estimation methods, namely ordinary least square (OLS), fixed effects, and random 
effects analyses. Consistent with the trade-off theory, they find the tax exemption received by 
firms is positively related to sukuk proceeds.  
Using the partial adjustment model to test the determinants of sukuk issuers’ target debt 
ratio, Mohamed et al. (2015) also find no evidence that profitability has an influence on the 
sukuk issuance decision for a sample of 80 public listed sukuk issuers from 2000 to 2012. 
This finding further reinforces Nagano’s (2010) inference that firms issue sukuk regardless of 
the availability of internal funds. Contrary to the findings documented by Nagano (2010) and 
Shahida and Saharah (2013), Mohamed et al. (2015) find firm size has a negative and 
significant coefficient in their estimation.32 Additionally, growth opportunity, which they 
proxy using sales growth, is positively related to the sukuk-to-asset ratio. These findings thus 
lend some support to the pecking order prediction.  
                                                 
32 Mohamed et al. (2015) attribute differences in their results from past findings to the use of different 
econometric estimation methods. While empirical results reported by previous studies generally based on OLS, 
fixed, and random effect regressions, theirs are based on dynamic GMM estimations using instrumental 
variables. 
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Our understanding of the determinants of sukuk issuance is further supplemented by 
Azmat et al. (2014a) and Mohamed et al. (2015) through their investigation into issuers’ 
choice of sukuk structure. Azmat et al. (2014a) note that different sukuk structures have 
different contractual requirements, which may affect firms’ decision differently. The 
structures of sukuk are classified into those that are secured against real assets (SARA) or 
lease-based sukuk; Islamic joint ventures (IJV); or debt-based. The priority claim of the 
SARA structure is assumed to commensurate with that of conventional collateralised debt. 
Arguing from the pecking order theory, Azmat et al. (2014a) predict that firms with higher 
leverage and growth opportunity will prefer IJV to SARA and debt-based sukuk. However, 
those with higher leverage, lower profitability, and higher risk will prefer SARA to debt-
based sukuk. Results from a sample of 456 sukuk issues partially support their predictions. In 
particular, less profitable and risky firms choose SARA sukuk over debt-based sukuk. 
Contrary to prediction, they do not find that firms’ choice of IJV sukuk is affected by stock 
valuation (market to book ratio), a factor shown to influence common equity issuance in the 
corporate finance literature. Interestingly, recent study shows that this equity-like sukuk 
structure is associated with a higher issuance rating (Azmat et al. 2015), thus bolstering their 
conclusion that issuers focus more on providing a higher level of security to investors, with 
sukuk being treated differently from common equity.  
Mohamed et al. (2015) extend Azmat et al. (2014a) by testing the determinants of target 
debt ratio for firms that issue sukuk. Unlike Azmat et al. (2014a), sukuk structures are 
classified into exchange-based (debt-like) and partnership-based (equity-like) structures. Their 
results from standard generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimations show that debt-
like sukuk issuers are characterised by smaller and high growth firms. The positive relation 
between debt-like sukuk issuance and firms’ growth opportunity goes against the prediction 
of the pecking order theory, which is also supported by Azmat et al. (2014a). Firm size is the 
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only factor found to be significant in explaining firms’ use of equity-like sukuk. It has a 
negative sign. Mohamed et al. (2015) view this finding as supporting the pecking order theory 
since smaller firms, faced with a higher likelihood of bankruptcy, would prefer a profit 
sharing instrument. 
Several studies provide indirect evidence on the motivations for firms to issue sukuk by 
examining the stock market reaction to sukuk issuance announcements. Studies in this strand 
of the literature suggest that there are potential positive economic consequences to be realised 
from sukuk issuance, which motivate firms to raise capital through sukuk.  
Ibrahim and Minai (2009) and Mohd Ashhari et al. (2009) provide the earliest evidence 
from an event study of sukuk issuance. The former posit that sukuk issuance increases the 
issuers’ share price for the following reasons: i) investors perceive sukuk as an ethical 
financing choice; ii) sukuk attract both conventional and Islamic funds, and thus provide a 
cheaper source of financing; and iii) sukuk are typically used to finance new investments. 
Using a sample of 81 sukuk issued from January 2000 to June 2006 in Malaysia, Ibrahim and 
Minai (2009) find a significant positive cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for 
sukuk issuers for event windows (-3, 0) and (-3, 3) days surrounding the announcement of 
sukuk issuance. In comparison, no significant wealth effect is reported for a sample of 69 
conventional bond issues. The latter finding is in line with previous studies in the U.S. (e.g., 
Dann and Mikkelson, 1984; Eckbo, 1986; and Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). They infer that 
sukuk issuance enhances the Shariah-compliant status of the issuer thereby attracting demand 
for its stock which in turn leads to an increase in share price. However, further investigation 
using cross-sectional regressions does not validate this inference. The positive market reaction 
to sukuk issuance announcement appears to be significantly influenced by firm size and 
investment opportunity. 
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Similarly, Mohd Ashhari et al. (2009) document a significant positive CAAR for event 
windows (-1, +1) and (0, +1) days surrounding the announcement of sukuk issuance. There is 
no wealth effect documented for conventional bond issuance within three days of the issuance 
announcement. However, in an extended window of (0, +7) days, the CAAR for conventional 
bond issuance is larger than for sukuk issuance. Results from multivariate regressions show 
that issue size is the only significant determinant of the wealth effect of sukuk issuance. 
Specifically, they find that larger sukuk issue size is associated with a negative wealth effect, 
and explain that this is due to the increased default risk which is undesirable to shareholders. 
Drawing from his results of insignificant relation between information cost and sukuk 
issuance decision, Nagano (2010) resorts to testing the implication of the trade-off theory 
which predicts that firms issue sukuk due to other benefits. Nagano (2010) examines two such 
benefits, which are an increase in firm value and product market performance. Results from 
the event study and the total factor productivity analysis confirm their prediction.33 In 
particular, sukuk issuers are associated with more positive stock returns surrounding the 
issuance announcement, and higher average total factor productivity.  
The finding of a positive stock market reaction to sukuk issuance announcements is 
refuted by recent studies. For a sample of 77 sukuk and 93 conventional bonds issued between 
2002 and 2009, Godlewski et al. (2013) show the CAAR for sukuk issuers is significantly 
negative for various event window lengths surrounding the announcement day. The CAAR 
for conventional bond issues is positive but is not significant. They offer two explanations for 
the negative market reaction to sukuk issuance. First, the high demand for Shariah-compliant 
financial instruments by IFIs makes it easier for firms to raise funds through sukuk, including 
firms that are weak financially. Comparing the characteristics of sukuk issuers and 
conventional bond issuers, they observe sukuk issuers are on average smaller, more indebted, 
                                                 
33 A standard event study methodology is used to estimate abnormal returns for event windows of (-1,1), (-
10,10), and (-20, 20) days. Total factor productivity regression is based on time series data between 2002 and 
2006. 
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and less profitable than conventional bond issuers. Second, without explicitly testing the 
impact of sukuk structure on the cumulative returns, they reason that only firms with the 
lowest return expectation are motivated to issue sukuk because the profit and loss sharing 
structure allows managers to minimise the firm’s loss if the project failed. Therefore, the 
stock market does not react positively to the announcement of sukuk issuance due to the 
adverse selection problem.  
Alam et al. (2013) find results parallel to Godlewski et al. (2013) in an event study of a 
sample of 79 sukuk and 87 conventional bonds issued in several countries (Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Pakistan, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar) during the 2004-2012 period. In 
partitioning the sample into the pre-, during, and post-crisis periods, they find the stock 
market reaction to the announcement of sukuk issuance varies with economic conditions. 
Specifically, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of sukuk and conventional bond issuers 
are significantly negative during the crisis period, with sukuk issuers having a greater 
percentage of negative CARs than conventional bond issuers. However, the CARs are 
significantly positive for sukuk issuers and insignificant for conventional bond issuers in the 
post-crisis period. Further investigation using a multivariate analysis shows that the market 
reaction to sukuk issuance announcements is negatively related to issue size and free cash 
flow. The former corroborates the finding of Mohd Ashhari et al. (2009). 
The preceding empirical studies show that conventional capital structure theories can 
only partly explain firms’ motivation to use this financial instrument, perhaps owing to the 
unique institution of sukuk. The conflicting findings to the predictions of capital structure 
theories motivated Mohamed et al. (2015) to conduct an interview session with the main 
parties involved in sukuk issuance. In particular, they aim to obtain from the interviews a 
practical insight into their findings on why smaller and high growth firms are more likely to 
issue sukuk. The explanations from the practitioners point to the features of sukuk, 
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particularly the asset requirement, as well as favourable market conditions such as 
competitive pricing, tax incentives, and greater access to funding. Reconciling their results 
with the practitioners’ insights, Mohamed et al. (2015) conclude that sukuk offer some unique 
“benefits” to the issuers that cannot be explained through the lenses of conventional finance 
theories. 
 
3.3  Determinants of Firms’ Use of Asset-based Structured Financing 
Extant literature on the motivation for the use of asset-based structured financing 
arrangements mainly emerges within the context of project finance. An early study by Shah 
and Thakor (1987) highlights the signalling benefits of project finance. They argue that firms 
use project finance for risky investments to minimise the cost of revealing private 
information. The separation of the project company from the originator, in particular, allows 
creditors to evaluate the cash flow generation capability of the specific project without co-
mingling it with the cash flows from other assets belonging to the originator. This financing 
structure, as their model demonstrates, results in lower information production costs and 
higher leverage.  
Viewing from the perspectives of managerial ability and control benefits, Chemmanur 
and John (1996) contend that signalling alone cannot explain the existence of project finance. 
Relaxing the asymmetric information assumption, they show that limited-recourse project 
financing is an optimal choice of financing structure in terms of realised corporate control 
benefits. 
With the exception of the above studies, the agency-based explanation forms a major 
part of the project finance literature. A group of studies model firms’ choice of project finance 
as a function of the agency cost of debt. Analysing the role of seniority and dividend 
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covenants in controlling adverse investment incentives, Berkovitch and Kim (1990) note the 
effectiveness of project finance in minimising the agency costs associated with risky debt 
under the symmetric information assumption. Comparing the form of seniority across various 
debt arrangements, they derive that the optimal ex ante seniority rule is to raise debt through 
project finance which offers new debt holders a first claim on the project assets, but without 
recourse to existing assets. Separating investment assets and their cash flows from the existing 
ones can minimise potential wealth transfers between shareholders and existing debt holders, 
and hence the agency cost associated with adverse investment incentives. 
In a similar spirit, John and John (1991) and Flannery et al. (1993) show that project 
finance can lead to an optimal capital allocation, which results in a reduction in agency costs 
and an increase in the value of tax shield. In contrast to Berkovitch and Kim (1990), John and 
John (1991) present their model under asymmetric information between firm insiders and 
outside investors. In their model, underinvestment incentives of risky debt instead of risk-
shifting incentives are the source of agency conflicts. Using a theoretical agency approach 
adapted from Myers (1977), they illustrate that project finance can mitigate the 
underinvestment problem through the flexibility in allocating debt individually to separate 
projects in different states. This, in turn, leads to increased investment incentives and tax 
shields. Flannery et al. (1993) provide a similar conclusion when underinvestment, asset 
substitution, and corporate tax are considered.    
Articulating the salient features of project finance, several studies highlight the 
monitoring mechanisms of project finance. Brealey et al. (1996) analyse the rationales for the 
unique characteristics of project finance in the context of infrastructure projects. They 
illustrate that a network of contractual arrangements in project finance can mitigate agency 
problem, and serve as a risk management tool for firms to distribute project-related risks to 
parties that can best evaluate and manage them. Esty (2003) analyses a number of case studies 
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and derives that the separation of project assets and extensive contracting allow firms to 
create asset-specific governance and to achieve high leverage. The contract governance is 
further assured by a private monitoring mechanism, where a syndicate of banks act as lenders 
and project sponsors as equity holders of the project (Brealey et al., 1996; Esty, 2003). 
Together, this system effectively limits managerial discretion, hence minimising the agency 
costs of corporate financing (Finnerty, 2013).  
The body of literature that tests the empirical implications derived from early theoretical 
works on project finance remains thin, mainly due to data availability. Examining the role of 
project finance as a driver of economic growth for a sample of 90 countries for the 1991-2005 
period, Kleimeier and Versteeg (2010) posit that the contractual structure of project finance 
can substitute for poor financial market development and corporate governance. The 
flexibility of project finance allows a project to be structured to meet a specified investment 
objective and to deal with potential conflicts created by adverse managerial incentives and 
legal constraints. This encourages large scale investments by private sector firms thereby 
stimulating economic growth. Identifying the impact of project finance on low-, middle-, and 
high-income countries, they find that project finance (as a fraction of gross domestic product 
(GDP)) has a significant positive effect on economic growth only in low-income countries. 
Further tests show that an increase in the use of project finance from the 25th percentile to the 
75th percentile in low-income countries increases economic growth by 0.67 percentage points, 
thus confirming that project finance is growth-enhancing for countries with relatively weak 
financial development and governance. 
Corielli et al. (2010) examine whether the prevalent use of non-financial contracts 
(NFCs) in project finance leads to higher leverage on the ground that extensive contract 
design mitigates agency problems and serves as an effective risk management mechanism. 
Using a large sample of project finance loans in the U.S. between 1998 and 2003, they show 
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that the presence of NFCs, particularly operation and maintenance agreements, is positively 
associated with leverage. This evidence suggests the effectiveness of NFCs as a mechanism to 
control agency costs of debt and project risks.  
Building on the theory of debt expounded by Hart and Moore (1997),34 Subramanian et 
al. (2008) argue that the extensive contractual arrangements and private enforcement 
mechanisms in project finance make cash flows verifiable and collateral quickly seized by 
lenders. This setting decreases the probability that firms would default on their debt 
strategically and in turn results in an increase in debt capacity. Testing the choice between 
project finance and corporate debt finance across 39 countries, they find that firms with higher 
free cash flow are more likely to employ project finance than conventional debt. Alam (2010) 
provides a similar implication for a sample of 577 project finance originated by 440 U.S. and 
non-U.S. firms from 1990 to 2008. Testing the influence of cash flow measures on the 
likelihood of firms employing project finance relative to corporate debt finance, she finds that 
firms are more likely to use project finance when cash flow volatility and the correlation 
between originator’s and project’s cash flows are high. Further, results generated by firm-
level variables are not consistent with the agency cost of free cash flow argument, but support 
the signalling benefits of project finance.  
Mills and Newberry (2005) argue that financing incentives, such as the ability to access 
cost-effective conventional financing sources and favourable balance sheet reporting, are 
primary motivations for firms to use the complex and costly structure of financing. Using a 
sample of 559 U.S. firms, they examine the characteristics of firms that use structured finance 
and find these firms report greater interest expense on corporate tax returns than on financial 
statements, suggesting a tax motivation for structured financing arrangements. Consistent 
with the financing incentives argument, structured finance is employed by credit-constrained 
                                                 
34 Hart and Moore (1997) propose that when cash flows are not verifiable and thus prone to managerial 
expropriation, the debt capacity of a project becomes limited. 
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firms with poor credit ratings or which are highly leveraged. Such financing contracts, as they 
infer, are used by firms to obtain low-cost financing and to manage debt ratings.35 
Carlin et al. (2006) argue that minimising financing cost, an objective of hybrid 
securities issuance, is associated with regulatory arbitrage motive. Comparing the cost of 
capital of financial securities under the rise and fall states of share price, their analysis shows 
the debt-equity hybrid (i.e., convertible notes) offers greater benefits than conventional 
financing for poor performing firms. A further analysis of the financial statements of 22 
hybrid security issuers shows that regulatory arbitrage leads to a misclassification of these 
securities as equity instead of debt, which is deemed more appropriate. The misclassification 
provides a means to window-dress the balance sheet by enabling the firm’s leverage to be 
understated and earnings to be overstated.  
 
3.4  The Choice of Financing Structure 
The overview of sukuk institution in Chapter 2 shows that sukuk can be broadly 
classified into two financing structures. The first is the contract of exchange with a 
conventional debt payoff structure – the return is fixed, pre-determined, and distributed 
periodically. The second is the participatory contract with a number of conventional equity 
characteristics – investors are the owner of the venture, and profits or losses realised from the 
venture are shared among the contributing parties. Further, sukuk also differ in the structure 
of collateral security. To inform the analysis of sukuk issuers’ choice of these structures, this 
section discusses the related empirical works from the conventional financing market setting. 
Specifically, it reviews the literature that examines the determinants of debt-equity choice and 
                                                 
35 Some firms are willing to tolerate with high cost of debt financing in line with the lenders’ perception on their 
increased risk. Under off-balance sheet financial contracts, for example, the risk to the lenders is reduced through 
the bankruptcy remoteness of SPV (Mills and Newberry, 2005). 
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the use of collateral in debt contracts from the information asymmetry and agency cost 
perspectives.  
 
3.4.1 Islamic banking and finance: The debt-like versus equity-like structure debate 
Early literature in Islamic finance focuses on the promotion of outcome-based financial 
transactions through profit and loss sharing (henceforth, PLS), which is synonymous to 
holding an equity stake in a firm. To proponents of Islamic finance, the PLS-based (as 
opposed to interest-based) banking system is ideal as it is deemed efficient and welfare 
optimising for an Islamic economy.36 A number of Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Sudan, 
and Iran have made serious efforts to dissolve the conventional financial system after 
obtaining independence from British colonisation. Despite outlawing the interest-based 
system for Muslim borrowers and creditors, the practice of Islamic finance in these countries 
has in fact been dominated by debt-like structures, and the PLS principle has never been 
strictly applied (Zaher and Hassan, 2001). A similar trend is also observed among IFIs in 
Muslim jurisdictions with a dual financial system (Islamic and conventional), including 
Bahrain, Indonesia, and Malaysia.  
El-Hawary et al. (2004) and Warde (2010) observe that the debt-like structure – sale and 
lease-based transactions – can exceed 80 percent of Islamic banks’ assets portfolio. 
Consistently, Khan (2010) reports that three decades after the introduction of Islamic banking, 
there remains no discernible difference between Islamic and conventional banking apart from 
the former providing an Islamic identity to conventional financial transactions. He links this 
finding to the debt-like structure being less risky than the equity-like structure, and to the 
former’s ability to replicate the risk-return profile of conventional debts.                                                                                                                                
                                                 
36 A detailed survey of this literature is provided by Siddiqi (2006).  
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Borrowing from corporate finance theories, a growing body of Islamic banking and 
finance (IBF) research discusses the rationale as to why the debt-like structure is preferred to 
the equity-like structure. Dar et al. (1998) present a model of contract choice to examine the 
relation between investment size, profitability, and agency problems in partnership-based or 
PLS contracts. 37 They argue that a bank’s decision to extend credit through the PLS contract 
depends partly on the institutional environment in which it operates. In the presence of 
contractual incompleteness, potential moral hazard problems suggest high monitoring costs 
for PLS contracts. The model predicts that an increase in the size of investment has two 
possible effects: an increase in output and an increase in adverse incentives of the agent. 
Considering transaction and monitoring costs, the contract choice modelling reduces to an 
equation implying that PLS contracts are only feasible for medium-sized investment projects, 
while large and high-cost investments are likely to be financed through fixed-rate or debt-like 
contracts.  
Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) argue that the aversion to equity-like financing is due to 
moral hazard problems in developing countries where Islamic banks have to deal with firms 
whose managers are likely to misuse or divert funds to self-benefitted projects. Developing a 
model of optimal contracts under an incomplete contract setting, they derive the following 
implications: i) debt-like financing dominates equity-based financing as moral hazard 
increases. This coincides with the observation of corporate preference for debt-like 
instruments (e.g., murabahah and ijarah) over equity-like instruments (e.g., mudarabah and 
musharakah); ii) debt contracts will be short-term in nature and skewed toward low-cost 
projects, as supported by the increasing use of markup (murabahah) contracts in short-term 
                                                 
37 PLS is an arrangement between two or more parties who invest their capital, in this case Islamic bank 
(principal) and the borrower (agent) who identifies the project and is responsible to run the business project. 
Profit and loss are shared based on predetermined ratios, corresponding to their capital and effort contributions. 
The agency argument in this contract is that the borrower alone can observe the quality of the project and his 
own level of effort (Sarker, 1999). The borrower is assumed to have the incentive to divert investors’ funds and 
falsely report the profit realised due to limited liability clause where the investors who only contribute the capital 
are liable to the financial losses. 
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based trade and commerce financing compared to long-term based agriculture and real estate 
investments; and iii) funding for high-cost projects are extended to managers who can provide 
the means of lowering default risk. This partly explains the prevalent use of collateral in 
Islamic banks’ lending. They conclude that the observed lending practice of Islamic banks is a 
rational response to adverse selection and agency problems.  
Khan (2010) and El-Hawary et al. (2004) point to the poor information environment in 
jurisdictions where the majority of IFIs operate. They later note that there remains a lack of, 
“clarity and enforceability of property rights, the quality of contract law and an opportunity to 
bring prompt remedies to breaches, the efficiency of judicial recourse and other dispute 
resolution mechanisms” in developing Muslim countries (El-Hawary et al., 2004, p.35). Khan 
(2010) concludes that under these market conditions, collateralised debt structures are 
preferable to equity-like structures to minimise information asymmetry and the ensuing 
agency costs. 
In the absence of strict regulatory controls, practitioners note the difficulty in adapting 
the ideal PLS financing mode to modern economic realities due to potential agency conflicts 
as managers may be tempted to, “privatize the profits and socialize the losses” (Warde, 2010, 
p. 164). The silent partnership nature of mudarabah, in particular, allows one party to take 
advantage of the other. For example, the manager (mudarib) may structure the contract in 
manners that allow her to transfer the risk to other participants or engage in high-risk projects 
since she is not committing her money in such a structure (Warde, 2010).   
 
3.4.2 Conventional debt-equity financing decision 
The influence of adverse selection and moral hazard problems on firms’ choice of 
financing structure has been explained in depth and breadth in the literature of conventional 
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capital structure. An overview of this vast literature can be organised into information-based 
and agency-based groups.  
 
Information-based explanations 
In their seminal paper, Myers and Majluf (1984) show that the cost of information 
asymmetry – mispricing of equity by less-informed investors – may cause managers to forgo 
potentially valuable investment opportunity if equity was the only source of external 
financing. Assuming that management works in the interest of existing shareholders, their 
model proposes that information asymmetry results in a financing decision that follows a 
hierarchy of preferences. In this pecking order, internal funds are the most preferred source of 
financing, and if external financing is required, firms will choose the less risky securities first, 
i.e., debt is preferred to equity (Myers, 1984).  
Some research extends the pecking order model to incorporate several other conditions 
of information asymmetry which may explain the choice between debt and equity. Narayanan 
(1988) analyses the financing decision in a setting where information asymmetry concerns 
with only new investment opportunities. While the implications of his model are consistent 
with the pecking order theory (i.e., debt is preferred to equity), the investment decision of 
firms is driven by a different factor, i.e., the potential Akerlof’s (1970) lemons problem in the 
market. The model implies that when the market is unable to differentiate firm quality, the 
pooling equilibrium of equity price results in above-average quality firms being undervalued 
and below-average quality firms being overvalued. The overvaluation of equity issues by 
investors will result in negative net present value (NPV) investments being undertaken. To 
alleviate this problem, the model proposes the use of debt for ‘good’ firms to distinguish 
themselves from ‘bad’ firms. Since debt is risky in Narayanan’s (1988) specification, and due 
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to its fixed claim nature (bankruptcy cost is high for ‘bad’ firms), bad firms prefer to issue 
overvalued equity than issuing debt.  
Several studies show that under different considerations, information asymmetry may 
lead to a reverse pecking order (i.e., equity is preferred to debt). Bolton and Freixas (2000) 
develop an equilibrium model of the capital market which expands the choice of financing to 
include bank loans. They propose financing cost as the main driving factor for the financing 
choice: i) equity financing has no bankruptcy costs but has high dilution costs due to 
asymmetric information about firm quality; ii) bond financing has lower dilution costs, but a 
high level of debt will increase bankruptcy and liquidation costs; and iii) bank loans are a 
more expensive funding source due to bankruptcy, liquidation, and intermediation costs, but 
banks are able to restructure the contract and liquidate efficiently given their superior 
information about the borrower. If bankruptcy cost is the main concern given outstanding debt 
and equity in place, the equilibrium model suggests that information asymmetries about 
firms’ ability to meet financial claim leads to the following financing segmentation: equity 
becomes the feasible source of funds for high-risk firms that are unable to access debt 
financing; relatively safer firms prefer bank loans; and the safest firms raise funds from the 
bond market.  
Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) examine corporate financing choice based on information 
production cost associated with equity and risky debt issuance. Contrary to Myers and 
Majluf’s (1984) assumption of a constant degree of asymmetric information between the 
firm’s management and outside investors, their model considers the conditions when investors 
can produce (noisy) information. They extend the intuition of the pecking order model by 
showing that if specialised investors are willing to produce information about firm quality, 
firms are likely to issue more information-sensitive security (equity) than less information-
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sensitive ones (risky debt).38 This financing choice would benefit firms with high information 
asymmetry since an informative security price would reduce uninformed security trading. 
However, the preference for equity depends on the cost of information production and the 
precision of the information produced by specialised investors. 
Empirical evidence shows that information asymmetry does not necessarily cause the 
financing decision to follow the hierarchy proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984). In certain 
circumstances, information asymmetry drives firms to choose the most expensive and 
information-sensitive security (i.e., equity financing) rather than the safest one (i.e., debt 
financing). 
Fama and French (2005) argue that the information asymmetry associated with the 
standard equity is no longer an issue for firms if there are alternative ways of issuing equity at 
relatively lower information and transaction costs.39 Contrary to the pecking order theory, 
they find that firms characterised as being small in size, and having low profitability and high 
growth are more likely to issue equity to meet their financial needs. Gatchev et al. (2009) 
disaggregate financial deficits into investment in fixed capital and cash flow shortfalls. They 
find that small, high growth, and low profitability firms issue more equity to finance their 
investments in fixed assets and profit shortfalls. The use of equity is also prevalent for 
financing intangible assets (i.e., R&D and advertising ventures) and internally-induced 
investments, suggesting high contracting cost for debt associated with these financial needs. If 
a debt is chosen, these firms prefer short-term debt over long-term debt.   
The mixed evidence casts doubt on the ability of the pecking order theory to explain 
firms’ financing behaviour. This motivates a group of researchers to take a different approach 
                                                 
38 Specialised investors are those with access to information-production technology by which they are able to 
obtain information about the quality of the issuers. The cost of access to the firm’s information is to be borne by 
the specialised investors. The privileged knowledge about the quality of firms will then assist investors to decide 
whether to buy the security issued or to invest their remaining wealth (Fulghieri ands Lukin, 2001). 
39 The alternatives for subsequent equity offerings include stock issues to employees, right issues, and direct 
purchase plans. 
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by testing the core assumption of the theory that information asymmetry is an important 
(perhaps the sole) determinant of financing choice. Dittmar and Thakor (2007) develop a 
‘managerial investment autonomy’ theory based on the intuition that the financing decision 
depends on how it will affect the firm’s investment decision and thus the stock price. The 
theory predicts that managers issue equity at times when investors are likely to agree with the 
firm’s investment decision, i.e., when the stock price is high (low information asymmetry). 
They issue debt otherwise. For a large sample of equity and straight debt issues in the U.S. 
from 1993 to 2002, they provide supporting evidence for the prediction. Results from logistic 
regressions show that firms issue equity when stock price and agreement parameters are 
high.40 
Using a similar approach, subsequent empirical studies provide consistent evidence 
showing that firms with higher information asymmetry use more debt than equity financing 
(Agarwal and O’Hara, 2007; Autore and Kovacs, 2010; Bharath et al., 2009; Bessler et al., 
2011). For example, extending the empirical work of the studies mentioned above to an 
international sample, Bessler et al. (2011) find that firms are more likely to issue equity when 
they face lower adverse selection, and exploit windows of opportunities by issuing large 
amounts of equity following a decline in firm-level information asymmetry. Additionally, 
they observe differences in firms’ financing behaviour across legal institutions: equity 
issuance by firms in civil law countries is unresponsive to time variation in information 
asymmetry compared to equity issuance by firms in common law countries.  
Information asymmetry associated with the nature of the industry also influences the 
choice of external financing. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) argue that high-tech firms face 
high information costs due to the risky nature of R&D investments: i) the lower probability of 
                                                 
40 The proxies for agreement parameter in this study include the difference between actual earning and mean 
analyst forecast in the quarter prior to equity issuance, the number of consecutive quarters prior to equity 
issuance in which firms’ actual earnings exceed that of analyst forecast, and the abnormal returns of three-day 
surrounding firms’ acquisition (cash deal).  
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success in R&D projects means that the return on R&D investments is highly uncertain; ii) 
the difficulty faced by investors (creditors) in valuing R&D investments in which corporate 
insiders have superior information; and iii) high-tech investments normally have lower 
collateral value. They argue that the high risk and uncertainty of high-tech investments render 
a high cost of debt, and if the marginal cost of debt is sufficiently high, firms will opt for 
equity financing. Indeed, their findings show that equity is the primary source of external 
financing for high-tech firms.  
In sum, the preceding suggests that information asymmetry influences the debt-equity 
choice of firms in several ways, more than that highlighted by Myers and Majluf (1984). That 
is, information asymmetry also arises from firm characteristics, the type of financial need, and 
the nature of the industry wherein the firm operates.  
 
Agency-based explanations 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that agency problems can arise in a principal-agent 
relation due to potential conflicts of interests. The two types of agency conflicts they explain 
are the shareholder-manager conflict and shareholder-debtholder conflict.  
The shareholder-manager conflict arises because the manager (insider) has greater 
control over the firm’s resources but holds only a small fraction of the ownership. The 
separation of ownership and control will place outside shareholders at a disadvantage if 
managers pursue their self-interested decisions at the expense of shareholders.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that increasing the proportion of debt financing in 
the firm’s capital structure may mitigate the shareholder-manager agency conflict. Jensen 
(1986) and Stulz (1990) agree that due to its fixed claim nature, debt financing has the 
disciplining function that effectively enforces managers to pay out future cash flow and 
consequently reduces the amount of free cash available for managerial discretion. Harris and 
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Raviv (1990) further argue that the benefit of debt as a disciplining device is due to the 
consideration of potential default as debt offers lenders the option to force the borrower into 
liquidation. Debt financing is also associated with increased information disclosure regarding 
the firm’s operating decision and contractual payment ability – information that is useful for 
investors’ evaluation.  
Long and Malitz (1985), Friend and Lang (1988), and Crutchley and Hansen (1989) are 
among the early studies that test the implications of agency theory on debt and equity 
financing. Analysing investment-related agency problems, Long and Malitz (1985) highlight 
the effect of the investment type undertaken by firms on their financing decision. If the firm’s 
investment opportunities consist mainly of physical assets whose value and risk are 
observable, then it should be able to employ more debt as underinvestment or risk shifting 
behaviour is easier to predict. They examine the cross-sectional behaviour of 545 firms traded 
on the U.S. exchanges between 1978 and 1980. Results show that firms with greater earnings 
volatility and higher intangible investments (i.e., R&D and advertising) have lower debt, 
supporting the prediction that moral hazard problem plays a significant role in capital 
structure decision. 
Friend and Lang (1988) test whether managerial self-interest can explain firms’ capital 
structure decision. Specifically, they test the effect of ownership structure on management’s 
ability and desire to adjust the debt level. Since higher insider ownership is associated with 
lower agency conflicts, managers are better able to adjust the debt level to suit their interests. 
Examining a sample of 984 firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange from 1979 to 1983, 
they find a negative relation between the debt level and managerial insider ownership. 
However, the debt level is significantly higher for firms with higher outsiders’ shareholding, 
suggesting that the presence of substantial non-managerial ownership in the firm can better 
align the interests of managers with those of outside shareholders. 
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Crutchley and Hansen (1989) test the relation between the agency cost of both debt and 
equity and firms’ capital structure decision. Using proxies for agency cost in Long and Malitz 
(1985) and Friend and Lang (1988), among others, the results for a sample of 603 industrial 
firms from 1981 to 1985 support the agency theory implications. More precisely, they find 
earnings volatility is negatively related to leverage, and managerial stock ownership is 
negatively related to the degree of stock diversification. The study supports the implication in 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) where greater stock diversification induces greater managerial 
ownership and lower debt. 
Jung et al. (1996) argue that firms issue equity to benefit the management rather than 
the shareholders because equity enhances managerial discretion. Their results show that there 
are two types of equity issuers – firms that have valuable investment options, and firms that 
seek financing to grow profitably.  
Harvey et al. (2004) directly test the ability of debt to reduce agency cost of free cash 
flow for a sample of 1014 public listed industrial firms in 18 emerging countries. They use the 
ratio of the management group’s control rights to its cash flow rights to capture the potential 
agency conflicts associated with free cash flow. The cross-sectional analysis shows that the 
interaction term between cash flow rights leverage41 and debt ratio is positively related to firm 
value (Tobin’s Q). Cash flow rights leverage is also positively related to debt ratio, suggesting 
that firms issue more debts if they face higher agency conflicts due to the separation of 
management control and ownership. Results from their event study show that debt issues, 
particularly subsequent syndicated loans, generate positive abnormal returns. Adding to their 
primary finding, the abnormal returns associated with these loans are positively correlated 
with the cash flow right leverage measure. Overall, their study provides robust evidence 
                                                 
41 Harvey et al. (2004) construct this variable to measure the degree of separation between managerial cash flow 
rights ownership and control, which is defined as the ratio of the management group’s control rights to its cash 
flow rights.  
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suggesting that debt, especially those which are actively monitored, can mitigate agency costs 
associated with misaligned managerial incentives.  
While increasing the amount of debt can alleviate agency problems associated with free 
cash flow, it also gives rise to a shareholder-debtholder conflict arising from moral hazard 
problems of asset substitution and underinvestment. An increase in debt financing opens up 
the opportunity for asset substitution where the firm’s management extracts a return from the 
difference between the face value of the debt and the high return on risky projects. If the 
lender anticipates managerial incentive to transfer low-risk assets for high risk investment 
projects, the firm will receive a lower amount of debt than expected at the time of issuance 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since the lender does not have control over managerial 
decision, she is likely to demand a higher yield to compensate for asset substitution risk 
(Krishnaswami et al., 1999). The other type of agency cost of debt, the underinvestment 
problem, is discussed by Myers (1977) and Stulz (1990). The problem arises because of the 
fixed and seniority claim of debt while managers are assumed to always act in the interest of 
shareholders, the residual claimants. With the existing amount of debt that firms carry, 
managers are likely to give up some positive NPV projects if the expected cash flows are 
lower than the face value of the debt in order to serve shareholders’ interest (Myers, 1977).  
In what follows, the literature that examines the role of collateral in controlling this type 
of agency problem is reviewed.  
 
3.4.3 Collateral structure 
Collateral or security provision is an important component in structured and risky debt 
instruments like sukuk and project finance. Since assignable cash flow and high leverage are 
typical features of these types of financing, collateral provides the lender an assurance that the 
cash flow of the investment will sufficiently service the debt (Sorge and Gadanecz, 2010). 
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This section reviews the information- and agency-based explanations, and the empirical 
findings relating to firms’ decision to pledge collateral in their debt contracts. 
 
Information-based explanations 
Firms face two information problems when issuing debt, arising from investors’ 
uncertainty about the debt payoff distribution, and about the firm’s decision during the term 
of the debt contract (Triantis, 1992). Due to these information imperfections, investors are 
likely to undervalue the debt issuance. A common theme that runs through the extant 
theoretical discussion is that firms offer collateral or security interest in a debt contract in 
order to reduce information costs. In this sense, collateral serves as a reliable signal of a 
firm’s creditworthiness (e.g., Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; Triantis, 1992; Hill, 
1996).  
Adverse selection due to information asymmetry is likely to cause credit rationing. In 
his analysis of screening and rationing in the credit market, Bester (1985) shows that in 
equilibrium, where both low- and high-risk firms are pooled, low-risk firms that are able to 
provide sufficient amounts of collateral will do so to separate themselves from high-risk 
firms. Hill (1996) contends that low quality firms (i.e., high-risk and small firms), due to high 
uncertainties about their operation, are more likely to issue secured debt to reduce information 
costs compared to high-quality firms that are less likely to face credit constraints. 
Building a model based on the assumption of asymmetric valuation, Chan and Kanatas 
(1985) examine the signalling role of collateral in debt contracts. If the asymmetric valuation 
of debt arises from an information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender, collateral 
will serve as an information transmission device for the lender on the borrower’s expectation 
of the value of the investment. However, the borrower also balances the benefits and costs of 
the collateral, such as trading off a lower interest rate with a potential loss of the collateral 
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(Leeth and Scott, 1989). They show that the optimal level of collateral is increasing in project 
quality, suggesting that high-quality borrowers signal their creditworthiness by offering a 
higher level of security.  
In a similar vein, Igawa and Kanatas (1990) assume that an ex ante information 
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers on credit risk leads to the use of collateral or 
secured debt. Their model derives that, in equilibrium, firms of lowest credit quality are 
pooled and offer unsecured debt; medium-quality firms choose to sell assets and subsequently 
rent them for continued use; and firms of highest credit quality obtain financing through 
secured debt. It is also shown that the optimal secured debt contract involves over 
collateralisation which corresponds to the theoretical prediction in Bester (1985) and Chan 
and Kanatas (1985). 
Examining the rationale for the inclusion of covenants and collateral in debt contracts, 
Rajan and Winton (1995) note lenders’ incentives to gather additional costly information and 
to enforce appropriate action based on that information. Relative to short-term and long-term 
debt structures,42 offering collateral in debt contracts may incentivise the lender to monitor 
and promote an efficient use of unverifiable private information. In equilibrium, the lender’s 
action on collateral claims signals ‘bad’ information to other stakeholders, which may 
negatively affect the future cash flow of the firm. Accordingly, the lender will only claim 
collateral in the bad state to avoid negative externality on the firm’s cash flow in which it has 
a substantial stake. Their model suggests that secured debt is optimal for firms that need 
monitoring, such as poor performing firms.  
Notwithstanding the implications of the information effect of collateral, empirical 
studies on the use of secured debt are still limited and mostly focus on the U.S. context. Leeth 
                                                 
42 Short-term debt gives the lender greater flexibility to act based on the information gathered, but reduces the 
incentive to monitor even if the monitoring is socially beneficial. On the other hand, long term debt with 
covenants increases the lender’s incentive to monitor, but are less efficient as it limits the lender’s ability to act 
(until it has enough information that the covenants have been violated). 
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and Scott (1989) test the transaction cost theory of secured debt using a sample of over 1,000 
small business loans. Their results show the probability of offering secured debt decreases 
with default risk and increases with loan size and maturity, the marketability of assets, and the 
legal environment. The study generally supports the theoretical argument that collateral 
reduces borrowing costs. Testing the signalling hypothesis of debt priority structure choice for 
a sample of industrial firms on the COMPUSTAT from 1981 through to 1992, Barclay and 
Smith (1995) find a significant positive relation between firm quality and the fraction of 
secured debt to total fixed claims, where firm quality is measured by the firm’s abnormal 
future earnings. However, the economic impact is small, with every unit increase in firm 
quality increasing the fraction of secured debt by 2.5 percent.  
Berger and Udell (1998) examine the financing decision of small and medium firms in 
the U.S. They argue that the asymmetric information problem is severe among these firms 
whose business contracts are often private and less likely to be publicly visible or reported by 
analysts. Due to informational opacity, these firms are likely to face limited access to public 
debt. They observe that small- and medium-sized firms with valuable physical assets 
frequently borrow from private sources, and use these assets as collateral to back the loan 
contracts. The use of collateral is also positively associated with leverage for small firms in 
the U.K., as documented by Michaelas et al. (1999).  
Interestingly, Denis and Mihov (2003) find that collateral is also necessary for firms 
that access public debts. Results for 1,560 new debts issued between 1995 and 1996 show that 
the probability of public debt issue increases with the fraction of fixed assets. This finding 
partly supports the view that collateral helps lessen the effects of low credit quality.  
Chen et al. (1998) test the determinants of secured debt issuance among publicly listed 
firms in Singapore. Consistent with Barclay and Smith (1995), they find little support for the 
information asymmetry hypothesis that high-quality borrowers use more collaterals (secured 
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debt) to signal their quality or creditworthiness to lenders. Their results show that small firms 
with a greater chance of liquidation, a higher default risk, and greater information opacity use 
more secured debts than large firms. 
 
Agency-based explanations 
A large body of descriptive and theoretical studies exist to explain the relation between 
firms’ use of collateral and agency costs of debt mitigation. These studies suggest that 
collateral in debt contracts serves as a disciplining tool to control asset substitution and 
underinvestment problems. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that providing collateral reduces 
the total cost of debt as it makes asset substitution highly unlikely since the borrower cannot 
easily dispose of the pledged asset without the lender’s permission. This secures the lender’s 
claim, hence lowering the monitoring and enforcement costs that would otherwise be higher 
for unsecured debt (Smith and Warner, 1979; Mann, 1997).  
Stulz and Johnson (1985) propose that financing investment projects with secured debt 
can partly solve Myers’ (1977) underinvestment problem. Irrespective of the outstanding 
(unsecured) debt, offering security interest in a debt contract may reduce the anticipated cost 
of asset substitution. Mann (1997) identifies focusing on the lender’s monitoring of a 
particular asset and enhancing the effectiveness of loan covenants given the lender’s rights on 
the pledged assets as two mechanisms through which collateral can directly reduce 
managerial adverse incentive (i.e., asset substitution and underinvestment) and its associated 
costs. Therefore, collateral offers the lender more leverage on the borrower than normal debt 
as it can effectively control risky behaviour through the threat of loss that a borrower would 
bear if the lender exercises her rights (Mann, 1997; Scott, 1997). 
Long and Malitz (1985) assert that debt contracts are effective in dealing with 
underinvestment and asset substitution problems when a large fraction of firms’ investment 
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opportunity set comprises tangible assets. Their model implies that the presence of collateral 
allows debt holders to estimate firms’ underinvestment as well as asset substitution thereby 
promoting efficient monitoring on firms’ investments. The prediction follows that low growth 
firms with more tangible assets have greater debt capacity. To test this prediction, they 
perform a cross-sectional analysis on a sample of over 545 manufacturing firms listed on the 
U.S. stock exchanges. Results show that firms with tangible investments have higher financial 
leverage than those with intangible investments. This finding is robust to the inclusion of 
other factors that may influence financial leverage as suggested by earlier research.   
Hoshi et al. (1993) extend Diamond’s (1991) model to show that firms with an 
attractive investment opportunity set are more likely to issue public debt than bank loans and 
require less bank monitoring. An implication of their model is that firms that are well-
collateralised will choose public debt, presumably because issuing debt is relatively safer and 
cheaper if more of their assets can be used as collateral.  
Barclay and Smith (1995) provide preliminary empirical evidence on the determinants 
of firms’ use of secured debt. Testing several theoretical predictions on the variation in 
priority structure, results based on a sample of 4,995 U.S. industrial firms from 1981 to 1991 
consistently support the incentive contracting hypotheses, but weakly support the tax and 
signalling hypotheses. In particular, they document a positive relation between secured debt 
issuance and firms’ growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio). This finding is interpreted to 
suggest that firms with higher agency cost of debt prefer to finance their investments with 
high priority claims to limit wealth transfer and underinvestment problems. 
Drawing on the above theoretical studies, Nash et al. (2003) predict that firms with 
higher potential financial distress are more likely to include collateral provisions in their debt 
issuance. Results for a sample of 496 bonds issued by 310 firms over the 1989-1996 period 
support their prediction. Specifically, they find debt issues that include a covenant, which 
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requires firms to observe certain financial ratios and to avoid obtaining new financing during 
the current debt contract, tend to be secured. In contrast, high growth firms with a lower 
probability of financial distress issue debt without collateral provisions. They infer that such 
firms tend to preserve future flexibility in investment decision.  
Building on Stulz and Johnson’s (1985) argument that secured debt restricts asset 
substitution, Alderson et al. (2014) test the relation between the use of secured debt and the 
CEO’s risk appetite using a sample of 14,049 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2010. In 
line with Barclay and Smith (1995), they find that firms with higher growth opportunities 
issue more secured debt. Contrary to the prediction of Stulz and Johnson (1985), they find 
that firms employ less secured debt when their managers have high risk-taking incentives, but 
more secured debt when faced with high levels of managerial risk exposure, where the former 
is measured by vega, and the latter by delta. These firms also have greater short-term debt in 
their capital structure. Their finding suggests a substitution effect between secured debt and 
short-term debt in minimising agency costs of debt. 
Several studies examine the debt structure of firms in Japan, where regulation during 
the 1980s allowed firms to issue unsecured debts. Hoshi et al. (1993) test a sample of 536 
Japanese firms in the late 1980s and find that well-collateralised firms are more likely to issue 
public debt. This finding suggests that collateral can substitute for private monitoring. Hosono 
(2003) analyses the effect of growth opportunities and collateral on debt composition among 
176 Japanese machine manufacturing firms between 1990 and 1996. He finds that high 
growth opportunities and limited collateral induce firms to borrow privately from banks rather 
than from the public.  
Analysing a sample of debt issues that took place after the complete removal of binding 
regulations in the Japanese debt market in 1993, Shirasu and Xu (2007) find that firms with a 
higher fraction of tangible assets use more private debt than public debt. In the same vein, 
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Gan (2007) examines investment responses to the change in the collateral value in Japan, 
particularly due to the land-price collapse between 1990 and 1993.43 He conjectures that 
firms’ ability to collateralise their debt reflects the degree of information and agency problems 
they face. Using a sample of 847 publicly traded manufacturing firms from 1994 to 1998, he 
documents a positive relation between collateral losses and the propensity of firms obtaining 
bank debt. Further analysis suggests that collateral damage leads to underinvestment 
problems. 
 Evidence from a full sample of firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Singapore 
between 1983 and 1991, as reported by Chen et al. (1998), shows a positive relation between 
growth opportunity and the fraction of loans that are secured. In line with agency theory, they 
infer that firms with a high potential for asset substitution and underinvestment tend to pledge 
more assets in debt contracts to mitigate these problems. 
 
3.5  The Certification Effect of External Agents on Security Issuance 
The inherent information asymmetry in the capital market has seen the increasing 
importance of information producers, such as auditors and investment banks, in securities 
issuance. Considerable evidence shows that the reputation and recognised specialisation of the 
certifying agents are associated with the favourable pricing of firms’ security issuance (Slovin 
et al., 1990; Fang, 2005). To inform the analysis of the certification effects of key external 
parties involved in sukuk issuance, this section first reviews the extant studies on the 
reputation effect of lead arrangers in project finance and syndicated loans to inform the 
analysis on investment quality certification for sukuk issuance. Following that is a review of 
                                                 
43 Land serves as the primary collateral in Japan where 70 percent of secured loans are backed by this asset (Gan, 
2007). 
75 
 
relevant literature that provides implications for the certification effect of Shariah advisors 
and Shariah conscious investors.  
 
3.5.1 The certification effect of the lead arranger 
The literature that discusses lead arrangers’ certification is motivated by the theoretical 
work of, among others, Booth and Smith (1986), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), and Cook 
et al. (2003). Building on Klein and Leffler (1981), Booth and Smith (1986) propose that in 
situations where fund supply is conditional on investors’ confidence that firms have 
sufficiently valuable investment opportunities, an investment bank can be hired to certify that 
the issue price is congruent with the firm’s financial prospects. Accordingly, firms are viewed 
as, ‘leasing’ the arranger’s reputation which acts as a verification of the investment quality. 
However, for it to be a credible signal, outside investors require the reputation of the arranger 
to be observable (Booth and Smith, 1986).  
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) provide empirical predictions for the information 
reliability sought by outside investors in the context of reputation acquisition by investment 
banks. In their model, investment banks face a trade-off due to investors’ inference of their 
past performance in securities valuation – a costly stringent screening standard in the short 
run, and a long run benefit of reputation acquisition. Linking the banks’ reputation acquisition 
with their certification standard, the model implies that reputable arrangers are credible 
information producers due to their strict screening, and thus are effective in mitigating 
information asymmetry. Further, since more reputable arrangers employ a costlier and 
stringent screening standard, they charge higher fees. 
Closely related to this thesis is Gatti et al. (2013) who examine the certification effect of 
prestigious lead arrangers in project finance. They contend that certification by reputable 
banks is more valuable for project finance than conventional debt finance because of greater 
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agency and information problems associated with complex, stand-alone, and high-leverage 
investments. Based on a sample of 4,122 project finance loan tranches arranged from 1991 to 
2005, their results show project finance loans arranged by prestigious banks are associated 
with lower spreads and lower arrangement fees relative to loans arranged by lead banks with 
lower market shares. Interestingly, certification by prestigious banks is more valuable during 
periods of high information asymmetry and financial distress. 
A vast empirical literature on the certification effect of lead arrangers is available in a 
syndicated loan setting. Cook et al. (2003) analyse the premium of banks’ reputation. They 
argue that loans originated by reputable arrangers generate positive inferences due to 
investors’ belief of their due diligence. Firms are thus motivated to obtain loans from more 
reputable arrangers and are willing to pay a premium loan rate if there are net financial 
benefits to be gained from the certification. On the other hand, Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) 
contend that an investment bank that has developed a reputation (transaction-specific asset) 
through repeat business with syndicate members should face lower costs in arranging loans. 
In this case, more reputable banks can certify without holding a large share of loans as, 
“syndicate members may already lower the interest rates on loans originated by more 
reputable banks, and thus, a higher retention rate from these banks will have less effect on 
loan spreads” (Do and Vu, 2010, p. 476).  
Using a sample of 1,352 syndicated loans in the U.S., Do and Vu (2010) find no 
evidence that the certification effect, measured by the fitted values of loan retention,44 has a 
significant impact on the all-in spread for loans originated by the top three banks. However, 
loan retention matters for less reputable lead banks; the larger the share of the loan retained by 
these banks, the lower the spread.  
  
                                                 
44 This measure is obtained from the first stage regression of loan retention rate as a function of two 
instrumenting variables introduced to capture lead arrangers’ portfolio default risk and other determining 
variables including borrower characteristics, loan terms, and macroeconomic factors (Do and Vu, 2010). 
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Ross (2010) investigates the certification effect of the most prestigious banks in terms 
of the stock market reaction to loans certified by them, which he terms as the ‘dominant bank 
effect’. He argues that the three dominant banks in the U.S. (J.P Morgan Chase, Bank of 
America, and Citigroup) have a well-established reputation for high-quality screening and 
monitoring service so that loans syndicated by them provide a credible stamp of the 
borrower’s quality. Using a sample of 1,064 loan announcements during the 2000 – 2003 
period, he finds the stock market reacts favourably to announcements of loans syndicated by 
these dominant banks. The ‘dominant bank effect’ is especially large for opaque firms. 
Certification by the dominant banks also results in a reduction in the all-in drawn spread. 
Similar evidence is documented by Godlewski et al. (2012) for a sample of 924 syndicated 
loans in the French market during the 1992 – 2006 period using network centrality as a 
measure of bank reputation.  
Billett et al. (1995) and Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) use credit ratings as a proxy for 
investment banks’ reputation for the following reasons. First, banks’ credit quality matters to 
borrowing firms’ value because high-quality banks are expected to produce more accurate 
information about the firms. Second, high-quality banks are likely to survive longer, 
suggesting a secured long term relation with their clients (Billett et al., 1995). Consistent with 
these reasonings, Billett et al. (1995) find lenders with a higher credit rating are associated 
with a more positive stock price reaction. While Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) find no 
evidence that the lead arranger’s credit rating serves as a credible indicator of reputation, they 
find the number of repeat transactions between the lead bank and the syndicate members is a 
valuable proxy for the certification effect of the lead arranger’s reputation. This finding is 
consistent with their conjecture that lead arrangers with established transaction-specific assets 
face lower costs in their decision to syndicate.    
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Empirical evidence is mixed with regard to the certification effect of reputable lead 
arrangers on firms with higher information asymmetry. Controlling for selection bias, 
McCahery and Schwienbacher (2010) find unrated firms receive lower spreads relative to 
firms with a non-investment grade rating. However, they find that top tier banks charge 
significantly higher spreads on private firms categorised as opaque. This finding supports the 
prediction that more reputable lead arrangers are likely to charge higher loan spreads on firms 
with high information asymmetry as a compensation for bearing higher risk of adverse 
selection and moral hazard (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994), and for bridging the 
information gap between the firms and potential investors (Cook et al., 2003). In contrast, 
Ross (2010) finds that the spread on loans arranged by the most reputable bank is lower, 
especially for opaque firms, supporting their argument that these banks possess economies of 
scale and distributional advantages, which in turn allow them to offer better loan terms to 
borrowers. Testing the lead arranger’s reputation effect on the syndicated loan structure, Sufi 
(2007) also suggests that lead arrangers’ reputation can mitigate moral hazard concerns of 
opaque firms. He finds the share of loans retained by lead arrangers with a median reputation 
(measured by market share) is smaller than that retained by less reputable lead arrangers. Only 
the most reputable lead arrangers (99th percentile market share) can effectively overcome the 
moral hazard problem without having to retain the loan in opaque firms. 
 
3.5.2 The certification effect of Shariah advisors 
Since formal guidelines address only the general requirements of the sukuk contract, 
Shariah advisors are hired to review and give an opinion on the acceptability or permissibility 
of contract mechanisms and terms used by sukuk issuers, i.e., whether the sukuk contract is 
Shariah-compliant or not. Endorsement of the terms of sukuk contracts by Shariah advisors is 
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a mandatory pre-condition for the approval of sukuk issuance by capital market regulators, 
reflecting the important role of Shariah advisors in this market.  
In light of the increasing concern over Shariah-compliance risk, Godlewski et al. (2014) 
argue that firms’ shareholders value the choice of Shariah advisors because Shariah non-
compliance may lead to legal and reputational concerns, which may eventually affect the 
firm’s business. Accordingly, they predict that employing a reputable Shariah advisor to 
certify the sukuk has a positive impact on the issuing firm’s stock price. Results from an event 
study results on a sample of 131 corporate sukuk issued during the 2006 – 2013 period show 
that Shariah advisors’ reputation positively influences the issuers’ cumulative abnormal 
returns over a five-day period (-2, +2) surrounding the sukuk announcement date.  
The religious-psychology literature suggests that the reputation effect of Shariah 
advisors arises from their perceived profound religious knowledge and understanding as well 
as their high moral standard. Aspired by the notion that religious ideology influences 
individuals’ judgment of right and wrong, a group of studies have attempted to establish a link 
between religiosity and ethical judgment in business practices. Hunt and Vitell (2006) identify 
religion as one of the personal characteristics that influences a person’s ethical decision-
making process. Measuring religiousness using the Allport and Ross’ (1967) intrinsic-
extrinsic dichotomy,45 Clark and Dawson (1996) find that ‘personal religiousness’ does 
significantly influence a person’s ethical evaluations. In particular, more religious individuals 
(intrinsic group) place greater weight on deontological considerations when evaluating a set 
of scenarios and alternatives on business conducts.  
Siu et al. (2000) document similar findings for a sample of 650 business students of 
varying religious beliefs in Hong Kong in 1998. Ji et al. (2009) extend this line of study and 
finds that intrinsic religiosity Muslims who have a reasonably high knowledge of Islamic 
                                                 
45 An intrinsic religious individual is a person who internalizes religious teachings and beliefs in her daily life 
(Allport and Ross, 1967). 
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religion have a greater degree of ethical judgment. Indeed, international bodies such as IFSB 
and central banks have issued ‘fit and proper’ criteria for the appointment of Shariah advisors 
which emphasise not only their knowledge and experience, but also excellent personal 
character, all of which are necessary for reliable service (Nainggolan et al., 2015).  
 
3.5.3 The certification effect of auditors’ reputation 
From a practical viewpoint, the role Shariah advisors play in the sukuk issuance process 
is akin to that of external auditors in terms of certifying the information provided by the firm. 
A considerable body of accounting and finance research has examined the certification effect 
of auditors’ reputation in a conventional equity and bond setting of which the empirical 
insights are relevant to the context of Shariah advisors’ certification of sukuk. Extending 
Klein and Leffler’s (1981) reputational signalling theory, early studies argue that prestigious 
auditors have fewer incentives to cheat on audit service because the expected loss of future 
quasi-rents is greater than the short-term gain from cheating (DeAngelo, 1981; Beatty, 1989). 
As such, their audit services are perceived to be of higher quality and more reliable than 
services rendered by less prestigious auditors. This notion motivates the empirical prediction 
that hiring a high-quality auditor reduces the cost of capital and increases firm value (Titman 
and Trueman, 1986; Slovin et al., 1990; Khurana and Raman, 2006). 
Empirical evidence mostly suggests that reputable auditors can credibly certify firms’ 
information. In other words, the perceived high-quality audit service of reputable auditors 
mitigates the adverse selection problem by reducing the uncertainty associated with security 
issuance. Early studies such as Balvers et al. (1988) and Beatty (1989) find that auditor 
reputation is inversely related to IPO underpricing, consistent with the informational effect of 
highly reputable auditors. Willenborg (1999) finds similar results for small deal IPOs and 
infers that start-up firms obtain audit services of reputable auditors as an insurance signal. 
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Specifically, he argues that the relation evidenced in his setting does not indicate the 
significance of audit quality for young IPO firms, rather it captures, “the ability of the auditor 
to insure against potential investors’ losses” (Willenborg, 1999, p. 228). 
Several studies document the certification effect of reputable auditors on the cost of 
capital. Examining whether stock market investors perceive Big 4 auditors as providing high-
quality audit service, Khurana and Raman (2004) find this to be the case in the U.S., but not 
in other Anglo-American countries such as Australia, Canada, and the U.K. Specifically, only 
the audit service by Big 4 auditors in the U.S. is associated with a lower ex ante cost of 
equity. Mansi et al. (2004) document similar findings on the influence of Big 6 auditors on the 
cost of capital from a bondholders’ perspective. The economic impact of audit service by 
these auditors is larger for riskier firms, confirming the informational and insurance roles of 
more reputable auditors. 
Another strand of research examines the value of audit quality in terms of auditors’ 
industry specialisation. Craswell et al. (1995) argue that the credibility of audit services also 
relates to the auditor’s industry specialisation apart from its brand name, conceivably because 
an industry specialist auditor establishes its reputation, “by developing industry-specific skills 
and expertise over and above normal auditor expertise” (Craswell et al., 1995, p.301). 
Consistent with this argument, Knechel et al. (2007) document strong evidence of a positive 
market reaction to firms switching from a non-specialist Big 4 auditor to a specialist Big 4 
auditor, and a negative market reaction when the successor auditor is a non-specialist Big 4 
auditor. This finding leads them to conclude that the capital market perceives industry 
specialisation as another dimension of audit quality. In line with this conclusion, Ahmed et al. 
(2008) find that employing an industry specialist auditor is associated with a significantly 
lower cost of debt and equity, especially for firms with relatively weak monitoring 
mechanisms. Furthermore, Li et al. (2010) show that an audit by a city-level auditor specialist 
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is associated with a lower cost of debt, in line with the argument that audit quality matters to 
debt market investors.  
The above discussion suggests that Shariah advisors’ reputation may serve as another 
important mechanism for Shariah compliance certification. This is anecdotally evident in the 
business press. Referring to the trend of hiring a well-known scholar in the sukuk market, 
Mohamad Akram Laldin, deputy chairman of SAC at the Central Bank Malaysia, comments 
that:  
“…people are not going to question the credibility of this scholar. This scholar signs off, 
people know that he knows his stuff.” (Bloomberg, August 12, 2014) 
 
3.5.4 The certification effect of the Shariah advisory committee 
The diversity of the interpretations of Shariah among Muslim scholars has led to a 
debate on whether an endorsement by a group (committee) of Shariah advisors signals greater 
Shariah compliance in financial contracts than an endorsement by a single advisor. Such is the 
aim of Azmat et al. (2014a) and Azmat et al. (2015), who provide one of the early tests in the 
context of sukuk. They argue that endorsement by a number of Shariah advisors is based on 
the consensus reached on the terms and structure of the contract, and is less subjective 
compared to endorsement by a single advisor. Thus, they predict that Shariah committees are 
more likely to approve contracts with less controversial structure (i.e., ijarah or lease-based) 
than equity-like contracts. Their prediction is confirmed in a multinomial logistic regression. 
Analysing Shariah compliance certification from the perspective of shareholders’ value, 
Godlewski et al. (2014) find that the number of scholars endorsing issuance does not 
significantly influence the issuer’s stock price. They infer that investors may react to only 
some information regarding the certification of sukuk by Shariah advisors. 
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Testing the determinants of sukuk rating on a sample of 458 sukuk tranches for the 
period 2002 – 2010, Azmat et al. (2015) find that sukuk issuance which approved by a 
Shariah advisory committee has a higher rating. They infer that the Shariah advisory 
committee adopts a more conservative approach to endorsing Shariah compliance of sukuk 
than a single Shariah scholar. 
In an Islamic equity funds (IEFs) setting, Nainggolan et al. (2015) examine the 
effectiveness of Shariah Advisory Board (SAB) in reducing Shariah risk. For a sample of 126 
IEFs domiciled in 15 countries, their results show that IEFs with a smaller and more diverse 
SAB have lower Shariah risk. This finding supports the argument that a smaller board allows 
for effective communication and coordination, and that a larger board has an advantage of 
broader perspectives and diverse competencies thereby improving decision making. 
Interestingly, contrary to their prediction, IEFs with a more qualified SAB are associated with 
higher Shariah risk. They attribute this finding to fatwa shopping where IFIs that are unable to 
offer purely Shariah-compliant products appoint scholars who are willing to endorse their 
products in order to attract investors. Further, consistent with the view that serving multiple 
boards compromises the monitoring efficacy of the board, they find funds with a highly 
interlocked SAB have higher Shariah risk.  
The management literature has shed light on the theoretical link between the 
heterogeneity in management teams and the effectiveness of decision making, which can be 
extended to certification by Shariah committees. Bantel and Jackson (1989) suggest that 
having a group of decision makers allows for a synergy of individual members’ experience 
and cognitive resources, leading to an efficient solution to complex problems. Different 
perspectives among the group members in particular, “ensures consideration of a larger set of 
problems and a larger set of alternative potential solutions” (Bantel and Jackson, 1989, p.109). 
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Testing these arguments on a sample of 460 state-chartered and national banks in the U.S., 
they show that top management team heterogeneity positively influences banks’ innovations. 
A standard practice of empirical studies in this line of literature is to control for team 
size since heterogeneity measure is size-dependent with, “larger teams can be more diverse by 
definition” (Carpenter, 2002, p. 280). Evidence on the effect of decision-making team size on 
firm performance is mixed. Based on a sample of actions and responses of 32 U.S. airlines, 
Hambrick et al. (1996) find that while larger management teams restrain competitive 
initiatives, they positively influence the growth in a firm’s market share. However, Cannella 
et al. (2008) do not find any evidence of a significant relation between management team size 
and firm performance for a sample of 207 U.S. firms from 11 industries.  
 
3.5.5 The certification effect of Shariah conscious investors 
Azmat et al. (2014b) contend that observing a high level of Shariah compliance in the 
sukuk market in a capitalist business setting is challenging with the possibility of fatwa 
shopping, where firms may seek a scholarly opinion that is more lenient on certain debatable 
contract mechanisms or structures. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of standardisation 
of Shariah ruling.46 They propose that the moral hazard of lower preference for Shariah 
compliance among profit-oriented firms can be mitigated by the presence of investors with a 
higher preference for Shariah compliance, which they aptly term ‘Shariah conscious 
investors.’ Using the von Neumann utility function, they show that the aversion towards 
Shariah non-compliance of a financial contract can be incorporated into the profit rate. The 
algebraic outcome indicates that a lower profit rate will be realised with an increase in Shariah 
consciousness or aversion towards Shariah non-compliance risk of investors. The implication 
                                                 
46 While there are possibilities of fatwa shopping, such an assumption has been reinforced by conflicting rulings 
or interpretations from different scholars. See http://blogs.reuters.com/summits/2010/02/17/fatwa-shopping-not-
for-barclays/ 
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follows that this type of investor is more likely to implement Shariah post-monitoring on 
sukuk contract execution. 
Evidence documented by existing research on the monitoring effect stemming from 
investors’ identity can be extrapolated to the context of the certification effect of Shariah 
conscious investors. Several studies compare the information content of loans contracted by 
commercial banks and non-bank institutions. James (1987) tests Fama’s (1985) argument that 
the incidence of reserve requirements is a unique feature of commercial banks. For a sample 
of 207 financing announcements between 1974 and 1983, he reports a positive stock price 
reaction to bank loan agreements, and a non-positive reaction to public straight debt offerings. 
These results hold even after controlling for differences in the characteristics of the loan and 
the borrower, leading him to conclude that, “banks provide some special service not available 
from other lenders” (p. 234).  
In a later study, Preece and Mullineaux (1994) provide evidence showing that the stock 
market also reacts positively to the announcement of firms’ loan deals with non-bank 
institutions for a sample of 439 loan agreements between 1980 and 1987. They conclude that 
non-bank institutions have acquired a comparable ability as commercial banks in terms of 
information transmission. Billett et al. (1995) document similar findings for a sample of 626 
loans negotiated during 1980 to 1989. However, when the identity of the lender is defined by 
credit quality, they find the announcement of loans contracted by highest rated lenders (AAA) 
is associated with significantly larger abnormal returns. This suggests that the announcement 
of loans arranged by ‘good’ banks carries more reliable signal of valuable monitoring and 
screening services. 
Instead of looking at the stock price reaction to bank loan announcement, Chen et al. 
(1996) examine the impact of lenders’ identity on loan pricing. Specifically, they test the 
monitoring effect of domestic and foreign banks on loan rates following the enactment of the 
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FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991. Results 
based on a sample of 1,126 loans contracted by U.S. and Japanese banks in the U.S. for the 
1981-1993 period show that loans contracted by Japanese banks are priced significantly 
higher than those by U.S. banks to similar clients before the regulatory change. This finding 
confirms their conjecture that foreign banks are less efficient monitors since they are subject 
to less stringent regulation prior to FDICIA. Likewise, Chen et al. (2000) document a 
differential monitoring impact between foreign (Japanese banks) and domestic bank in the 
U.S. for a sample of 6,352 syndicated loans, which is partly explained by the enactment of the 
Basel Accord.47 
Another related line of literature examines the certification effect of investors’ identity 
in the equity market setting. Testing the certification hypothesis, Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) 
compare the impact of affiliated and unaffiliated investors48 on the stock performance of firms 
that issue both private and public equities. They posit that investment by affiliated investors 
can serve as a credible certification of firm value as implied by Leland and Pyle (1977) due to 
their greater access to the firm’s private information. Their results overall confirm that 
investor identity (i.e., investor affiliation) matters to firm stock valuation. In particular, 
investments by affiliated investors are both positively related to the stock price reaction 
surrounding announcement and the long-term abnormal returns for private placements 
sample. 
Dai (2007) compares the stock performance of firms invested by venture capitalists 
(VCs) and hedge funds (HFs) through private investments in public equity (PIPEs).  
Consistent with anecdotal evidence that VCs are active monitors, her sample shows that VCs 
hold a larger block stake and have at least one board seat through PIPEs. Also, their holding 
                                                 
47 The Basel Accord was introduced in July 12, 1988 with the aim “to improve the safety of the international 
banking system and reduce regulatory differences between banks of different national origins” (Chen et al., 
2000, p. 7). 
48 Affiliated investors in their study are defined as the officers or directors of the firm and their relatives, 
consultants or attorneys of the firm, and institutions affiliated with the firm, among others.  
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period after the PIPE is significantly longer than that of HFs. This monitoring commitment is 
appropriately priced by the stock market, as indicated by her finding that VC-invested firms 
perform significantly better than HF-invested firms in both short run and long run. Further 
investigations show the potential monitoring effect of VCs, which is measured by changes in 
board seats, does not significantly explain the positive valuation. The operating performance 
of VC-invested firms also does not improve significantly more than of HF-invested firms. She 
concludes that the value created by VCs’ investments is due to their certification effect rather 
than to their monitoring commitment.  
Together, the above studies suggest that the uniqueness of investors is a result of special 
regulations applicable to them and their investment objective. Such a uniqueness is reflected 
in their monitoring behaviour, which is shown to create value for their clients.   
 
3.6  Chapter Summary 
Empirical studies that examine the determinants of sukuk issuance have thus far been 
devoted to testing the implications of pecking order and trade-off theories. The preliminary 
contributions show that the traditional capital structure theories can partly explain the 
motivations for firms to issue sukuk. Recognising the resemblance of sukuk to project 
finance, this chapter reviewed the literature that elucidates the rationales for the use of such 
financing. The chief implication of this literature is that firms choose asset-based structured 
financing when they face severe agency problems associated with higher free cash flow and 
adverse investment incentives. 
The review of the related corporate finance literature informs the factors that may 
explain sukuk issuers’ choice of the debt-like versus equity-like structure, and the use of 
collaterals. Academic researchers point to adverse selection and moral hazard issues as the 
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driving factors for the prevalent use of debt-like structure and collateral in IBF operations. 
Indeed, information asymmetry and ensuing agency problems have been identified as the 
principal determinants of the capital structure decision in the conventional finance literature. 
From an asymmetric information perspective, empirical evidence is inconclusive on the 
prediction that information asymmetry leads firms to use debt relative to the expensive equity 
financing. From an agency perspective, a large body of empirical research shows that firms 
use more debt financing when they face moral hazard of managerial expropriation. Since 
having more debt in place may induce asset substitution and underinvestment, debts are 
accordingly collateralised to effectuate covenants and lenders’ monitoring.   
The certification literature sheds light on the mechanisms through which the key parties 
involved in sukuk issuance can mitigate investors’ concerns about adverse selection and 
moral hazard associated with complex Shariah-compliant financing. On investment 
certification, previous studies show that banks’ reputation alone can signal the quality of 
firms’ investment and creditworthiness. While more reputable banks are more likely to extend 
debt to more reputable firms, they extend debt to opaque firms as well. Interestingly, there is 
evidence that the certification effect is stronger for opaque firms. 
The certification of lower Shariah risk may result from quality screening by the advisors 
and the perceived effective Shariah monitoring by Shariah conscious arrangers. The review of 
auditing and management literature suggests two dimensions of Shariah advisors’ 
certification: i) advisors’ reputation; and ii) a synergy of experience and resources of a 
committee of advisors. Finally, since different types of financial institutions are subject to 
different regulations, previous studies suggest that strong Shariah governance within arrangers 
may induce Shariah monitoring thereby lowering Shariah risk. This implication insinuates 
that there is a certification effect of Shariah-regulated arrangers, such as Islamic banks and 
other IFIs, on the pricing of sukuk issuance. 
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Chapter 4 
Hypotheses 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Having established the theoretical and technical resemblance of sukuk to project finance 
(Chapter 2), the hypothesis for the choice between sukuk and conventional bonds in Section 
4.2 builds on the project finance literature that uses agency cost mitigation as its primary 
rationale. Within the agency cost perspective, Section 4.3 develops testable hypotheses for the 
choice of the following sukuk structures: i) debt-like versus equity-like; ii) secured versus 
unsecured; and iii) SPV versus no SPV. Section 4.4 sets out the hypotheses for the 
certification effects of key external parties involved in sukuk issuance, followed by a chapter 
summary in Section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Agency Cost and Corporate Sukuk Issuance 
Conflicting interests between the agent and the principal with regard to cash flow 
distribution and investment policy give rise to agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Our 
review of the contractual structure of sukuk and the project finance literature implies that 
careful engineering in sukuk contracts in terms of risk and return allocation can effectively 
attenuate managerial moral hazard, thus minimising agency costs, for the following reasons. 
First, the securitisation of well-identified assets in sukuk issuance can mitigate the 
underinvestment problem where a firm will strategically fail to exercise the value increasing 
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investment options.49 John and John (1991) illustrate that by setting aside the assets and 
dedicating them to an identified project, firms can independently determine debt allocation 
between projects across business states. Since the financing is now project-specific, 
competing claimants (shareholders and bondholders) are less concerned with bankruptcy risk 
associated with risky debt. This in turn motivates the manager to undertake profitable growth 
options, thereby reducing the agency cost of underinvestment. Analysing the interactions 
between financing and investment decisions in a model of bondholder–shareholder conflicts 
over investment policy, Childs et al. (2005) also find the agency cost of underinvestment is 
dramatically reduced if managers can flexibly adjust the firm’s debt level across business 
states. 
Second, extensive contracting, which is salient to sukuk contracts, reinforces the agency 
problem mitigation effects of securitisation. Ebrahim et al. (2016) illustrate that the elaborate 
and prudent documentation of debt contracts, where the contract terms are linked to the 
capacity of the project and the issuer across business states, effectively sterilises issuers’ 
strategic default during the contract tenure. This provides sukuk an additional advantage over 
conventional bonds in mitigating the moral hazard of underinvestment; the latter are merely 
debt obligations or claims on opaque intangible assets that are prone to underinvestment 
problem.  
Asset securitisation, combined with meticulous contract documentation render cash 
flows verifiable and collateral easily seized by lenders (Subramanian et al. 2008). John and 
John (1991) and Esty (2003) note that this financial package is designed to achieve greater 
debt capacity in asset-based finance, which consequently disciplines the manager to disgorge 
cash. Therefore, sukuk can deter moral hazard of free cash flow more effectively than 
                                                 
49 Myers (1977) suggests that this problem is particularly acute among high growth firms that face financial 
distress. Since such firms are likely to be presented with investment options at different points of time, positive 
NPV projects may not be undertaken or delayed if a large portion of the returns will be captured by the debt 
holders. The current debt holders, anticipating this agency problem, will price the debt security issuance 
accordingly.   
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conventional bonds where the intermingling of cash flows from various existing assets makes 
it virtually impossible to segregate and dedicate cash flows to the repayment of debt. This 
argument has support in Alam (2010) and Subramanian et al. (2008) who analyse firms’ 
choice of project finance. We thus predict that firms prefer sukuk to conventional bond 
issuance when they face higher agency costs:  
 
H1:  Firms with higher agency costs are more likely to issue sukuk than conventional bonds. 
        
4.3  The Choice of Sukuk Structure 
Firms’ selection of the structures and contractual constraints for their debt issuance 
reflects the pursuit of minimising the impact of capital market imperfections. Following the 
implication of H1 that firms issue sukuk to mitigate agency cost, this section develops a set of 
hypotheses concerning the choice of observable sukuk structures to further investigate the 
agency cost objective of sukuk issuers.  
4.3.1 Debt-like versus equity-like structure 
The equity-like structure, which applies the profit and risk sharing principle, remains 
the central proposition of Islamic finance as it allows for an equitable income distribution 
between the firm and the capital provider in an investment contract (Godlewski et al., 2014; 
Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). However, the nature of equity-like contracts, where the payoff 
depends on efficient and productive management of investment, exposes investors to agency 
cost of free cash flow (Presley and Sessions, 1994). Indeed, Jung et al. (1996) argue that firms 
issue equity to benefit management rather than shareholders because equity enhances 
managerial discretion.  
Agency theory in the corporate finance literature proposes debt as an antidote to this 
problem (Harris and Raviv, 1991). Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) argue that debt, due to its 
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fixed claim nature, disciplines managers to pay out future cash flow, hence reducing the free 
cash available for managerial self-dealing (Jensen, 1986; Blanchard et al., 1994). From the 
perspective of Islamic finance, the disciplining function of the debt-like structure stems from 
providing lenders control right over the project assets which they can seize it in the event of 
default (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000). In an incomplete contract setting, Aggarwal and 
Yousef (2000) illustrate that the debt-like structure is preferred to the equity-like structure in 
IBF operations when the moral hazard of cash flow abuse increases. Since tightly enforced 
cash flow constraints in the form of a debt structure significantly impede potential managerial 
discretion, we predict that sukuk issuers are more likely to use the debt-like structure if they 
face higher agency cost of free cash flow. 
 
H2:  Firms with higher agency cost of free cash flow are more likely to issue debt-like         
than equity-like sukuk structure. 
 
4.3.2 The choice between secured and unsecured structure 
Ebrahim et al. (2016) advocate that sukuk contracts should be well-collateralised in 
order to mitigate the agency cost of debt. Collateral or security interest is an important 
element in structured debt finance like sukuk given the need to secure investors’ interest in the 
project cash flows and to accommodate the high-leverage structure of this financing. The 
secured debt literature proposes that collateral50 can serve as an effective bonding mechanism 
that aligns the interest of managers with that of investors. Collateral mitigates agency costs of 
debt in the following ways. First, it increases firms’ incentive to undertake positive NPV 
                                                 
50 Collateral may include a deed or trust on the project assets (e.g., real property) or a series of security 
agreements (pledges) on the personal property of the firm (e.g., construction contracts, input agreements, 
reserves, and receivables). 
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investments by providing high priority claims to the secured lenders (Stulz and Johnson, 
1985), and eliminating the transfer of wealth to existing debt holders (Leeth and Scott, 1989).  
Second, the threat of collateral sanctions upon default would discourage managers from 
making subsequent borrowings during the contract term (Hart and Moore, 1994; Mann, 
1997). Triantis (1992) demonstrates that the sanction following borrowers’ violation of 
contractual constraints under a secured debt is more severe than that under an unsecured debt 
because the secured lender can quickly gain control over the firm’s assets. The unsecured 
lender, on the other hand, has to rely on the state enforcement mechanism. Therefore, the 
provision of collateral can better control the underinvestment problem than restrictive 
covenants since it increases the issuer’s concerns that violations of the debt contract are 
punished. Additionally, the range of asset substitution is limited in the presence of secured 
debt because the pledged assets can only be disposed of with the lenders’ permission (Smith 
and Warner, 1979). Thus, we predict that firms use collateral provision in sukuk issuance 
when they face higher agency costs of debt: 
 
H3:  Firms with higher agency costs of debt are more likely to pledge collateral in sukuk          
contracts. 
 
4.3.3 Creating an SPV for sukuk issuance 
Since corporate governance structure is typically not designed to address asset-specific 
agency conflicts (Esty, 2003), we argue that sukuk issuers may not be able to reduce agency 
costs efficiently if the same project were to be financed by direct financing. This is especially 
so in the case of sukuk where the arrangement is asset-specific.  
Esty (2003) suggests that the creation of an independent entity for sukuk issuance 
allows the parent firm (originator) to create an asset-specific governance system. Specifically, 
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this financing structure protects future cash flows from mismanagement because the cash 
flows are managed by a third party (SPV) who is committed to distributing them to the capital 
providers (Iacobucci and Winter, 2005). As such, using an SPV for the purpose of sukuk 
issuance should significantly reduce agency cost of free cash flow. 
Extant theoretical works on project finance also imply that the transfer of sukuk assets 
to an SPV can effectively mitigate the underinvestment problem due to high leverage and 
financial distress. John and John (1991) argue that the ensuing optimal debt allocation 
between the originator and the SPV allows firms to raise the desired leverage to undertake 
positive NPV investments. This structure also reduces the expected distress costs due to 
potential risk contamination because the originator’s loss exposure in the event of default is 
limited to its equity commitment to the project (Esty, 2003). Therefore, we predict that the 
likelihood of firms creating an SPV for the issuance of sukuk increases with agency costs: 
 
H4:  Firms with higher agency costs are more likely to create an SPV for sukuk issuance.   
 
4.4 Key External Parties’ Certification and Sukuk Pricing 
4.4.1 Investment quality certification 
Firms are primarily concerned with obtaining favourable pricing when attempting to 
raise external capital. However, it is often the case that security value depends on investors’ 
perception and knowledge about the firm’s prospects. This information is not directly 
observable to investors. In the presence of information asymmetry, investors will find it 
difficult to distinguish between good and poor quality investments, potentially leading to 
market failure of the type identified by Akerlof (1970). Building on prior literature on the 
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effect of banks’ reputation on security pricing, we propose that reputable lead arrangers can 
credibly certify the quality of sukuk investment. 
In their seminal paper, Klein and Leffler (1981) illustrate that reputation works as a 
private mechanism which ensures that firms deliver the quality of services which they 
contracted for. They derive that cheating is unlikely to occur if the present value of the firm’s 
future quasi-rent is higher than the present value of the short-term gain from cheating on 
product quality. An implication of Klein and Leffler’s (1981) reputational paradigm for sukuk 
issuance is that lead banks with established reputation are less likely to cheat by inaccurately 
certifying firms with poor quality investments because they have a greater reputational capital 
to lose if caught cheating.  
However, it is unclear how the reputation of lead banks (arrangers) affects the sukuk 
spread given the conflicting arguments provided by the syndicated loan literature. On one 
hand, Cook et al. (2003) argue that information asymmetry provides a window of opportunity 
for reputable banks to charge a certification premium. They find that firms that feature greater 
information asymmetry pay higher loan rates to lenders with higher credit ratings from which 
they infer that the premium charged is due to lenders’ certification that the associated risk is 
managed. A similar inference is offered by the market competition argument. More reputable 
banks are often the dominant ones in the loan market, having acquired an oligopolistic market 
power through barriers to entry. By deterring potential rivals from competing for deals (Ross, 
2010), more reputable banks are able to exploit their clients, for example, by charging a 
higher interest rate.  
Against these arguments, the literature outlines several competitive advantages that 
more reputable banks can bring to the issuers in the form of lower spreads. First, more 
extensive experience from having a longer history of repeat business suggests that more 
reputable banks have a, “better feel for pricing conditions and business prospects of their 
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clients” (Ross, 2010, p. 5). Second, more reputable banks are likely to have built superior 
networking, suggesting a distributional advantage which allows for a better syndicate 
formation (Godlewski et al., 2012). Third, these banks are also likely to have greater 
competence in screening and monitoring due to higher capital investments (e.g. information 
technologies and human capital) (Ross, 2010). Therefore, the decision by more reputable 
banks to arrange a sukuk contract signals the quality of the issuance to potential sukuk holders 
who in turn are willing to accept a lower rate of return on sukuk issuance. Given the 
conflicting arguments, we do not predict a direction of the relation between lead arrangers’ 
reputation and sukuk yield spread: 
 
H5:  Lead arrangers’ reputation has a significant effect on sukuk spread. 
 
4.4.2 Shariah compliance certification 
Shariah certification is a mandatory requirement for Islamic financial instruments.  
Thus, every sukuk issuance must have a ‘stamp of approval’ of Shariah compliance. This 
Shariah stamp helps reduces non-compliance risk concerns of investors (Azmat et al., 2014b).  
We argue that firms with investment projects that are close to the spirit of Shariah, i.e., those 
with a lower Shariah non-compliance risk, are motivated to distinguish themselves from 
others if doing so allows their sukuk to be issued at more favourable terms, e.g., lower profit 
rate. We propose three mechanisms through which a sukuk issuer can credibly signal the 
degree of Shariah compliance of her investment to potential investors.  
The first mechanism is the credibility of the Shariah advisor who endorses the sukuk 
contract. By verifying and lending their credibility to the information provided in the sukuk 
offering circular, Shariah advisors help to convince investors about the lower Shariah risk 
associated with the issuance. Existing literature suggests that reputable Shariah advisors can 
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credibly certify Shariah compliance for the following reasons. First, as implied by the 
reputation signalling theory, Shariah advisors with an established reputation in the IBF 
industry have a stronger disincentive to cheat by providing a low-quality screening for short-
term gain because they risk forfeiting a greater reputational capital and the associated future 
quasi-rents (DeAngelo, 1981).  
Second, reputable Shariah advisors are typically leading scholars with recognised 
competence and expertise in deriving Islamic rulings such that the market perceives their 
screening as high standard and reliable (Godlewski et al., 2014). As stated by Sergey 
Dergachev, Senior Portfolio Manager at Union Investment, “…fatwa from a well-recognised 
scholar is something like a seal of quality and a seal of true compliance with Shariah.”51 The 
religious and psychology aspects of reputable Shariah scholars are the next compelling reason 
for their screening quality. Highly religious individuals have ‘more clearly defined 
deontological norms’ which are strongly linked to their ethical judgments (Hunt and Vitell, 
2006). The relation between religion and ethical beliefs is particularly significant for intrinsic 
religiosity individuals (Clark and Dawson, 1996). This reflects the quality of leading Shariah 
scholars who are known for their vast knowledge and deep understanding of the religion. 
Accordingly, investors may infer that reputable scholars are less likely to compromise their 
religious beliefs and ethical judgment by endorsing sukuk contracts that may expose investors 
to high Shariah risk.  
The preceding arguments suggest the Shariah certification effect of reputable Shariah 
scholars is effective due to their recognised expertise in Islamic finance and perceived 
commitment to observe religious-ethical principles. Therefore, we predict that sukuk endorsed 
by more reputable Shariah advisors are associated with a lower risk premium due to the 
perceived lower Shariah non-compliance risk:  
                                                 
51 See Bloomberg, August 12, 2014 at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-12/scholar-fees-
targeted-by-regulators-islamic-finance. 
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H6a: Sukuk contracts endorsed by more reputable Shariah advisors have on average a lower  
yield spread than those endorsed by less reputable Shariah advisors. 
 
Differing Shariah opinions on the acceptability of certain sukuk terms suggests the 
importance of having a committee of Shariah advisors to screen and endorse sukuk contracts  
(Azmat et al., 2014). Furthermore, as sukuk issuance involves extensive documentation and 
technical structures, Shariah non-compliance risk may be reduced if the screening task is 
performed by a number of Shariah advisors rather than by a single advisor. Certification by a 
Shariah advisory committee involves the combined perspectives, resources, and experience of 
a group of Shariah experts. From the management’s perspective, this synergy ensures that the 
approval of sukuk terms is based on the consensus reached as opposed to an individual 
preference (Azmat et al., 2014; Godlewski et al., 2014). The implied ‘thoroughness’ and 
‘toughness’ of contract screening by a committee of Shariah advisors should provide greater 
investors’ confidence on the permissibility of the sukuk structure. Based on these arguments, 
we predict that the risk premium required by investors is lower for sukuk contracts certified 
by a Shariah advisory committee than by a single Shariah advisor: 
 
H6b: Sukuk contracts endorsed by a Shariah advisory committee are on average associated 
with a lower yield spread than those endorsed by a single Shariah advisor.  
 
As with auditors, Shariah advisors certify only ex ante issuance information. They 
neither produce additional information about the firm’s future value nor monitor the firm’s 
conduct when exercising the contract (Datar et al., 1991). Azmat et al. (2014b) argue that the 
participation of Shariah conscious investors in sukuk investment can mitigate the moral 
hazard problems associated with a lower preference for Shariah compliance among profit-
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oriented firms. Their model shows that the rate of return on sukuk is decreasing in investors’ 
aversion to Shariah risk. Drawing on their theoretical work, we propose that IFIs can certify 
that potential moral hazard problems are minimised through their participation as the arranger. 
This Shariah certification effect is premised on the grounds that IFIs, as Shariah-regulated 
financial institutions, are incentivised to ensure Shariah compliance for the following reasons. 
First, IFIs are responsible for ensuring end-to-end Shariah compliance in their operations, 
which are supervised and monitored by an in-house Shariah board (BNM, 2010). This has 
support in Safieddine (2009, p. 152), who states, “Adherence to Shariah principles is the 
primary distinguishing attribute of Islamic financial institutions.” It is also well recognised 
that the fiduciary duty of IFIs is to invest Muslim depositors’ money in investments that 
comply with Shariah. This fiduciary responsibility suggests that Shariah monitoring in sukuk 
will be in place by having an IFI as the arranger in charge of monitoring the contract.  
Second, IFIs are highly averse to Shariah risk because they face greater legal and 
reputational risk associated with Shariah non-compliance than conventional lead arrangers. In 
particular, failure to comply with Shariah will erode Islamic stakeholders’ confidence, leading 
to financial and reputational damages, including revenue losses and capital flights, to the IFIs 
(Laldin, 2013). The threat of potential material losses is thus likely to induce greater Shariah 
monitoring commitment by IFIs, hence ensuring a greater conformance of the sukuk contract 
execution with Shariah principles. 
Based on the preceding discussion, we predict that having IFIs as the arranger assures 
lower Shariah compliance risk of sukuk issuance, hence reducing the risk premium:  
 
H7:  Sukuk contracts with IFIs as the arranger are associated with a lower yield spread. 
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4.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter developed three sets of testable hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H1) tests 
whether agency costs determine firms’ decision to adopt sukuk financing. The second set of 
hypotheses links agency costs to sukuk contract design. Specifically, we hypothesise that 
firms with higher agency cost of free cash flow are more likely to use debt-like structure (H2), 
and those facing agency cost of debt are more likely to use collateral provision (H3). As the 
separation of investment assets from the originating firm improves cash flow verifiability and 
debt capacity, the fourth hypothesis (H4) predicts that firms use an SPV for sukuk issuance to 
minimise total agency costs.  
The final set of hypotheses relate to the certification effect of key external parties in 
security issuance. Drawing from financial intermediation literature, we posit that reputable 
lead arrangers can certify sukuk investment quality (H5). Given conflicting arguments, we do 
not predict the direction of the relation between having reputable banks as the lead arranger 
and sukuk spread. Hence, it is interesting to see as to whether lead arrangers’ certification is 
reflected in lower spread according to competitive advantage argument or higher spread 
according to certification premium argument. On Shariah certification, our hypotheses predict 
that endorsement of sukuk contracts by credible Shariah advisors mitigates adverse selection 
with respect to dilution in Shariah compliance, thereby lowering the spread (H6a and H6b). 
Drawing on the monitoring role of arrangers, our final hypothesis (H7) predicts that IFIs’ 
participation as the arranger induces Shariah monitoring on sukuk contracts to mitigate 
potential moral hazard problems associated with a preference for lower Shariah compliance.  
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Chapter 5 
Data and Research Methods 
 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter outlines the data and research methods used to test the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 4. It begins with a description of the data sources and sample 
construction procedure in Section 5.2. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 respectively discuss the empirical 
methods to address the research questions on firms’ choice of sukuk and their structure (RQ1 
and RQ2), and the impact of issuance parties’ certification on sukuk pricing (RQ3). Section 
5.5 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2  Data Sources 
Data on Malaysian domiciled corporate sukuk issues from 2001 to 2014 are sourced 
from the Bloomberg Professional Service database (henceforth, Bloomberg). The raw data 
comprises 8,692 sukuk issued by 378 firms, and 3,863 conventional bonds issued by 306 
firms. The unit of observation reported in Bloomberg is a facility or a tranche. We note that 
sukuk are drafted at the deal level where the structure of the contract and the involved parties 
are typically identical across tranches of the same deal. However, the yield, credit rating, 
proceeds, and maturity of the issuance can vary from one tranche to another. Financial data 
are obtained from Worldscope for listed firms and Orbis for private firms. Issues by financial 
firms and the government’s investment-arm institutions are excluded as their operations are 
subject to additional regulations.  
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5.3 Sample Construction 
5.3.1 Tests of the choice of sukuk and sukuk structure (RQ1 and RQ2) 
A deal-level sample is constructed by filtering out issues based on their respective 
offering circulars so that each observation represents a bond deal. A sukuk deal may contain 
more than one tranche or facility. However, the structure of each tranche, i.e., debt-like or 
equity-like, collateral, and SPV, is determined at the deal level. As far as the financing choice 
analysis is concerned, multiple tranches of the same deal cannot be treated as independent 
observations. Our approach thus ensures that the sample is more representative of the firm’s 
choice of sukuk structure.  
Information on institutional investors’ shareholding is hand-collected from bond 
offering circulars and annual reports. The list of Shariah index constituents and daily stock 
price data are sourced from Bloomberg. An analysis of firms’ choice of sukuk and their 
structure requires firm-level accounting data that satisfy the constructs of agency cost proxies. 
For this reason, only issues made by publicly listed firms are included in the sample. 
Conventional bond issues made by firms whose principal activities are not Shariah-compliant 
(e.g., casino service and intoxicant production) are also excluded because sukuk are not an 
alternative financing option for these firms. These filters result in a final sample of 230 
corporate bond deals issued by 171 firms, of which 128 are sukuk and 102 are conventional 
bonds.52 More than 80 percent of sample firms issue either sukuk or conventional bonds only 
once over the entire period of analysis. Hence, our sample is a cross-section rather than a 
panel.   
Table 5.1 presents the frequency distribution of Islamic and conventional bond deals in 
the final sample over the 14-year study period and across industries. In comparison to 
conventional bond issues, Panel A shows there is a significant increase in the number of 
                                                 
52 Only 15 sample firms issue both types of bonds. 
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sukuk issuance between 2003 and 2007. The proceeds from sukuk surpass those of 
conventional bonds after 2005 − a trend which can be attributed to the promotion of sukuk by 
the capital market regulators through strategic initiatives mapped in the CMP1.   
The volume of both sukuk and conventional bond issuance dropped sharply between 
2008 and 2010, coinciding with the global financial crisis (GFC). The decline in sukuk issues 
has also been attributed to the critique of the Shariah board chair of AAOIFI, Sheikh 
Muhammad Taqi Usmani, that as much as 85 percent of sukuk issued violated the risk-
sharing principle and may thus not be Shariah-compliant (Godlewski et al., 2014). His 
critique was aimed mainly at the principal guarantee and liquidity facility mechanisms in 
equity-like sukuk.53 In the sample, equity-like sukuk mostly appear from 2008 onwards, 
suggesting that the ‘2008 AAOIFI impact’ is not a concern in the debt-like versus equity-like 
structure choice analysis. Another notable aspect of the sukuk sample is the lack of popularity 
of the equity-like structure and the use of SPVs, as these are adopted by only about one in 
every five issuers. The survey findings of El-Hawary et al. (2004) and Zaher and Hassan 
(2001) also report the low usage of equity-like structures in IBF operations. On the use of 
SPVs, the sample suggests the leniency of the market regulators with regard to the 
requirement of legal transfer of assets to a separate entity in sukuk issuance.  
Firms in the manufacturing and construction sectors contribute about half of the sample 
sukuk and conventional bond issues, as shown by Panel B, while the frequency of sukuk 
issuance appears evenly distributed across the remaining sectors.  
                                                 
53 In response, the Shariah board of the AAOIFI issued a resolution on sukuk in February 2008 which prohibits 
such practices. 
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Table 5.1: Distribution of sample debt security deals by year and sector 
 
N Amount N Amount N Amount N Amount N Amount N Amount N Amount N Amount
Panel A: By year
2001 5 1761 5 2457 5 1761 0 0 0 0 5 1761 0 0 5 1761
2002 3 1068 8 884 2 270 1 798 3 1068 0 0 1 798 2 270
2003 11 3640 8 5778 11 3640 0 0 4 575 7 3065 2 780 9 2860
2004 12 1675 10 1701 12 1675 0 0 10 1225 2 450 1 60 11 1615
2005 17 3480 9 1270 17 3480 0 0 12 2730 5 750 3 1020 14 2460
2006 15 2835 7 941 15 2835 0 0 10 1985 5 850 3 1085 12 1750
2007 10 7840 9 3142 10 7840 0 0 6 1940 4 5900 3 660 7 7180
2008 9 5175 7 4207 3 1130 6 4045 4 2775 5 2400 1 300 8 4875
2009 3 5500 6 1315 1 200 2 5300 0 0 3 5500 0 0 3 5500
2010 5 5815 6 1786 2 4800 3 1015 1 4200 4 1615 1 4200 4 1615
2011 14 22352 9 6858 7 4988 7 17364 6 18102 8 4250 4 2057 10 20295
2012 5 11020 5 380 2 6000 3 5020 0 0 5 11020 1 5000 4 6020
2013 10 10885 6 5933 5 3185 5 7700 3 385 7 10500 2 2150 8 8735
2014 9 17180 7 4589 7 12680 2 4500 3 5180 6 12000 3 5500 6 11680
Panel B: By sector
Agriculture 7 1335 3 112 7 1335 0 0 4 685 3 650 1 210 6 1125
Construction 28 12402 22 7754 20 8310 8 4092 17 9637 11 2765 7 5222 21 7180
Transportation 11 10730 4 248 9 5730 2 5000 5 1510 6 9220 3 1950 8 8780
Manufacturing 49 28586 43 16074 37 16036 12 12550 22 5710 27 22876 7 4535 42 24051
Energy and oil 13 21908 15 15018 11 6208 2 15700 8 17308 5 4600 4 2173 9 19735
Telecommunication 8 20650 3 156 5 14900 3 5750 1 4200 7 16450 2 9200 6 11450
Retail 5 645 7 1011 5 645 0 0 2 215 3 430 0 0 5 645
Other services 7 3970 5 868 5 1320 2 2650 3 900 4 3070 1 320 6 3650
Total 128 100226 102 41241 99 54484 29 45742 62 40165 66 60061 25 23610 103 76616
No SPV
Sukuk StructuresConventional
Bonds
Sukuk
Debt-like Equity-like Secured Unsecured SPV
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5.3.2 Tests of sukuk certification effects (RQ3) 
The third research question investigates the pricing effect of sukuk certification. The 
tranche-level analysis is appropriate for this test since sukuk spreads, the response factor, 
varies across tranches. Tranches of the same sukuk deal also differ in rating, maturity, and 
issuance proceeds. Since each sukuk tranche has different risk profile and is priced 
independently, the unit of observation in this analysis is thus a tranche. This approach follows 
previous studies that examine the pricing effect of certification in structured finance (e.g., 
Cook et al., 2003; Gatti et al. 2013; Ross, 2010). For each tranche, issuance details including 
the yield to maturity (YTM), proceeds, maturity, ratings, and the key parties involved – lead 
arranger, syndicate participants, and Shariah advisors – are collected from Bloomberg. Sukuk 
issued by privately held firms are included in the sample because an empirical examination of 
the third research question (RQ3) relates to issuance-specific factors rather than firm-specific 
factors. 
Bloomberg provides the ranking of the arranging banks through its League Table and 
the ranking of Shariah advisors through Islamic Finance Platform.54 Sukuk issues with 
missing data on the yields and involved parties are excluded. These filters result in a final 
sample of 3,462 sukuk tranches issued by 286 firms, with about two-thirds of the sample 
tranches issued by private firms. 
As Table 5.2 shows, there is an increasing trend in sukuk tranche issuance, both in 
number and volume, between 2001 and 2007. The number and volume of sukuk tranche 
issuance decreased during the 2008 – 2010 period, coinciding with the two important events: 
the GFC and Sheikh Usmani’s criticism of sukuk. Firms from the construction and energy and 
oil sectors make up a large proportion of sukuk tranches. This indicates that sukuk are a 
                                                 
54 Bank rankings are based on the total amount of the offering sold, while that of Shariah advisors is based on the 
number of sukuk they have endorsed. 
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perfect fit for large-scale and capital-intensive projects since they allow for an extension of 
financing against the projected cash flows (Farrell, 2003). 
Table 5.2: Distribution of sample sukuk tranches by year and sector 
  
 
 
 
N
Proceeds 
(MYR)
N
Proceeds 
(MYR)
N
Proceeds 
(MYR)
Panel A: By year
2001 147 2584 103 1296 44 1288
2002 140 3937 84 935 56 3002
2003 96 3423 57 2808 39 615
2004 273 4144 163 3157 110 987
2005 358 5118 230 3492 128 1626
2006 349 3664 160 1809 189 1855
2007 347 9611 134 6537 213 3074
2008 337 5310 124 3000 213 2310
2009 208 7937 73 2255 135 5682
2010 172 6018 109 4310 63 1708
2011 220 11748 147 8543 73 3205
2012 283 23988 228 18605 55 5383
2013 317 14092 214 7921 103 6171
2014 215 11429 149 6892 66 4537
Panel B: By sector
Agriculture 267 2162 43 270 224 1892
Construction 774 19962 514 15628 260 4334
Transportation 673 28720 433 19418 240 9302
Manufacturing 552 12799 175 6375 377 6424
Energy and oil 862 33600 606 19236 256 14364
Telecommunication 116 11166 89 7828 27 3338
Retail 83 782 26 263 57 519
Other services 135 3812 89 2542 46 1270
Total 3462 113003 1975 71560 1487 41443
Full sample Private firms Public listed firms
107 
 
5.4 Research Methods 
5.4.1 Tests of the choice of sukuk and sukuk structure (RQ1 and RQ2) 
The first two research questions (RQ1 and RQ2) focus on the choice of financing 
structure rather than the static characteristics of firms’ capital structure and its optimisation. 
The logistic regression fits this research objective. Since the response variable is 
dichotomous, we are able to link the time-variant predictors to the probability of choice 
between two financing structures. In comparison, previous studies use the sukuk-to-liability 
(Nagano, 2010; Shahida and Saharah, 2013) or sukuk-to-asset (Mohamed et al., 2015) ratio as 
the response variable in their model estimation. Using a dichotomous response variable to test 
sukuk issuance motivation allows us to draw clean inferences given the fact that sukuk 
issuance involves securitisation, for which meeting the firm-level target leverage is less 
important.55 This approach is in line with Alam (2010) and Subramanian et al. (2008) who use 
logistic regression in their analysis of firms’ choice of project finance. To test the agency 
hypothesis (H1) for firms’ decision to issue sukuk, the following logistic regression equation 
is estimated: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑢𝑘𝑢𝑘𝑖 > 0) = 𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                           (1) 
where Sukuk > 0 implies that sukuk are chosen over conventional bonds; Agency is a vector 
of agency costs variables; and Control is a vector of control variables.  
Conditioned on firms issuing sukuk, we estimate the following logistic model to test 
agency cost hypothesis of issuers’ choice of sukuk structure:  
𝑃𝑟(𝑆𝑢𝑘𝑢𝑘 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 > 0) = 𝛼 +  𝛽
′𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 +  𝛾
′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 +  𝛿𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                             (2) 
where Sukuk Structure>0 represents that the following sukuk structures are chosen: debt-like, 
secured, and SPV.  
                                                 
55 As noted earlier, an important question under the arrangement of such structured securities is what is the 
optimal contract form to achieve the desired leverage rather than how much proceeds to be raised given a 
leverage target. 
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 To address potential bias in inference due to repeated bond deals, standard errors are 
clustered by firm in both regression equations (1) and (2).  
 
Proxies of the agency cost of free cash flow 
Jensen (1986) defines free cash flow as the cash flow remaining after all profitable 
investment projects have been undertaken. Following Lang et al. (1991), Free cash flow is 
measured as operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes, preferred 
dividends, and common dividends, scaled by total sales. The agency cost of free cash flow is 
also proxied by Profitability, which increases managers’ incentive to increase cash resources 
under their control (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003). From a trade-off perspective, profitability 
is used to capture tax motivations for debt issuance (Graham, 2000; Frank and Goyal, 2005). 
Following previous studies (Harvey et al., 2004; Mohamed et al., 2015), Profitability is 
measured by the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets. If the agency cost of free cash flow argument holds, both Free cash 
flow and Profitability are expected to be positively associated with the probability of sukuk 
issuance and all the three structure choices, i.e., debt-like, secured, and SPV. 
 
Proxies of the agency cost of debt 
Agency theory predicts that underinvestment problems increase with the level of firms’ 
growth option, debt outstanding, and financial distress (Myers, 1977). Our main proxy for 
growth opportunities is the Market-to-book ratio. Following Barclay and Smith (1995) and 
Krishnaswami et al. (1999), we employ depreciation-to-asset ratio (Depreciation) as our 
second proxy for growth opportunities. The coefficient of Depreciation is expected to have an 
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opposite sign to Market-to-book because a higher depreciation ratio indicates higher tangible 
assets in place and thus lower growth opportunities.  
We capture potential agency cost of debt due to potential financial distress by 
incorporating the Debt-to-asset ratio (Barclay and Smith, 1995; Chen et al., 1998) and 
Altman’s (1968) Z score. If high outstanding debt and the likelihood of going bankrupt drive 
firms to issue sukuk, we expect to see a negative coefficient for Debt-to-asset and a positive 
coefficient for Z score. 
 
Control variables 
The corporate finance literature suggests that information asymmetry is an important 
determinant of security choice. Following previous studies, firm size (Assets) and age (Age) 
are used to capture the richness of the firm’s information environment (Johnson, 1997).56 
Information asymmetry is also higher when managers possess more value-relevant firm-
specific information than outside investors. Following Krishnaswami et al. (1999), this value-
relevant information is proxied using the residual standard deviation (Residual s.d.) from the 
market model regression. By way of comparison, Azmat et al. (2014a) include this variable in 
their analysis of sukuk structure choice as a proxy for bankruptcy risk. Sukuk investment 
standards issued by the AAOIFI and other standard-setting bodies emphasise the use of 
tangible assets, particularly in debt-like sukuk structure. Hence, we control for Tangibility, 
proxied by the fixed assets to total assets ratio.  
 
                                                 
56 Previous studies also use firm size to proxy for economies of scale in flotation costs. As sukuk issues involve 
high costs in terms of legal, accounting, Shariah audit, and trustees’ fees, we expect sukuk are more likely to be 
issued by larger firms which are able to benefit from economies of scale in issuance cost (Krishnaswami et al., 
1999; de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003). 
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Table 5.3: Variable definitions for tests of debt security choice (RQ1 and RQ2) 
 
Variables Definitions
Dependent variables
Sukuk 1 if the issuance deal is sukuk and 0 if it is conventional bond
Debt-like sukuk 1 if the sukuk structure is debt-like and 0 if it is equity-like
Secured 1 if the sukuk deal includes collateral or security interest provision and  0 otherwise
SPV 1 if the sukuk deal issued by an SPV and 0 otherwise
Test variables
Free cash flow Operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, taxes, preferred 
dividends, and common dividends, divided by total sales
Profitability The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets
Market-to-book Market price per share divided by book value per share
Depreciation Depreciation expense divided by total assets
Debt-to-asset Total debt divided by total assets
Z score Altman's (1968) Z score computed by Thomson Reuters. A firm has a lower risk of 
going bankrupt if z > 2.99 (manufacturing weights) or z > 2.66 (non-manufacturing 
weights)
Control variables
Ln(Assets ) Natural logarithm of total assets
Ln(Age ) Natural logarithm of the number of years between the incorporation date and the 
date of issuance
Residual s.d. Standard deviation of residuals obtained from the market model regression in the 
fiscal year preceding the issuance
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets
GLIC 1 if the firm has government-linked investment institutions as its substantial 
shareholder and zero otherwise
Mulim directors The percentage of Muslim directors on the board
Shariah Index 1 if the firm is a constituent of Bursa Malaysia Shariah index and 0 otherwise
Shariah committee 1 for sukuk issuance approved by a shariah advisory committee and 0 for a single 
shariah advisor
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There is a strong indication of political support for sukuk issuance as acknowledged by 
academic research and business press (Bassens et al., 2012). Previous studies document the 
important role and effectiveness of government-sponsored institutional investors in driving 
capital market policy in Malaysia. For example, Fraser et al. (2006) find a positive relation 
between political patronage through GLICs’ ownership and leverage for their sample of 257 
Malaysian firms from 1990 to 1999. Testing the corporate governance role of Minority 
Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG), Wahab et al. (2007) report a positive impact of 
institutional ownership on corporate governance reform. Hence, it is conceivable that recent 
regulators’ initiative to promote the sukuk market is facilitated by institutional investors’ 
ability to exercise influence over firms’ financing decisions. To account for this factor, we 
create a GLIC dummy variable which takes the value of one for firms with a GLIC as a 
substantial shareholder (as disclosed in the offering circular) in the year prior to security 
issuance, and zero otherwise.57 GLICs are identified as large government-controlled and 
government-sponsored institutional investors (Wahab et al., 2007).58 
Further, we control for religious-related factors. We include a Shariah index dummy 
which takes the value of one if the firm is a constituent of the Shariah index, and zero 
otherwise. Firms that are constituents of the Shariah index are likely to prefer sukuk in order 
to portray their Shariah-compliant concerns to the stakeholders (Abdul Rahman, 2012).We 
also control for the proportion of Muslim directors on the board.59 Muslim directors may 
favour sukuk issuance as they conceivably have greater Islamic financing awareness than 
non-Muslim directors. Intuitively, a larger proportion of Muslim directors on the board will 
                                                 
57 A substantial shareholder as defined in Section 6D of the Companies Act 1965 is a person or an entity that 
holds not less than five percent of the aggregate of the nominal amounts of all the voting shares. 
58 The six largest institutional investors are the five members of MSWG, Employees Provident Fund, Lembaga 
Tabung Angkatan Tentera (Armed Forces Fund Board), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (National Equity 
Corporation), Lembaga Tabung Haji (Pilgrimage Board), Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial (Social Security 
Organization), and the investment holding arm of the Malaysian government, Khazanah Nasional. 
59 Muslim directors are identified by their name structures: Arabic patronym name, namely bin (a son of) and 
binti (a daughter of); and hereditary title or surname that is originally inherited by Muslim families. 
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be more successful in influencing a firm’s decision to issue sukuk. Azmat et al. (2014a) argue 
that the choice of sukuk structure is likely to be influenced by the type of Shariah advisor 
appointed by the issuer. Therefore, we include Shariah committee which takes the value of 
one if the sukuk issuance is endorsed by a committee of Shariah advisors, and zero if it is 
endorsed by a single Shariah advisor. Finally, we control for industry and year dummies. 
Definitions of our test variables are summarised in Table 5.3. 
 
Robustness tests 
The two-step Heckman (1979) procedure is employed to address potential inference 
bias arising from non-random sukuk sample selection. In the first stage, we estimate equation 
(1) using the probit estimator, where Sukuk > 0 means that the observation is selected into the 
sample.60 The unique political economy of Malaysia provides an instrumental variable – the 
presence of GLICs as the substantial shareholder.61 We expect substantial GLIC shareholding 
to strongly influence firms’ decision to issue sukuk, but not the sukuk contract design. Hence, 
GLIC serves as the identifying variable in equation (1), and is excluded from the structure 
choice regression in equation (2) to satisfy the exclusion restriction necessary for 
identification in the procedure. Using the estimated coefficients from equation (1), we obtain 
the inverse Mills ratio (𝜆𝑖), which is expressed as follows:  
𝜆𝑖 =
𝜙(𝑍𝑖)
1 − Φ(𝑍𝑖)
 
where 𝜙 denotes the standard normal probability density function, and Φ is the standard 
normal cumulative density function of the independent variables (𝑍𝑖). The inverse Mills ratio 
is included in equation (2) as a control for sample selection bias. Under the null hypothesis of 
                                                 
60 The setup of Heckman (1979) model assumes bivariate normality, which is applicable under probit estimation 
(Bushway et al., 2007). 
61 In Malaysia, GLICs continue to serve as the main policy tool for the government in its capital market 
development agenda. These institutional investors hold a substantial amount of equity in public listed firms, and 
hence are able to take an active role in firms’ management and enforce control (Wahab et al., 2007).   
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no selectivity bias, we test whether the coefficient on lambda (𝜆) is statistically significantly 
different from zero. If this is not the case, endogeneity concerns due to selection bias are not 
an issue.  
To assess the financial impact of sukuk issuance, the standard event study methodology 
is performed to determine whether there is an abnormal stock price reaction to the issuance 
announcement. From the finding, we are able to infer the economic significance of this 
corporate event. This thesis predicts that the increased disclosure and monitoring associated 
with real asset transactions in sukuk issuance lead to a reduction in agency costs thereby 
generating positive wealth effects for shareholders.  
The market model is estimated for each firm with FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI 
(FBMKLCI) as the benchmark. The abnormal return (AR) is measured as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡)           (3) 
where for firm i in period t,  AR is the abnormal return; 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the raw return; 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the return 
on the market portfolio; and 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are the constant and parameter estimate respectively. 
The model is estimated over an estimation period of -200 to -100 days prior to the 
announcement date ‘0’. The average abnormal return is computed as: 
𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 =
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 
and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is:   
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡1,𝑡2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖,𝑡
𝑡=𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
. 
We compute the CAR for event windows (-3, +1) and (-10, +10) days surrounding the 
announcement. These event windows are selected to account for potential information leakage 
and post announcement drift during sukuk syndication.The test of significance of CARs is the 
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standardised residual model by Patell (1976), which allows for heteroscedasticity in the event 
window residuals and prevents a few large sample deviations from driving the results.62 
 
5.4.3 Tests of sukuk certification effects (RQ3) 
To test the certification hypotheses (H5 to H7), a general linear regression specification that 
takes the following form is estimated: 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽
′𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                                             (4) 
where Spread is the difference between the sukuk yield to maturity and the benchmark rate. 
The main test variable is Certification, which is a vector of proxies for Shariah and 
investment certification effects. Control is a set of explanatory variables that may also affect 
the yield spread, which include issuance and firm characteristics. Definitions of the test 
variables in regression (2) are provided in Table 5.4. White’s (1980) robust variance estimator 
is used to correct for heteroscedasticity in linear regression.  
 
Measurement of sukuk spread 
Previous studies on the pricing effect of third party certification in debt securities use an 
all-in-drawn spread measure, which includes the transaction cost of the debt arrangement, 
such as the arranging or underwriting fees. Since this information is not available for sukuk 
issuance, we base our pricing measure on sukuk yield spread. Therefore, Spread is defined as 
the difference between the yield to maturity (YTM) and the Kuala Lumpur Interbank Offered 
Rate (KLIBOR). 
 
 
                                                 
62 We also consider Boehmer et al.'s (1991) cross-sectional t test which is robust to event-induced variance 
increases. Using this alternative method does not significantly affect the findings. 
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Proxy of lead arranger’s reputation 
The proxy for lead arranger’s reputation is based on the market league table (market 
share tabulation).63 Market share indicates a bank’s ‘brand name’ and ‘goodwill’ (Fang, 
2005). Ross (2010) infers that reputation has a cut-off rather than a continuous effect, such 
that a highly reputable bank will never cheat because the costs of damaged reputation far 
outweigh the benefits from cheating. Therefore, we use a Top 5 bank dummy that equals one 
if the lead arranger is among the top five banks on Bloomberg’s league table, and zero 
otherwise. We observe that the top five banks, such as CIMB, Maybank, and AmInvestment 
Bank, account for at least two-thirds of the security underwritings in the Malaysian capital 
year after year. Therefore, there is a sense of stability of their reputation over time. As a 
robustness check, we follow previous studies that use top three banks to capture the lead 
arranger’s reputation effect (Ross, 2010; Do and Vu, 2010). If the lead bank’s reputation 
provides a credible stamp about the quality of the firm’s investment, we expect to see a 
negative sign on the Top 5 bank coefficient. 
 
Proxies of Shariah certification  
We construct two variables to test the certification effects of Shariah advisors. First, 
following Azmat et al. (2015), we include a Shariah committee dummy which takes the value 
of one if the sukuk issue is endorsed by a committee of Shariah advisors, and zero if it is 
endorsed by a single Shariah advisor. Endorsement of sukuk by a Shariah advisory committee 
lowers investors’ Shariah risk concerns due to the perceived congruence of advisers’ opinions 
(Godlewski et al. 2014). Hence, we predict a negative coefficient for this variable.  
                                                 
63 Other studies such as Billett et al. (1995) and Cook et al. (2003) use banks’ credit rating as reputation proxy. 
However, we do not have sufficient information about the credit rating of sample banks, and thus do not use the 
rating in the analysis.  
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Second, we create a Top 5 Shariah advisor dummy that equals one if the advisor is 
among the top five Shariah advisors in the sukuk market in the previous year of sukuk 
issuance, and zero otherwise. This variable captures the reputation effect of Shariah advisors. 
We expect the coefficient of Top 5 Shariah advisor to have a negative sign since an 
endorsement by a reputable Shariah advisor is associated with lower Shariah risk perception, 
hence a lower sukuk spread.  
We construct an IFI arranger dummy to test the Shariah monitoring effect of Shariah 
conscious investors. Arrangers are responsible for administering the deal, and thus have 
greater control over the operation of the sukuk contract relative to other syndicate members. 
Hence, IFI arranger takes a value of one if at least one arranger (either the lead or joint lead 
arranger) in the syndicate is an IFI. If the presence of at least one IFI as the arranger enhances 
Shariah monitoring, which in turn reduces the required premium associated with Shariah risk, 
IFI arranger should appear with a negative coefficient.  
 
Control variables 
The terms of the sukuk contract, as negotiated between the arrangers and the issuers, 
may imply the level of adverse selection or moral hazard problems. Since the contract is 
designed prior to lead arrangers’ invitation of other financial institutions to participate in the 
syndicate, these potential syndicate members are likely to incorporate information on issuance 
characteristics into their valuation. To capture issuance-related risks, we control for the 
issuance amount, maturity, issuance rating, syndicate size, and collateral structure.  
Existing literature shows that larger loans and loans with a longer maturity are 
associated with higher lenders’ risk exposure (Cook et al., 2003). Accounting for such risk, 
lenders are more likely to demand a premium for their loan, i.e., a higher spread. We thus 
expect a positive sign for Amount and Maturity. 
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Credit rating is an important determinant of credit spread because it indicates the quality 
of the issuance. It follows that investment grade debt securities have less concern about 
adverse selection and default risk, which in turn reduces the risk premium required by 
investors. Evidence shows that syndicated loans that are assigned with an investment grade 
rating are associated with a lower spread (Godlewski and Weill, 2008; Ross, 2010).64 
Following previous studies, we include Investment grade rating, a dummy variable that 
equals one if the credit rating is “investment grade”, and zero otherwise (Fang, 2005; 
McCahery and Schwienbacher, 2010). We predict a negative coefficient for this variable.  
Lee and Mullineaux (2004) and Sufi (2007) find that firms with lower information 
quality or relatively riskier firms have a smaller syndicate of lenders. Following these studies, 
we use Syndicate size, defined as the number of lenders in the syndicate, to control for 
syndicate structure that may mitigate informational asymmetry and agency problems within 
the syndicate. Since a large number of lenders in the syndicate indicate a lower risk due to 
greater risk sharing or diversification (Bae et al., 2014), a lower spread is expected. We expect 
to see a negative sign on the Syndicate size coefficient.  
The use of collateral and SPV in structured finance is related to firms’ attempt to 
minimise adverse selection and moral hazard (Finnerty, 2013). Our analysis in the previous 
chapter shows that issuers with higher agency cost of underinvestment pledge collateral and 
use an SPV for sukuk issuance. We expect Secured and SPV sukuk structures are associated 
with a lower spread, and thus predict a negative coefficient for both dummy variables. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Ratings on sukuk are usually obtained before the lead arranger invites other participant banks. This allows 
potential syndicate members to infer about the credit risk of the issuance and incorporate this information in their 
valuation, see http://www.mifc.com/?ch=ch_kc_framework&pg=pg_kcfm_regulatory&ac=196. 
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Table 5.4: Variable definitions for tests of sukuk certification effects (RQ3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Definitions
Dependent variable
Spread Sukuk yield to maturity spread over KLIBOR
Test variables
Top 5 bank 1 if sukuk issuance is arranged by a top 5 bank and 0 otherwise
Top 5 shariah advisor 1 if sukuk issuance is approved by a top 5 shariah advisor and 0 otherwise
Shariah committee 1 if sukuk issuance is approved by a Shariah advisory committee and 0 otherwise
IFI arranger 1 if sukuk issuance is arranged by an IFI and 0 otherwise
Control variables
Ln(Amount ) Natural logarithm of tranche issuance amount
Maturity Tenor of sukuk tranche in years
Investment grade rating 1 if trance issuance rating is investment grade and 0 otherwise
Syndicate size Number of arrangers/lenders
Secured 1 if sukuk issuance is secured and 0 otherwise
SPV 1 if sukuk issuance involves an SPV and 0 otherwise
Murabahah 1 if sukuk issuance is structured based on murabahah principle and 0 otherwise
Ijarah 1 if sukuk issuance is structured based on ijarah principle and 0 otherwise
Istisna 1 if sukuk issuance is structured based on istisna principle and 0 otherwise
Mudarabah 1 if sukuk issuance is structured based on mudarabah principle and 0 otherwise
Musharakah 1 if sukuk issuance is structured based on musharakah principle and 0 otherwise
Private firm 1 if the issuer is a privately held firm
Ln(Assets ) Natural logarithm of total assets
Profitability The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets
Debt-to-asset Total debt divided by total assets
Z score Altman's (1968) Z score computed by Thomson Reuters. A firm has a lower risk 
of going bankrupt if z > 2.99 (manufacturing weights) or z > 2.66 (non-
manufacturing weights)
Instrument variables
Issue frequency The number of previous sukuk issuance made by the issuer
Proximity 1 if the distance between the issuer's headquater and the lead arranger's 
headquarter is within 30 kilometers, 0 otherwise
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Previous studies suggest that firms’ financial characteristics influence the borrowing 
costs. Firms with a strong financial stance are less risky, and are accordingly charged with a 
lower interest rate (Focarelli et al., 2008; Do and Vu, 2010). We include four measures of 
firm-level risk, namely Assets, Debt-to-asset, Profitability, and Z score. We predict that sukuk 
issued by larger firms, firms with lower leverage ratio, higher profitability, and lower 
financial distress have lower yield spreads. Further, since private firms suffer from higher 
information asymmetry than public listed firms, we predict a higher spread for Private firm 
dummy due to greater screening and monitoring efforts required by the lead arranger (Sufi, 
2007). 
Finally, since the degree of credit and Shariah risks may vary across Islamic finance 
structures applied to the sukuk contract, we control for a set of dummy variables that 
represent murabahah, ijarah, istisna, mudarabah, and musharakah structures. We also control 
for year and industry dummies in the regressions. Definitions of variables used in this test 
appear in Table 5.4. 
 
Robustness tests 
The syndicated loan literature suggests that self-selection bias is a material concern in 
the context of highly reputable lead banks. Potential self-selection is likely amongst the top 
lead arrangers where they choose to underwrite only issuance from high quality firms in order 
to protect their reputation (Fang, 2005; McCahery and Schwienbacher, 2010). From an 
econometric perspective, since the reduced-form estimation tends to overlook these self-
selection issues, inference drawn may be erroneous.  
We address the self-selection issue by using a treatment effect model which depicts 
arranger-issuer choice as a function of firm-specific variables. A suitable instrument for this 
model is one that influences the arranger-issuer choice, but is not ex ante related to sukuk 
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pricing. We use the number of previous sukuk issues (Issue frequency) as the first instrument. 
Intuitively, banks are more likely to choose firms that have previously issued sukuk since 
doing so reduces their information search cost. The second instrument is the bank’s 
geographical proximity (Proximity) to the issuer. Shorter geographic distance between the 
bank and the issuing firm may affect the arranger-issuer choice because the transaction costs, 
particularly related to information acquisition, can be minimised (Ross, 2010). The treatment 
model is specified as the following:  
𝑇𝑜𝑝 5 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝑓(𝑋, 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦)       (5) 
Where X is a vector of firm-specific variables, and Issue frequency and Proximity are the 
identifying variables that may affect issuers’ choice of a top bank, but not the yield spread. 
The other variables are as previously specified. Equation (5) is estimated using a probit model 
due to bivariate normality assumption (Heckman, 1979) (see Appendix 1 for the estimation 
results). The inverse Mills ratio computed from equation (5) is then included in the equation 
(4) when firm characteristics are controlled for. 
Additional tests are conducted to determine whether the results are robust to alternative 
specifications. First, we use the number of lenders or syndicate members as another proxy for 
risk perception and substitute Spread as the dependent variable in equation (3). If our 
hypotheses hold, the coefficients of the explanatory variables will appear with an opposite 
sign to that when Spread is the dependent variable. 
Second, we test whether the results are driven by prominent events in 2008: the AAOIFI 
pronouncement and the GFC. This is achieved by partitioning the sample into pre- and post-
2008 periods, and estimating equation (4) separately for each of the periods. This method 
allows us to compare the statistical and economic impacts of certification variables between 
the two periods. 
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5.5  Chapter Summary 
We employ logistic regressions to simulate firms’ incremental financing decision to test 
the agency cost hypothesis for corporate choice of issuing sukuk. This method helps to 
directly answer the question of why sukuk are preferred to conventional bonds. Our analysis 
of issuers’ choice of sukuk structure is conditional on sukuk issuance. We consider three 
observable choices of sukuk structure: (i) debt-like vs. equity-like; (ii) secured vs. unsecured; 
and (iii) SPV vs. no SPV. A common practice in the corporate financing choice literature is to 
assess the economic consequences of firms’ decision. We follow this by employing an event 
study analysis, which allows us to draw inferences on the particular mechanism by which 
sukuk can add value to the issuer. 
Our approach to examining the pricing effect of sukuk certification is novel for several 
reasons. First, we use the yield spread to capture the risk premium required by lending 
institutions in a sukuk contract. Using this measure as the response variable allows us to 
directly assess the driving factors of sukuk holders’ risk perception. Second, since the analysis 
is issuance-specific, we are able to exploit a large dataset of sukuk issued by both privately 
held and publicly listed firms, i.e., the analysis is not restricted to the sample of issuers with 
available firm-level information of which private firms’ financial reporting is known to be 
lacking. Finally, we use a set of variables to capture the certification effects of key parties 
involved in a sukuk issuance. Our innovation also lies in the construction of an IFI arranger 
dummy to capture the monitoring effect of Shariah-regulated financial institutions.  
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Chapter 6 
Empirical Results 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results addressing the three research questions. It begins 
with a discussion of results from logistic regressions and the event study analysis of firms’ choice 
of sukuk and their structure (RQ1 and RQ2) in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 presents and discusses the 
empirical results for the certification effects of key external parties involved in sukuk issuance, 
while Section 6.3 provides a summary of the chapter.  
 
6.1 The Choice of Sukuk and Sukuk Structure 
6.1.1 Summary statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 6.1 presents the mean and median of each independent variable, with the 
corresponding test statistics for differences across the financing types. Comparing firms that issue 
sukuk with conventional bond issuers, we observe that sukuk issuers generate on average three 
times more free cash flow, and are 57 percent more profitable. These differences are statistically 
significant under both parametric (t-test) and non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) tests. To the extent 
that these firm-specific variables act as indicators of potential agency cost of free cash flow, there 
is preliminary support for H1.  
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics and test of differences in variables across debt security types 
This table presents the mean and median (italic) values of independent variables and results from tests of difference. ***, **, * denote two-tailed significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. t-test (Mann Whitney z-test) is used for test of difference in means (medians). See Table 5.3 for variable definitions.  
Sukuk                      
Conv. 
bonds Debt Equity Secured Unsecured SPV
No 
SPV
Agency cost variables
Free cash flow 0.09 0.03 5.11 *** 0.09 0.10 0.33 0.10 0.08 1.18 0.10 0.09 0.32
0.08 0.03 5.83 *** 0.09 0.06 -1.03 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.16
Profitability 0.11 0.07 3.45 *** 0.11 0.09 1.79 * 0.10 0.11 -1.45 0.10 0.11 -0.46
0.11 0.08 4.04 *** 0.11 0.09 -1.95 * 0.10 0.12 -1.78 * 0.11 0.11 -0.16
Market-to-book 1.73 1.05 3.73 *** 1.70 1.85 -0.46 1.53 1.92 -1.44 2.23 1.61 1.84 *
1.28 1.00 3.33 *** 1.23 1.54 -1.36 1.09 1.59 -2.62 *** 1.42 1.26 0.34
Depreciation 0.03 0.05 -1.82 * 0.03 0.02 1.75 * 0.02 0.03 -1.86 * 0.03 0.03 -0.28
0.02 0.02 0.51 0.02 0.02 2.15 ** 0.02 0.02 1.71 * 0.02 0.02 -0.57
Debt-to-asset 0.30 0.41 -4.06 *** 0.30 0.28 0.72 0.34 0.26 3.23 *** 0.33 0.29 1.47
0.30 0.36 -3.13 *** 0.30 0.29 0.76 0.33 0.25 3.20 *** 0.33 0.30 1.32
Z-score 6.40 5.03 2.10 ** 6.46 6.19 0.34 5.82 6.95 -1.74 * 5.46 6.63 -1.45
6.17 4.96 3.40 *** 6.25 5.35 1.23 5.62 6.52 -1.33 5.23 6.26 -1.68 *
Control variables
5.92 4.00 3.25 *** 5.30 8.02 -3.73 *** 2.79 8.86 -5.15 *** 6.56 5.76 1.31
1.26 0.53 3.26 *** 0.73 3.48 -3.91 *** 0.59 3.68 -4.75 *** 1.95 1.11 1.60
Age (year) 20.75 21.51 -0.78 18.42 28.68 -2.39 ** 14.79 26.34 -4.12 *** 19.71 21.00 -0.28
16.25 16.50 -0.69 14.92 27.25 -2.49 ** 10.24 27.13 -4.01 *** 18.00 16.25 0.22
Residual s.d. 0.02 0.03 -5.94 *** 0.02 0.02 -2.40 ** 0.02 0.02 3.65 ** 0.02 0.02 0.90
0.02 0.03 -4.64 *** 0.02 0.02 -2.30 ** 0.02 0.02 3.54 ** 0.02 0.02 1.11
Tangibility 0.39 0.42 -0.98 0.41 0.30 2.51 ** 0.39 0.38 0.14 0.40 0.38 0.41
0.38 0.42 -1.01 0.43 0.25 2.83 *** 0.40 0.37 0.18 0.40 0.38 0.22
GLIC 0.77 0.43 5.65 *** 0.75 0.86 -1.29 0.73 0.82 -1.25 0.80 0.77 0.35
1 0 5.30 *** 1 1 -1.29 1 1 -1.24 1 1 0.35
Muslim directors 0.51 0.39 3.23 ** 0.48 0.60 -2.00 ** 0.50 0.52 -0.23 0.53 0.50 0.39
0.50 0.33 2.96 *** 0.50 0.60 -2.12 ** 0.50 0.52 -0.20 1 0 0.43
Shariah Index 0.72 0.48 3.91 *** 0.68 0.86 -1.82 * 0.61 0.83 -2.76 *** 0.83 0.70 1.35
1 0 -3.79 *** 1 1 -1.80 * 1 1 -2.69 *** 1 1 1.35
0.57 0.72 -1.54 0.53 0.67 -1.55 0.68 0.58 0.89
1 1 -1.53 1 1 -1.55 1 1 0.89
Shariah committee
Difference Difference Difference Difference
Total assets (MYR bil)
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The mean and median Market-to-book ratios indicate that sukuk issuers have significantly 
higher growth opportunities (by 65 percent) than conventional bond issuers. The lower leverage 
and financial distress of sukuk issuers, as indicated by an 11 percent lower Debt-to-asset ratio 
and a 1.37 higher average Z score, is contrary to the agency cost of debt prediction. Mohamed et 
al. (2015) also report a lower debt to asset ratio for their sukuk sample over the 2000-2012 
period.  
Sukuk issuers are on average 48 percent larger than conventional bond issuers, with a mean 
(median) total assets of MYR5.92 billion (MYR1.26 billion). They also have a 10 percent lower 
residual standard deviation than conventional bond issuers. Together, these findings are 
indicative of lower information asymmetry for sukuk issuers. As expected, sukuk issuers are 
more likely to have a GLIC as a substantial shareholder and to be a constituent of the Shariah 
Index than conventional bond issuers. Sukuk issuers also have a 12 percent higher proportion of 
Muslim directors on the board. 
Several tentative inferences can be made from a comparison of firm characteristics across 
the sukuk subsamples. Sukuk issuers that use a debt-like structure are on average 20 percent more 
profitable and have higher depreciation than those issuers that use an equity-like structure. Debt-
like sukuk issuers are relatively opaque; they are 34 percent smaller and ten years younger than 
equity-like sukuk issuers. Consistent with the requirement that debt-like sukuk must be 
predominantly based on physical assets, the mean and median Tangibility of debt-like sukuk 
issuers are significantly higher than those of equity-like sukuk issuers.  
The univariate tests provide ambiguous indications as to whether high growth firms prefer 
secured or unsecured sukuk structure. However, indicative of agency cost of debt, firms that 
pledge collateral in sukuk issuance have on average an eight percent higher Debt-to-asset ratio 
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and a 1.03 lower Z score. These differences are significant at the 1 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. Consistent with the information asymmetry explanation, issuers of secured sukuk 
are on average significantly smaller (by 70 percent), and younger (by 11.5 years) than unsecured 
sukuk issuers. Other than Market-to-book ratio and Z score, we do not find any significant 
difference in firm-specific variables between firms that create an SPV for their sukuk issuance 
and those that do not. 
Table 6.2 displays pair-wise correlations between independent variables for the full set of 
observations. We note significant and high correlations between various test variables, implying 
that these variables share similar underlying constructs. For example, Profitability is significantly 
positively correlated with Free cash flow, while Z score is significantly positively correlated with 
Depreciation but significantly negatively correlated with Debt-to-asset ratio. The observed high 
correlations could result in a spurious relation between sukuk financing decision and our proxies 
of agency conflicts. To minimise potential multicollinearity in the regressions, we examine the 
explanatory power of these highly correlated test variables in separate regressions.  
 
 
126 
 
Table 6.2: Pearson correlation matrix of variables for tests of debt security choice 
This table presents the correlation matrix of independent variables. ***, **, * denote significance at the minimum 5 percent level. See Table 5.3 for variable 
definitions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Free cash flow 1.00
2 Profitability 0.52 * 1.00
3 Market-to-book 0.15 * 0.22 * 1.00
4 Depreciation 0.07 0.18 * 0.09 1.00
5 Debt-to-asset -0.26 * -0.32 * -0.20 * -0.10 1.00
6 Z score 0.21 * 0.41 * 0.28 * 0.53 * -0.55 * 1.00
7 Ln(Assets ) 0.09 0.02 0.21 * -0.12 -0.10 -0.04 1.00
8 Ln(Age ) -0.16 * -0.15 * -0.01 -0.11 0.03 -0.07 0.39 * 1.00
9 Residual s.d. -0.34 * -0.34 * -0.36 * -0.03 0.33 * -0.33 * -0.43 * -0.05 1.00
10 Tangibility 0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.20 * -0.16 * 0.04 0.02 -0.02 1.00
11 GLIC 0.23 * 0.10 0.20 * -0.04 -0.08 0.08 0.34 * 0.14 * -0.32 * 0.00 1.00
12 Muslim directors 0.10 -0.04 0.12 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.22 * 0.00 -0.12 -0.05 0.34 * 1.00
13 Shariah Index 0.07 0.02 0.32 * -0.04 -0.26 * 0.20 * 0.53 * 0.12 * -0.40 * -0.03 0.31 * 0.16 * 1.00
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6.1.2 Multivariate analysis 
The choice between sukuk and conventional bonds 
Table 6.3 reports the results from logistic regression of firms’ choice of sukuk (Pr(Sukuk> 
0) on agency cost proxies– Free cash flow, Profitability, Market-to-book, Depreciation, Debt-to-
asset, and Z score. Control variables are included in the model specifications. To provide 
meaningful economic interpretations, we report the marginal effects at the mean (MEMs) of each 
test variable instead of the unstandardised logistic regression coefficient.65  
Specifications (1) and (2) provide the results for the full sample, where we test the 
likelihood of firms issuing sukuk instead of conventional bonds. Since debt-like sukuk are 
deemed more comparable to conventional bonds in terms of the risk and return structure, we 
rerun the test for the subsample of debt-like sukuk issuers in specifications (3) and (4). 
Our results support agency cost mitigation as a motivation for sukuk issuance, in line with 
H1. Consistent with univariate results, firms with higher Free cash flow (specification (1)) and 
Profitability (specification (2)) are more likely to issue sukuk than conventional bonds. The 
MEMs for Free cash flow and Profitability indicate that the likelihood of firms issuing sukuk is 
highly responsive to changes in free cash flow. In economic terms, a 1 percent increase in Free 
cash flow and Profitability are associated with an increase in the probability of issuing sukuk by 
1.434 and 1.156 percent. Previous studies do not find that profitability is significant in explaining 
corporate decision to sukuk issuance (e.g. Nagano, 2010; Shahida and Saharah, 2013; Mohamed 
et al., 2015). The difference in results may be due to the use of a binary dependent variable 
                                                 
65 The marginal effect measures the instantaneous rate of change for a continuous independent variable and the 
discrete change for a binary independent variable. See ‘Marginal effects for continuous variables’ by Richard 
Williams at http://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/. 
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representing the choice between sukuk and conventional bonds in our study, and the use of 
relative sukuk issuance size (scaled by either total liability or total assets) in past studies.  
Consistent with Mohamed et al. (2015), we find sukuk issuers have higher growth 
opportunities, as proxied by Market-to-book and Depreciation. The MEMs for Depreciation is 
fairly large, indicating that for every 1 percent increase in Depreciation, the probability of issuing 
sukuk increases by 0.776 percent.  
Our main proxy for financial distress, Debt-to-asset, is insignificant, consistent with 
Shahida and Saharah (2013) who use leverage to proxy for firms’ funding ability. Therefore, 
there is no evidence to support the proposition that the level of debt in place is an important 
consideration in the choice of sukuk. A plausible reason is that, even for highly leveraged firms, 
sukuk contracts (as in project finance) can be tailored to achieve a sound security structure such 
that they prioritize the repayment to current lenders (McMillen, 2000). In specification (2), the 
coefficient on Z score is significant and has the predicted sign. However, its economic 
significance is too small to be meaningful such that a 1 point decrease in Z score, hence an 
increase of the likelihood of going bankrupt, is associated with only 1.4 percent increase in the 
probability of firms choosing sukuk.  
The positive and negative coefficients on Profitability and Depreciation respectively are 
consistent with the tax motivation of sukuk issuers. To the extent that sukuk contracts function 
like project finance, this tax motivation for sukuk issuance is in accord with John and John (1991) 
who conclude that project finance leads to a net reduction in agency costs and a net increase in 
tax shields.  
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Table 6.3: Logistic regression analysis of bond security choice 
 
This table presents the results of the logistic regression model in equation (1). The coefficients reported are marginal 
effects at the mean. In specifications (1) and (2), the dependent variable takes a value of 1 for sukuk, and 0 for 
conventional bonds. In specifications (3) and (4), the dependent variable takes a value of 1 for debt-like sukuk, and 0 
for conventional bonds. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. z-statistics 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in parentheses. See Table 5.3 for variable definitions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Agency variables
Free cash flow 1.434 *** 1.808 ***
(3.76) (3.27)
Profitability 1.156 *** 1.415 ***
(2.69) (2.74)
Market-to-book 0.046 ** 0.055 ** 0.050 ** 0.065 **
(2.04) (2.15) (2.18) (2.36)
Depreciation -0.776 ** -0.858 ***
(-2.52) (-2.74)
Debt-to-asset -0.283 -0.309
(-1.50) (-1.54)
Z score -0.014 ** -0.011
(-2.13) (-1.44)
Control variables
Ln(Assets ) 0.088 -0.028 0.065 -0.031
(1.61) (-0.47) (1.03) (-0.43)
Ln(Age ) -0.248 ** -0.331 *** -0.296 ** -0.386 ***
(-2.24) (-2.90) (-2.24) (-2.77)
Residual s.d. -7.122 *** -5.882 **
(-3.10) (-2.09)
Tangibility -0.183 -0.165 -0.203 -0.237
(-1.19) (-0.90) (-1.21) (-1.22)
GLIC 0.196 *** 0.197 *** 0.238 *** 0.228 ***
(2.61) (2.76) (2.80) (2.63)
Muslim directors 0.235 ** 0.353 *** 0.080 0.252 **
(1.99) (2.94) (0.67) (2.01)
Shariah Index 0.083 0.080 0.061 0.045
(0.88) (0.94) (0.62) (0.51)
Constant -3.452 5.017 -0.732 6.813
(-1.11) (1.42) (-0.21) (1.52)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 34.25% 33.33% 39.00%  37.95%
% Correctly classified 79.05% 77.89% 80.77% 76.02%
Sukuk vs. 
Conventional bonds
Debt-like sukuk vs. 
Conventional bonds
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Focusing on the control variables, Ln(Assets) is both economically and statistically 
insignificant, contrary to previous studies which find either a positive (Nagano, 2010; Shahida 
and Saharah, 2013) or negative sign (Mohamed et al., 2015) for this variable. We find younger 
firms and firms with lower idiosyncratic risk are more likely to issue sukuk. Taken together, there 
is little evidence that information asymmetry is a significant driver of firms’ choice of sukuk vs. 
conventional debt. Tangibility is insignificant in our estimation, consistent with Mohamed et al. 
(2015) who infer that sukuk issuers rely more on intangible assets despite regulators’ emphasis 
on tangible asset-backing in sukuk issuance. Another plausible explanation can be derived from 
the contractual structure of project finance where the projected cash flows and originators’ 
guarantee form the main security for lenders instead of originators’ existing physical assets 
(Farrell, 2003). 
The positive coefficient on GLIC is in line with our conjecture that GLICs provide an 
effective vehicle for the Malaysian government to promote sukuk issuance. The impact of this 
political factor is economically large. All else equal, having a GLIC as a substantial shareholder 
increases the probability of firms issuing sukuk by 19.6 percent. This finding is consistent with 
Fraser et al. (2006) who document a positive influence of GLICs’ ownership on firms’ leverage 
in Malaysia. As expected, sukuk issuers are more likely to have a higher fraction of Muslim 
directors on the board. However, whether the firm belongs to a Shariah Index is immaterial to the 
decision to issue sukuk.  
Specifications (3) and (4) show the results are robust when we analyse the likelihood of 
firms issuing debt-like sukuk instead of conventional bonds. In this reduced sample, there is 
strong empirical support for agency cost mitigation as a driving factor for firms to choose to issue 
debt-like sukuk. 
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We also replicate previous studies that use sukuk proceeds (scaled by total assets and 
liabilities) as the response variable (Nagano, 2010; Shahida and Saharah, 2013; Mohamed et al. 
(2015). Results (see Appendix 2) show that Free cash flow has a negative sign and a large 
coefficient value across specifications, ranging from 1.131 to 2.55. This finding supports that 
firms with higher free cash flow tend to obtain higher sukuk leverage. The statistically 
insignificant coefficient of Profitability echoes the finding reported in previous studies. In line 
with Mohamed et al. (2015), firm size is negatively associated with sukuk proceeds. Hence, small 
firms are able to raise higher sukuk proceeds, consistent with the fact that the elaborate and 
complex structures of asset-based financing serve to restrict moral hazard problems thereby 
allowing firms to achieve higher leverage. 
 
The choice of sukuk structure 
Table 6.4 reports the logistic regression results for the tests of issuers’ choice of sukuk 
structure. We control for potential selectivity bias in each specification, which is represented by 
the inverse Mills ratio. As before, we report the MEM of the coefficients for economic 
interpretation. The logistic regression model does well in predicting the choice of sukuk structure 
in all specifications, as indicated by the classification statistics. At least 76 percent of sukuk 
structures are correctly predicted using the regression specifications. 
Specifications (1) and (2) display the results for the determinants of sukuk issuers’ choice 
between debt-like and equity-like structure. Our analysis yields results contrary to the agency 
cost of free cash flow argument for debt structure issuance (H2). Free cash flow is negative and 
statistically significant (5 percent level). As specification (1) shows, a 1 percent increase in Free 
cash flow reduces the probability of firms choosing debt-like structure by 0.865 percent. 
132 
 
Although Profitability is statistically insignificant, the AME of its coefficient shows that firms 
are 1.374 percent more likely to choose debt-like structure than equity-like ones when their 
profitability increases by 1 percent. Given these conflicting and mixed results, we infer that 
equity-like sukuk do not appear to vary significantly from debt-like sukuk in terms of agency 
cost. Credit enhancements, notably liquidity-facility contracts and purchase undertakings that are 
being practiced by sukuk issuers may explain this finding (Dusuki, 2010). Our finding partly 
supports Azmat et al.’s (2014a) conclusion that firms treat equity-like sukuk structure different 
from common equity.  
Consistent with H3, results from specifications (3) and (4) show that firms with higher 
growth opportunities (lower Depreciation) and financial distress (higher Debt-to-asset ratios and 
lower Z score) are more likely to pledge collateral in their sukuk contracts. The AME is 
particularly large for Depreciation and Debt-to-asset: for every 1 percent increase in depreciation 
and leverage, the probability that a sukuk issuance includes a collateral provision increases by 
4.635 and 1.256 percent, respectively. Our sample thus corroborates the practical importance of 
collateral for firms with higher agency cost of debt.  
Similarly, firms that issue sukuk through an SPV are also characterised as having high 
growth opportunities and financial distress, as shown by specifications (5) and (6). This finding is 
consistent with the proposition that using an SPV in sukuk issuance mitigates the agency cost of 
underinvestment. Contrary to our expectation, none of the proxies for agency cost of free cash 
flow is statistically or economically significant in explaining the use of an SPV in sukuk 
issuance. A plausible reason is the delegation of the trustee’s role by SPVs to external agents to 
ensure that the issuer discharges its payment obligation.  
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Table 6.4: Logistic regression analysis of sukuk structure choice 
 
This table presents the results of the logistic regressions using Heckman specification to assess the potential effect of 
self-selection. The coefficients reported are marginal effects at the mean. In specifications (1) and (2), the dependent 
variable takes a value of 1 for debt-like structure, and 0 for equity-like structure. In specifications (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 for secured structure, and 0 for unsecured structure. In specifications (5) and 
(6), the dependent variable takes a value of 1 for sukuk issued through an SPV, and 0 otherwise. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. z-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level are in parentheses. See Table 5.3 for variable definitions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agency variables
Free cash flow -0.865 ** 1.456 ** -0.315
(-2.14) (2.06) (-0.87)
Profitability 1.374 0.049 1.324
(1.45) (0.03) (1.15)
Market-to-book -0.041 0.035 -0.033 -0.059 0.015 0.038 *
(-1.48) (0.90) (-1.24) (-1.65) (0.57) (1.05)
Depreciation 4.253 -4.635 * -2.614
(1.39) (-1.72) (-0.69)
Debt-to-asset 0.284 1.256 *** 0.742 *
(1.05) (2.91) (1.89)
Z score -0.020 -0.075 ** -0.065 **
(-1.30) (-2.43) (-2.10)
Control variables
Ln(Assets ) -0.183 *** -0.153 * -0.284 ** -0.431 *** -0.023 -0.008
(-2.70) (-1.78) (-2.12) (-3.59) (-0.22) (-0.07)
Ln(Age ) -0.118 -0.243 * -0.318 ** -0.171 * -0.011 -0.068
(-0.87) (-1.69) (-1.99) (-1.81) (-0.09) (-0.49)
Residual s.d. 7.279 -0.279 1.926
(1.45) (-0.04) (0.23)
Tangibility 0.365 0.117 ** 0.169 0.316 0.262 0.100
(1.46) (2.34) (0.67) (1.35) (1.29) (0.53)
Muslim directors -0.266 -0.116 0.168 -0.003 -0.183 -0.253
(-1.55) (-0.73) (0.94) (-0.02) (-0.95) (-1.26)
Shariah Index -0.021 0.021 0.140 0.105 0.092 0.180
(-0.17) (0.23) (1.05) (0.74) (0.56) (1.05)
Shariah committee -0.024 -0.148 0.142 0.217 ** 0.020 0.036
(-0.27) (-1.40) (1.39) (2.07) (0.18) (0.27)
Inverse Mills ratio -0.339 ** -0.088 -0.068 -0.423 ** -0.330 -0.197
(-2.17) (-0.48) (-0.41) (-2.40) (-1.57) (-1.08)
Constant 15.90 *** 11.10 * 19.76 ** 28.21 *** -1.527 -0.655
(3.35) (1.88) (2.29) (3.33) (-0.22) (-0.08)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 28.29% 31.75% 39.97% 36.91% 17.04% 20.65%
% Correctly classified 79.28% 84.76% 80.37% 76.53% 81.82% 80.58%
SPV vs. No SPVDebt-like vs. Equity-like Secured vs. Unsecured
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With respect to the control variables, smaller firms are more likely to issue debt-like 
structure and pledge collateral in their sukuk issuance, as are younger firms. The economic 
impact of Assets and Age on the probability of firms choosing debt-like and secured sukuk 
structures is significant. Informational opacity is thus another important factor driving issuers’ 
choice of sukuk structure. These findings support Khan’s (2010) contention that with high 
probability of adverse selection and moral hazard problems, debt-like and collateralised 
structures are preferred in order to minimise lenders’ risk. While we expect religious-related 
factors to play a significant role in determining sukuk issuers’ choice between debt-like and 
equity-like structure, we do not find this to be the case. Overall, our results indicate that the 
choice of sukuk structure largely depends on firms’ financial ability rather than their religious 
identity.  
 
6.1.3 The wealth effect of sukuk issuance on shareholders 
In this section, we perform the standard event study analysis to determine the abnormal 
stock price effect surrounding the sukuk issuance announcement. By calibrating the stock market 
reaction, we are able to infer the economic significance of this corporate event. We predict that 
the increased disclosure and monitoring associated with real asset transaction in sukuk issuance 
lead to a reduction in agency costs, hence generating positive wealth effects for shareholders.  
Table 6.5 reports the results. In Panel A, we find that irrespective of the event window 
used, both the announcements of sukuk and conventional bond issuance are associated with a 
positive average CAR of around 0.53 percent and 2.03 percent respectively. While the mean 
difference of these stock returns is large, it is statistically insignificant. These findings contradict 
those of Godlewski et al. (2013) and Alam et al. (2013), but are consistent with those of Ibrahim 
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and Minai (2009). We attribute the difference in results to differences in sampling procedures 
across the studies.66 A slightly larger proportion of sukuk have positive CARs compared to 
conventional bonds, although the difference is not statistically significant. Results from 
segregating the sukuk sample by structure type show that the announcement effect of sukuk 
issuance appears to be driven by unsecured sukuk and those with no SPV. These findings indicate 
that a less tight provision or structure in sukuk issuance is favoured by shareholders, possibly 
because the manager is able to preserve some degree of flexibility in cash flow allocation.  
For illustrative purposes, Figure 6.1 plots the CARs for sukuk and conventional bonds for 
the (-10, +10) days window surrounding the issuance announcement. The stock returns 
surrounding the sukuk issuance announcement moves somewhat in parallel with those of 
conventional bonds. However, the CAR for sukuk issuers spikes up from an average 0.14 on day 
-10 to 2.20 percent on the sukuk issuance announcement day. This substantial gain in stock 
returns confirms the value creation of sukuk issuance. Comparing the CARs across sukuk 
structures in Figure 6.2, we observe that stock returns are higher for equity-like sukuk during the 
days around the sukuk issuance announcement. However, debt-like sukuk consistently generate 
positive returns from day 2, surpassing the returns on equity-like sukuk. A similar pattern is 
observed for secured versus unsecured sukuk. Further, stock returns of firms that use an SPV are 
mostly negative and fluctuate considerably from day to day surrounding the sukuk issuance 
announcement. We note that the size of the SPV subsample with available stock return data is too 
small to draw reliable inferences. 
 
                                                 
66 Unlike Godlewski et al. (2013), our sample contains firms that issue both sukuk and conventional bonds. Since 
sukuk and conventional bond were not issued in the same year, or in consecutive years, we keep these firms in our 
sample.  
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Figure 6.1: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around bond security issuance 
announcement 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around sukuk issuance announcement 
across structure types 
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Table 6.5: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around bond security issuance announcement 
  
This table presents cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) by types of security issuance in Panel A and across HIGH and LOW agency characteristics (above or 
below sample median) in panel B. The test of difference in CARs across security issuance types as well as between high and low agency cost subsamples is 
based on t-statistics. See Table 5.3 for variable definitions. 
Event window (-10, +10)
Positive
CARs (%)
CAR 
(%)
Difference 
(t -stat) 
Positive
CARs (%)
CAR 
(%)
Panel A: CAR across security types
Conventional bonds 89 46.10 2.03 5.30 *** 1.04 49.44 2.02 2.19 ** 1.04
Sukuk 125 50.40 0.53 1.93 * 57.60 1.06 2.38 **
Debt-like 100 49.00 0.52 1.29 -0.55 59.00 1.12 1.77 * -0.86
Equity-like 28 50.00 0.28 1.25 46.43 0.44 1.44
Secured 62 45.16 -0.07 0.07 0.81 58.06 0.87 1.42 -0.21
Unsecured 66 53.03 0.97 2.33 ** 54.55 1.06 1.73 *
SPV 25 44.00 -0.73 -0.29 1.64 48.00 0.25 -0.17 0.23
No SPV 103 50.49 0.75 2.06 ** 58.25 1.14 2.57 **
Panel B: CAR for sukuk issuers across HIGH and LOW agency costs
HIGH agency cost (Free cash flow ) 61 0.37 1.13 -0.66 0.31 1.40 0.24
LOW agency cost (Free cash flow ) 64 0.68 1.81 * 1.77 1.95 *
HIGH agency cost (Market-to-book ) 65 0.79 1.38 1.25 2.19 2.61 *** 1.81 *
LOW agency cost (Market-to-book ) 60 0.24 1.34 -0.17 0.72
HIGH agency cost (Debt-to-asset ) 65 0.01 0.83 -0.66 0.11 1.52 -1.34
LOW agency cost (Debt-to-asset ) 60 1.09 1.91 * 2.08 1.85 *
HIGH agency cost (Z score ) 44 0.71 1.85 * 0.33 2.32 2.51 ** 0.52
LOW agency cost (Z score ) 84 0.28 1.20 0.26 0.94
N
Event window (-3, +1)
z -stat z -stat
Difference 
(t -stat) 
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In Panel B of Table 6.5, we test whether the wealth effect of sukuk is related to firms’ 
agency problems. We partition the firms into HIGH and LOW agency cost based on the sample 
median of the agency cost proxies, and then compare the CARs across the two groups. Our 
evidence suggests that sukuk issuance by firms with higher agency cost is associated with more 
positive and significant CARs. In particular, for the (-10, +10) window, firms with HIGH agency 
costs, as measured by Market-to-book ratio and Z score, have on average a two percentage point 
higher CAR than firms with LOW agency costs. This evidence corroborates that the market 
perceives sukuk to mitigate agency cost of underinvestment due to the flexibility for project-
specific allocation of debt and proper risk management. 
 
6.2 Sukuk Certification Effects 
This section reports the results from tests of the certification effect of key external parties 
involved in sukuk issuance. Specifically, using a large sample of 3462 sukuk tranches, we 
examine the certification effect of lead arrangers, Shariah advisors, and IFI arrangers. As in the 
preceding section, both univariate and multivariate analyses are conducted. 
6.2.1 Summary statistics and univariate results 
Table 6.6 presents the summary statistics for our test and control variables. The total 
amount of sukuk issued ranges from MYR0.67 million to MYR1750 million. The average 
(median) issuance amount is MYR32 million (MYR9.83 million), while the average (median) 
maturity is 6.1 (5) years per tranche. About half the sukuk tranches are secured, and 80 percent 
are investment grade rated. Yield spreads range from -1.99 percent for the most senior tranche to 
43.22 percent for the most junior tranche. The average (median) yield spread for sukuk tranches 
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is 2.38 (1.90) percent or 238 (190) basis points over the benchmark rate (KLIBOR). This large 
spread is similar to that reported by Gatti et al. (2013) for project finance. On average, two banks 
are involved in a sukuk deal, with the largest syndicate size consisting of eight banks. The small 
syndicate size suggests that sukuk requires high level monitoring by arrangers (Lee and 
Mullineaux, 2004). Approximately 62 percent of sukuk are arranged by top five banks, 60 
percent are certified by Shariah advisory committees, 81 percent employ the services of top 5 
Shariah advisors, and only 15 percent employ an IFI as the arranger.  
Since about half the sample sukuk tranches originate from private firms, we test whether 
there are any significant difference in the test variables between public listed issuers and private 
firms. Table 6.6 shows that, on average, sukuk issued by private firms have significantly lower 
spreads (by 0.27 percent), larger issuance amounts (by 8.1 MYR million), and longer maturity 
(by 4 years) when compared to public listed issuers. Sukuk issued by private firms are also less 
likely to have an investment grade rating. Further, the proportion of sukuk issued by private firms 
that are secured is more than twice that issued by public listed firms (66 percent vs. 29 percent).  
There are also significant differences in certification variables between the two subsamples. 
For example, a significantly larger proportion of sukuk issued by private firms are arranged by a 
top five bank, when compared to public listed firms (71 percent vs. 49 percent). Similarly, a 
much higher proportion of sukuk issuance by private firms is certified by Shariah committees (72 
percent vs. 43 percent) and involves IFI arrangers (19 percent vs. 10 percent) compared to public 
listed sukuk issuers. As expected and based on available accounting data, on average, private 
firms that issue sukuk are substantially smaller (3.02 MYR billion vs. 8.50 MYR billion) and are 
more leveraged (50 percent vs. 32 percent) than public firms that issue sukuk.  
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Table 6.6: Univariate test of differences in variables between private and public issuers of sukuk 
This table presents the mean and median values of independent variables and results from tests of difference. ***, **, * denote two-tailed significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. t-test (Mann Whitney z-test) is used for test of difference in means (medians). See Table 5.4 for variable 
definitions.  
Mean Median Std. dev. N Mean Median N Mean Median N
Issuance characteristics
Sukuk spread 2.46 1.78 3.70 3462 2.35 1.79 1975 2.62 1.75 1487 -2.10 ** 1.93 *
Amount (MYR million) 32.1 9.83 87.8 3462 36.00 11.80 1975 27.90 8.49 1481 2.68 *** 6.38 ***
Maturity (year) 6.09 5 5.92 3462 7.63 7 1975 3.96 1.08 1487 18.98 *** 22.49 ***
Investment grade rating 0.80 1 0.40 3462 0.76 1 1975 0.84 1 1487 5.64 *** 5.61 ***
Syndicate size 1.74 1 1.20 3462 2.04 2 1975 1.36 1 1485 17.02 *** 14.95 ***
Secured 0.50 1 0.50 3462 0.66 1 1975 0.29 0 1487 23.07 *** 21.48 ***
SPV 0.14 0 0.35 3462 0.10 0 1975 0.18 0 1487 -6.78 *** -6.73 ***
Murabahah 0.63 1 0.48 3462 0.56 1 1975 0.71 1 1444 -9.33 *** -9.21 ***
Ijarah 0.15 0 0.35 3462 0.16 0 1975 0.13 0 1487 2.06 ** 2.06 ***
Istisna 0.06 0 0.24 3462 0.09 0 1975 0.02 0 1487 9.26 *** 9.15 ***
Mudarabah 0.03 0 0.18 3462 0.03 0 1975 0.04 0 1487 -0.92 -0.92
Musharakah 0.13 0 0.33 3462 0.15 0 1975 0.10 0 1487 4.48 *** 4.46 ***
Certification variables
Top 5 bank 0.62 1 0.48 3462 0.71 1 1975 0.49 0 1487 13.59 *** 13.24 ***
Top 5 Shariah advisor 0.81 1 0.39 3382 0.78 1 1914 0.84 1 1468 -4.62 *** -4.61 ***
Shariah committee 0.60 1 0.49 3334 0.72 1 1867 0.43 0 1467 18.06 *** 17.23 ***
IFI arranger 0.15 0 0.36 3462 0.19 0 1975 0.10 0 1487 7.75 *** 7.69 ***
Firm characteristics
Private firm 0.57 1 0.50 3462
Total assets (MYR million) 6813 1182 17041 1877 3020 1439 572 8503 955 1305 -6.47 *** 0.95
Debt-to-asset 0.34 0.32 0.15 1550 0.58 0.47 232 0.32 0.32 1318 16.21 *** 11.17 ***
ROA 0.06 0.06 0.05 1366 0.11 0.12 48 0.06 0.06 1318 7.03 *** 6.50 ***
Z score 2.16 1.87 1.65 1279 2.71 3.27 31 2.21 1.83 1248 0.96 3.40 ***
Full sample Private firms Public listed firms Difference
t -stat MW
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Table 6.7 reports univariate differences in yield spreads for the subsamples categorised by 
key external parties involved in sukuk issuance. The results show that yield spreads are on 
average 0.96 percentage points lower when the sukuk issuance is arranged by a top five bank. 
Sukuk issuance that involves an IFI as an arranger has a significantly lower spread (by 0.41 
percentage points), as are sukuk endorsed by a top Shariah advisor (by 0.79 percentage points) 
and by a Shariah advisory committee (by 1.07 percentage points). Our univariate tests thus 
provide preliminary support for the certification hypotheses.  
We note several interesting differences in issuance characteristics across the subsamples. In 
particular, the proceeds of sukuk endorsed by a top five bank, a top five Shariah advisor and a 
Shariah committee are on average four times larger and have almost twice as long maturity. 
These subsamples have a syndication team which is twice as large, on average, and are less likely 
to be rated investment grade.  
In terms of security structure, sukuk endorsed by a top five Shariah advisor are less likely 
to be secured or collateralised relative to that of their counterparts. The reverse is observed for 
sukuk endorsed by a top five bank, a Shariah advisory committee, and an IFI. Our finding that the 
proportion of secured sukuk is significantly higher for the IFI arranger subsample is consistent 
with previous survey findings that infer this trend as a rational response by IFIs to capital market 
imperfections (Aggarwal and Yousef, 2000; Khan, 2010).  
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Table 6.7: Univariate test of differences in variables across sukuk certifiers 
 
This table presents the mean and median (italic) values of independent variables and results from tests of difference. 
***, **, * denote two-tailed significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. t-test (Mann Whitney z-test) 
is used for test of difference in means (medians). See Table 5.4 for variable definitions.  
Top 5 
bank
Non-
top 5 
bank
Top 5 
Shariah 
adv.
Non-top 
5 Shariah 
adv.
Shariah 
comm.
Single 
Shariah 
adv.
IFI 
arranger
Non-
IFI 
arranger
Issuance characteristics
Sukuk spread 2.10 3.06 -7.40 *** 2.29 3.08 -4.89 *** 2.03 3.10 8.17 *** 2.12 2.53 -2.33 **
1.70 2.02 -3.37 *** 1.70 1.89 -4.66 *** 1.70 1.93 2.50 ** 1.68 1.80 -0.37
Amount (MYR million) 46.2 10.2 11.8 *** 37.1 13.6 6.16 *** 45.0 14.4 -9.86 *** 37.4 31.7 1.36
15.8 5.31 22.9 *** 10.9 7.89 10.7 *** 14.2 5.76 -18.0 *** 16.2 9.21 6.36 ***
Maturity (year) 7.59 3.54 20.8 *** 6.05 6.20 -0.59 7.91 3.28 -23.7 *** 7.36 5.82 5.55 ***
6.99 0.51 23.2 *** 5.00 5.00 -0.89 7.00 0.50 -25.1 *** 6.00 5.00 4.31 ***
Investment grade rating 0.75 0.87 8.44 *** 0.80 0.79 0.94 0.74 0.88 10.1 *** 0.67 0.82 -7.80 ***
1 1 8.36 *** 1 1 0.94 1 1 9.97 *** 1 1 7.74 ***
Syndicate size 2.10 1.18 23.6 *** 1.75 1.68 1.43 2.07 1.25 -20.9 *** 2.74 1.57 21.9 ***
2 1 24.8 *** 0 1 -0.88 2 1 -21.2 *** 2 1 16.1 ***
Secured 0.59 0.36 13.8 *** 0.49 0.55 -2.74 *** 0.64 0.31 -19.4 *** 0.60 0.49 4.96 ***
1 0 13.4 *** 0 0 2.73 *** 1 0 -18.4 *** 1 0 4.95 ***
SPV 0.15 0.12 2.04 ** 0.13 0.14 -0.32 0.14 0.13 -0.26 0.20 0.12 4.88 ***
0 0 2.04 ** 0 0 0.32 0 0 -0.26 0 0 4.87 ***
Murabahah 0.53 0.78 -15.1 *** 0.64 0.56 3.60 *** 0.52 0.79 16.0 *** 0.59 0.63 -1.77 *
1 1 -14.6 *** 1 1 3.59 *** 1 1 15.4 *** 1 1 -1.77 *
Ijarah 0.18 0.10 6.23 *** 0.15 0.15 0.22 0.20 0.09 -8.28 *** 0.14 0.15 -0.47
0 0 6.20 *** 0 0 0.22 0 0 -8.20 *** 0 0 -0.47
Istisna 0.08 0.02 7.73 *** 0.03 0.17 13.7 *** 0.09 0.02 -9.31 *** 0.05 0.06 -1.56
0 0 7.66 *** 0 0 13.4 *** 0 0 -9.19 *** 0 0 -1.56
Mudarabah 0.04 0.03 1.00 0.04 0.01 3.82 *** 0.04 0.03 -2.33 ** 0.02 0.04 -1.87 *
0 0 1.00 0 0 3.81 *** 0 0 -2.32 ** 0 0 -1.87 *
Musharakah 0.18 0.04 12.0 *** 0.14 0.09 3.57 *** 0.16 0.08 -6.33 *** 0.13 0.13 0.10
0 0 11.7 *** 0 0 3.57 *** 0 0 -6.30 *** 0 0 0.10
Firm characteristics
Private firm 0.66 0.43 13.6 *** 0.65 0.55 4.62 *** 0.38 0.68 -18.1 *** 0.54 0.72 -7.75 ***
1 0 13.2 *** 1 1 4.61 *** 1 0 -17.2 *** 1 1 -7.69 ***
Total assets (MYR million) 8414 4244 5.17 *** 14283 5235 8.98 *** 1845 11246 -12.1 *** 7147 4412 2.22 **
3214 533 19.8 *** 1043 3058 -4.22 *** 2058 600 -16.2 *** 978 1186 0.76
Debt-to-asset 0.37 0.35 1.96 * 0.29 0.37 -5.16 *** 0.38 0.33 3.98 *** 0.36 0.39 -1.90 *
0.31 0.35 3.03 *** 0.35 0.28 7.15 *** 0.30 0.35 4.19 *** 0.37 0.33 3.76 ***
ROA 0.07 0.05 8.17 *** 0.07 0.06 2.26 ** 0.05 0.08 -12.8 *** 0.06 0.06 0.49
0.07 0.06 9.29 *** 0.06 0.07 -1.87 * 0.08 0.05 -14.1 *** 0.08 0.06 1.19
Z score 2.53 1.95 3.72 *** 2.06 2.24 -1.50 1.78 2.84 -12.3 *** 2.28 1.68 2.18 **
2.37 1.65 8.90 *** 1.86 1.90 -0.37 2.83 1.59 -14.8 *** 1.60 1.90 3.06 ***
Diff. Diff. Diff. Diff.
143 
 
As expected, firms that employ the certification services of top five banks, top five Shariah 
advisors, and IFI tend to be larger. Firms that obtain endorsement by a Shariah advisory 
committee are on average much smaller as well as financially weaker than those that seek 
endorsement from a single Shariah advisor. This suggests that an endorsement of sukuk by a 
committee of Shariah advisors may benefit the firms in terms of providing greater assurance to 
sukuk holders about lower Shariah compliance risk.  
Table 6.8 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients of the test variables. We observe a 
negative correlation between yield spreads and certification proxies, as expected. The negative 
correlation is significant at the 5 percent level. The relatively low correlations between most other 
pairs of variables suggest that multicollinearity is not likely to be a major concern in our 
regressions. 
 
6.2.2 Multivariate analysis 
The pricing of sukuk certification 
Table 6.9 presents the multivariate analysis of the certification effect of key external parties 
involved in sukuk issuance. Specification (1) shows the baseline regression of the full sample. 
Consistent with the prediction, we find a negative relation between lead arrangers’ reputation and 
yield spreads. In economic terms, the spread is on average 0.717 percentage points lower if the 
sukuk issuance is arranged by a top five bank. This finding is in line with Gatti et al. (2013) who 
examine the impact of prestigious lead banks on project finance loan spreads, and with Ross 
(2010) for syndicated loan spreads.  
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Table 6.8: Pearson correlation matrix of variables for tests of sukuk certification effects 
 
* indicates significance at the 5 percent level. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Sukuk spread 1.00
2 Top 5 bank -0.12 * 1.00
3 Top 5 Shariah adv. -0.08 * 0.11 * 1.00
4 Shariah committee -0.14 * 0.40 * -0.15 * 1.00
5 IFI arranger -0.04 * -0.01 0.02 0.18 * 1.00
6 Ln(Amount ) -0.04 * 0.20 * 0.11 * 0.17 * 0.02 1.00
7 Maturity -0.05 * 0.33 * -0.01 0.38 * 0.09 * 0.26 * 1.00
8 Inv. grade rating -0.01 -0.14 * 0.02 -0.17 * -0.13 * -0.11 * -0.23 * 1.00
9 Syndicate size -0.06 * 0.37 * 0.02 0.34 * 0.35 * 0.22 * 0.27 * -0.01 1.00
10 Secured -0.06 * 0.23 * -0.05 * 0.32 * 0.08 * -0.01 0.41 * -0.11 * 0.23 * 1.00
11 SPV 0.01 0.03 * -0.01 0.00 0.08 * 0.04 * 0.05 * -0.04 * 0.00 0.14 * 1.00
12 Ln(Assets ) -0.06 * 0.12 * -0.20 * 0.27 * -0.05 * 0.21 * 0.37 * 0.08 * 0.08 * 0.19 * -0.02 1.00
13 Profitability -0.16 0.22 * -0.06 * 0.33 * 0.01 0.13 * 0.14 * -0.04 0.12 * 0.02 -0.12 * 0.07 * 1.00
14 Debt-to-asset -0.02 * 0.05 0.13 * -0.10 * 0.05 0.03 0.19 * 0.05 0.19 * 0.04 0.08 * -0.05 * 0.07 * 1.00
15 Z score -0.03 0.10 * 0.04 0.33 * -0.06 * 0.16 * 0.07 * 0.01 0.14 * -0.02 -0.06 * 0.08 * -0.18 * 0.51 * 1.00
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Our baseline regression results on Shariah certification are consistent with the univariate 
results. The coefficient of each Shariah certification variable appears with the expected sign and 
is significant at the 1 percent level. Appointing a top five Shariah advisor is associated with 1.105 
percentage points lower spread, on average. In terms of monetary value, this translates into a 
reduction of an annual financing cost of MYR0.328 million for the average size issuance of 
MYR29.7 million. Therefore, greater value has been placed on Shariah advisors’ reputation, 
consistent with the evidence documented by Godlewski et al. (2014) and as observed anecdotally 
in the business press.  
On Shariah compliance certification, results show that sukuk issuance endorsed by a 
Shariah advisory committee as opposed to a single advisor is associated with a large reduction in 
spread (by 1.13 percentage points, on average). This finding is consistent with that reported by 
Azmat et al. (2015) on a positive relation between sukuk rating and Shariah committee dummy, 
but contrasts with that of Godlewski et al. (2014) who find no evidence of significant impact of 
the number of Shariah scholars involved on issuers’ CAR surrounding the sukuk issuance 
announcement. The difference in results suggests that shareholders do not value issuers’ choice 
between a single or a committee of Shariah advisors as much as sukuk holders do, possibly 
because only the latter would stand to lose from Shariah non-compliance of sukuk. Further, IFIs’ 
participation as the lead arranger reduces sukuk spread by 0.33 percentage points. We attribute 
this finding to potential Shariah monitoring effects of IFIs given their fiduciary duty to monitor 
Shariah compliance risk in financial operations.  
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Table 6.9: OLS regression analysis of sukuk spreads 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of sukuk tranches from 2001 to 2014. The dependent variable is Spread. Specification (2) includes 
firm-specific controls. Inverse Mills ratio, which is generated from the Top 5 bank selection model, is included in specification (3) to control for self-selection. 
Specifications (4) to (7) include the interaction terms between Private firm dummy and each certification test variable. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level, respectively. White’s (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Certification variables
Top 5 bank -0.717 *** 0.679 * 1.140 *** -0.274 -0.645 *** -0.715 *** -0.731 ***
(-3.96) (1.94) (2.91) (-1.08) (-3.65) (-4.00) (-4.04)
Top 5 Shariah advisor -1.105 *** -0.727 * 0.644 * -0.958 *** -0.152 -1.044 *** -1.048 ***
(-3.68) (-1.94) (1.75) (-3.84) (0.53) (-4.01) (-3.91)
Shariah committee -1.133 *** -0.700 * -0.744 ** -1.074 *** -0.778 *** -1.108 *** -1.116 ***
(-6.92) (-1.92) (-2.08) (-6.83) (-5.54) (-4.87) (-6.77)
IFI arranger -0.325 ** -1.892 *** -2.368 *** -0.342 ** -0.601 *** -0.325 ** -1.010 ***
(-2.04) (-3.97) (-4.03) (-2.14) (-3.70) (-2.04) (-3.71)
Private x Top 5 bank -1.335 ***
(-3.61)
Private x Top 5 Shariah advisor -1.665 ***
(-4.65)
Private x Shariah Committee -0.049
(-0.15)
Private x IFI arranger 0.154
(0.56)
(2)(1)
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Table 6.9: OLS regression analysis of sukuk spreads (continued) 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of sukuk tranches from 2001 to 2014. The dependent variable is Spread. Specification (2) includes 
firm-specific controls. Inverse Mills ratio, which is generated from the Top 5 bank selection model, is included in specification (3) to control for self-selection. 
Specifications (4) to (7) include the interaction terms between Private firm dummy and each certification test variable. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level, respectively. White’s (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Issuance characteristics
Ln(Amount ) -0.217 -0.421 -0.271 -0.172 -0.237 ** -0.147 -0.162
(-1.21) (-0.65) (-0.78) (-1.46) (-2.04) (-1.22) (-1.37)
Maturity 0.046 *** 0.085 *** 0.073 *** 0.045 *** 0.057 *** 0.044 0.044 ***
(4.49) (3.87) (3.35) (4.44) (5.44) (4.45) (4.37)
Investment grade rating -0.396 -1.167 * -1.337 ** -0.170 -0.116 -0.139 -0.186
(-1.52) (-1.89) (-2.12) (-1.04) (-0.71) (-0.85) (-1.12)
Syndicate size 0.043 -0.933 ** -0.046 0.052 -0.039 0.038 0.021
(0.53) (-2.44) (-0.19) (0.99) (-0.68) (0.72) (0.40)
Secured -0.502 *** -0.695 * -0.774 ** -0.444 *** -0.563 *** -0.439 *** -0.430 ***
(-3.21) (-1.71) (-2.17) (-2.98) (-3.47) (-2.88) (-2.89)
SPV -0.091 -0.345 0.833 * 0.508 *** 0.098 0.597 *** 0.581 ***
(-0.35) (-0.51) (1.93) (3.48) (0.60) (4.11) (3.87)
Murabahah 0.339 -0.659 -0.738 0.287 0.163 0.364 0.315
(1.07) (-1.22) (-1.38) (0.95) (0.53) (1.18) (1.02)
Ijarah -0.520 * -0.924 * -1.108 ** -0.405 -0.580 ** -0.362 -0.414
(-1.91) (-1.74) (-2.07) (-1.52) (-2.13) (-1.36) (-1.54)
Istisna 1.109 *** -1.644 -1.461 0.731 ** 0.923 *** 0.784 ** 0.749 **
(3.28) (-1.63) (-1.45) (2.42) (2.85) (2.56) (2.46)
Mudarabah -0.921 ** 0.292 0.204 -0.782 * -1.057 *** -0.834 ** -0.913 **
(-2.24) (0.27) (0.18) (-1.91) (-2.59) (-2.08) (-2.23)
Musharakah -0.548 * -2.486 *** -2.509 *** -0.452 -0.970 *** -0.434 -0.430
(-1.71) (-4.00) (-4.08) (-1.42) (-2.90) (-1.37) (-1.35)
(1) (2)
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Table 6.9: OLS regression analysis of sukuk spreads (continued) 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of sukuk tranches from 2001 to 2014. The dependent variable is Spread. Specification (2) includes 
firm-specific controls. Inverse Mills ratio, which is generated from the Top 5 bank selection model, is included in specification (3) to control for self-selection. 
Specifications (4) to (7) include the interaction terms between Private firm dummy and each certification test variable. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent level, respectively. White’s (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Firm characteristics
Private firm -0.006 -0.297 4.753 ** 0.840 ** 3.369 *** 0.250 0.129
(-0.02) (-0.29) (2.33) (2.25) (4.11) (0.67) (0.55)
Ln(Assets ) -1.189 *** 1.733
(-4.29) (1.51)
Profitability -12.33 ** 1.723
(-1.99) (0.23)
Debt-to-asset 1.302 * -0.944
(1.92) (-1.12)
Z score -0.018 0.126
(-1.43) (1.16)
Inverse Mills ratio 5.773 **
(2.45)
Constant -3.205 ** 1.811 -14.08 ** -5.612 *** -4.293 *** -4.433 *** -4.183 ***
(-2.43) (0.81) (-2.27) (-3.94) (-3.30) (-3.25) (-3.13)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.140 0.150 0.159 0.137 0.139 0.134 0.135
No. of observations 2941 1183 1183 2941 2941 2941 2941
(1) (2)
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With regard to the control variables, we observe that sukuk spread is an increasing function 
of Maturity. This is consistent with the conventional wisdom that a premium is required by 
capital providers for a longer financing period (less liquid), given higher potential credit and 
business risks (Cook et al., 2003). As expected, secured sukuk have a lower spread, consistent 
with our evidence of agency cost mitigation effects of collateral.  
We re-estimate the baseline specification on a significantly reduced sample for which firm 
financial characteristics are available. Results are reported in specifications (2) and (3). We find 
that the inclusion of firm financial characteristics renders the effect of lead banks’ reputation on 
spreads contrary to our intuition. In specification (3), we control for potential self-selection by 
including the inverse Mills ratio generated from equation (5) (as described in Section 5.4.3). The 
positive effect of Top 5 bank on yield spreads now appears even stronger. Thus, it is possible that 
the reputation effect of top banks is moderated by firm size and profitability. An alternative 
explanation is that highly reputable banks which are often dominant players in the capital market 
are able to charge a reputation premium for their high quality certification services (Cook et al., 
2003).  
Similarly, the coefficient on Top 5 Shariah advisor has a statistically significant positive 
sign. The coefficients on Shariah committee and IFI arranger remain significantly negative. The 
latter appears with a larger magnitude impact of 2.37 percentage points reduction in spread, 
which is equivalent to MYR0.471 million for the average issuance amount MYR19.9 million. 
These results reinforce our inference from the baseline regression. Hence, we provide supporting 
evidence for Azmat et al.’s (2014b) argument that, with the possibility of fatwa shopping by 
profit-oriented firms, the moral hazard of lower preference for Shariah compliance can be 
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mitigated through the participation of investors who are high risk averse to Shariah non-
compliance of sukuk.  
Further, sukuk issued by larger and more profitable firms are also associated with a lower 
spread. This finding is in line with security issuance by financially stronger firms being more 
favourably priced due to the associated lower financial risk. In this reduced subsample, the results 
for the other control variables remain intact.   
Previous studies suggest that the certification effect of certifying agents is greater under 
severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems (Ross, 2010). We test whether this 
association is equally observable in the sukuk market, particularly in the case of Shariah 
certification. Due to high information opacity, private firms have more acute moral hazard 
problems, and would thus benefit from more intense screening and monitoring by independent 
parties (Sufi, 2007). We are able to exploit our sample for this test because tranche observations 
are fairly equally distributed between private and public listed firms. Specifications (4) to (7) of 
Table 6.9 present the results.  
Consistent with Sufi (2007) and Ross (2010) who suggest that lead arrangers’ reputation 
can mitigate moral hazard concerns of highly opaque firms, specification (5) shows a significant 
negative coefficient on the interaction variable Private x Top 5 bank. This suggests that top five 
banks are more effective in certifying the value of a sukuk issuance as shown by a significantly 
lower spread (1.34 percentage points). This economic effect is equivalent to an annual financing 
cost savings of MYR0.396 million. The coefficient on the interaction term Private x Top 5 
Shariah advisor is also negative, indicating that endorsement by a reputable Shariah advisor 
minimises sukuk holders’ concern over Shariah risk for firms that are relatively more opaque. In 
financial terms, appointing a top five Shariah advisor to endorse sukuk issuance reduces sukuk 
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spread by 1.67 percentage point, which translates into MYR0.495 million annual financing cost 
savings for an average issuance amount of MYR29.7 million. There is no evidence that having a 
Shariah committee or an IFI participating in the sukuk issued by private firms is related to spread. 
To test the robustness of sukuk pricing effect arising from certifiers’ reputation, we 
replicate specifications (1) to (5) using top three banks and top three Shariah advisors. Results are 
qualitatively similar and do not change our conclusion (see Appendix 3). 
 
Sukuk certification and syndicate participation 
Several studies in a syndicated loan setting test the certification effect of certifying agents 
in terms of syndicate participation (Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Bosch and Steffen, 2011; Sufi, 
2007). For example, Lee and Mullineaux (2004) show that reputable lead banks are associated 
with a greater number of financial institutions participating in the loan syndicate. This finding is 
interpreted to suggest that reputable banks possess a larger network and better screening 
technology such that their decision to contract a loan conveys favourable information to potential 
syndicate members. As a robustness check, we extend this analysis to our sample to test the 
influence of issuance parties’ certification on the syndicate size of sukuk issuance. We use 
Poisson estimator since the response variable, the number of syndicate members (syndicate size), 
is discrete and non-negative. If there is a certification effect of external key issuance parties, then 
sukuk issuance will attract greater syndicate participation due to lenders’ perception of lower 
risk. Other things equal, we expect to see a positive coefficient on the certification variables.  
Table 6.10 shows that the syndicate size is significantly larger for sukuk issuance arranged 
by top 5 banks, confirming that reputable lead arrangers are able to form a larger syndicate (Lee 
and Mullineaux, 2004). Likewise, the results also show that sukuk attract more participant 
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lenders if they are endorsed by a Shariah advisory committee or if an IFI is involved as the lead 
or joint lead arranger in the issuance. Overall, our analysis supports the investment and Shariah 
certification effects when we use syndicate size as an alternative proxy for investors’ perception 
of sukuk risk.   
We document an incremental effect of the above sukuk certifying agents on privately held 
issuers, thus providing support for the agency and moral hazard implications of syndicate 
structures as outlined and evidenced by Sufi (2007). In particular, our results suggest that the 
willingness of reputable banks to contract a sukuk with a private firm signals investment quality 
to potential lenders, hence attracting greater syndicate participation. We note that IFI arranger is 
positively related to the number of lenders and is economically significant in all regressions. This 
finding bolsters the inference that Shariah-regulated financial institutions are an important 
mechanism for controlling moral hazard associated with issuers’ lower preference for Shariah 
compliance.  
 
The 2008 pronouncement effect and Shariah certification in sukuk 
On 22 November 2007, Reuters reported a controversial claim made by the chair of the 
AAOIFI Shariah Board, Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Usmani, that 85 percent of sukuk issued up to 
2007 would fall foul of Shariah principles.67 Sheikh Usmani’s criticism particularly aimed at 
equity-like sukuk structuring practice in relation to the use of liquidity facility and purchase 
undertaking (principal guarantee) by the originator. His pronouncement was responded by a 
series of meetings by the AAOIFI Shariah board whose members are amongst world’s leading 
Islamic scholars. Following the board meetings, the AAOIFI issued Shariah resolutions on sukuk 
                                                 
67 See http://www.arabianbusiness.com/most-sukuk-not-islamic-body-claims-197156.html#.VhZOgZckrw 
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in February 2008, calling for IFIs and Shariah advisors to ensure that future structuring of sukuk 
adheres closely to the AAOIFI Shariah standards. With regard to the equity-like structure, the 
board clarified that it is permissible for the issuer to establish a reserve account or obtain a third 
party guarantee in order to secure the repayment. Purchase undertaking is permissible under the 
condition that the originator buys back her shares at their market value. 
The events above conceivably put more pressure on sukuk practitioners to seek greater 
certainty on issuance compliance with Shariah principles. We test whether the exogenous shock 
caused by the 2008 pronouncement has resulted in a structural shift in the Shariah certification of 
sukuk.  If Shariah risk is considered more seriously by issuers following the pronouncement, we 
expect the role of Shariah certifiers in Shariah compliance certification to be more significant in 
the post-2008 period. We test this prediction by running pre- and post-2008 subsamples 
regression on the spread. We standardise the spreads by year to address for potential structural 
shift in spreads due to the coinciding financial crisis. Since the pronouncement highlights the 
questionable practice in equity-like sukuk, we include the interaction terms between the equity-
like structure and Shariah certification proxies in the regression. This specification allows us to 
further test the certifiers’ role in minimising Shariah risk concern of investors in the presence of 
greater uncertainty about Shariah compliance of sukuk. 
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Table 6.10: Poisson regression analysis of sukuk syndicate participation 
 
This table presents the Poisson regression results for the sample of sukuk tranches from 2001 to 2014. The dependent variable is Syndicate size. Specification (2) 
includes firm-specific controls. Inverse Mills ratio, which is generated from the Top 5 bank selection model, is included in specification (3) to control for self-
selection. Specifications (4) to (7) include the interaction terms between Private firm dummy and each certification test variable. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. z-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Certification variables
Top 5 bank 0.377 *** 0.402 *** 0.408 *** 0.313 *** 0.402 *** 0.386 *** 0.391 ***
(10.10) (8.83) (8.57) (7.77) (10.90) (10.57) (10.82)
Top 5 Shariah advisor 0.030 0.139 *** 0.141 *** 0.0001 0.085 * 0.006 0.015
(0.68) (3.46) (3.39) (0.00) (1.85) (0.13) (0.35)
Shariah committee 0.188 *** 0.133 *** 0.131 *** 0.217 *** 0.226 *** 0.062 0.235 ***
(5.13) (3.19) (3.14) (5.88) (6.23) (1.36) (6.47)
IFI arranger 0.216 ** 0.358 *** 0.344 *** 0.692 *** 0.691 *** 0.682 *** 0.374 ***
(2.34) (6.25) (5.35) (10.25) (10.16) (10.20) (6.44)
Private x Top 5 Bank 0.197 ***
(3.22)
Private x Top 5 Shariah advisor -0.121
(-1.47)
Private x Shariah Committee 0.317 ***
(4.91)
Private x IFI arranger 0.469 ***
(4.42)
(1) (2) (3)
155 
 
Table 6.10: Poisson regression analysis of sukuk syndicate participation (continued) 
This table presents the Poisson regression results for the sample of sukuk tranches from 2001 to 2014. The dependent variable is Syndicate size. Specification (2) 
includes firm-specific controls. Inverse Mills ratio, which is generated from the Top 5 bank selection model, is included in specification (3) to control for self-
selection. Specifications (4) to (7) include the interaction terms between Private firm dummy and each certification test variable. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. z-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Issuance characteristics
Ln(Amount ) 0.299 *** 0.0102 0.010 0.298 *** 0.297 *** 0.305 *** 0.285 ***
(8.10) (0.27) (0.26) (8.02) (8.03) (8.25) (7.75)
Maturity 0.002 0.0098 * 0.0096 * 0.0034 0.0036 0.0035 0.0031
(0.53) (1.71) (1.67) (0.85) (0.91) (0.89) (0.78)
Investment grade rating 0.214 *** -0.111 * -0.113 ** 0.219 *** 0.216 *** 0.216 *** 0.192 ***
(4.35) (-1.88) (-1.93) (4.47) (4.41) (4.42) (3.97)
Secured 0.137 *** 0.091 * 0.088 * 0.142 *** 0.143 *** 0.153 *** 0.144 ***
(2.91) (1.88) (1.79) (3.02) (3.04) (3.24) (3.08)
SPV 0.014 -0.048 -0.049 0.052 0.034 0.049 0.028
(0.21) (-0.78) (-0.80) (0.80) (0.53) (0.77) (0.44)
Murabahah 0.177 * -0.092 -0.093 * 0.214 ** 0.198 ** 0.200 ** 0.176 *
(1.88) (-1.49) (-1.50) (2.26) (2.12) (2.13) (1.88)
Ijarah -0.344 *** 0.175 ** 0.173 ** -0.305 *** -0.306 *** -0.302 *** -0.335 ***
(-3.61) (2.45) (2.42) (-3.20) (-3.25) (-3.19) (-3.56)
Istisna 1.056 *** 0.398 *** 0.401 *** 1.081 *** 1.059 *** 1.065 *** 1.053 ***
(7.62) (2.61) (2.60) (7.61) (7.37) (7.55) (7.61)
Mudarabah -0.563 *** -0.330 *** -0.330 *** -0.543 *** -0.530 *** -0.494 *** -0.575 ***
(-5.44) (-3.71) (-3.71) (-5.31) (-5.20) (-4.85) (-5.54)
Musharakah 0.087 -0.100 -0.100 0.114 0.113 0.114 0.112
(0.80) (-0.97) (-0.96) (1.04) (1.04) (1.04) (1.03)
(1) (2) (3)
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Table 6.10: Poisson regression analysis of syndicate participation (continued) 
This table presents the Poisson regression results for the sample of sukuk tranches from 2001 to 2014. The dependent variable is Syndicate size. Specification (2) 
includes firm-specific controls. Inverse Mills ratio, which is generated from the Top 5 bank selection model, is included in specification (3) to control for self-
selection. Specifications (4) to (7) include the interaction terms between Private firm dummy and each certification test variable. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. z-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
(4) (5) (6) (7)
Firm characteristics
Private firm 0.268 0.374 ** 0.455 * 0.144 *** 0.353 *** 0.0841 * 0.213 ***
(6.70) (2.41) (1.69) (3.05) (5.06) (1.84) (5.30)
Ln(Assets ) 0.129 *** 0.180
(3.37) (1.28)
Profitability -0.758 *** -0.570
(-2.58) (-0.95)
Debt-to-asset 0.120 0.083
(0.93) (0.45)
Z score 0.042 ** 0.0414 **
(2.50) (2.47)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.094
(0.39)
Constant -0.599 1.462 *** 1.209 -0.361 -0.691 -0.377 -0.480
(-0.87) (3.18) (1.47) (-0.52) (-1.01) (-0.55) (-0.70)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.438 0.604 0.604 0.434 0.433 0.437 0.437
No. of observations 2968 1195 1195 2968 2968 2968 2968
(1) (2) (3)
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Specifications (1) to (4) of Table 6.11 display the regression results for the pre-2008 
subsample. The remaining specifications are for the post-2008 subsample. We are particularly 
interested in the interaction terms between the certification variables and the equity-like structure 
dummy. Results show that the negative and significant influence of IFI arranger on the spread of 
equity-like sukuk remains intact over the full sample period. Interestingly, endorsement by a 
reputable Shariah advisor or a Shariah advisory committee on this controversial sukuk structure 
reduces the average spread by 3.47 and 2.03 percentage points respectively. This reduction in the 
spread is significant only in the post-2008 period. The latter finding suggests that credible 
Shariah certification can clear investors’ doubt on the permissibility of questionable structures.  
Together, the results offer strong support to the conjecture that the 2008 pronouncement by 
the AAOIFI drives the sukuk market to put relatively more weight on the certification of Shariah 
compliance in sukuk structuring.  
We observe that reputable lead banks also play an important role in certifying sukuk 
investment in the post-2008 period only, reducing sukuk spread by an average of 1.54 to 2.45 
percentage points. Under the equity-like structure, having a Top 5 bank further reduces the spread 
by 2.72 percentage points, on average.  
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Table 6.11: OLS regression analysis of 2008 pronouncement effect 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the partitioned samples of sukuk tranches pre- and post-2008 periods. The dependent variable is Spread. 
Specifications (1) to (4) include the interaction terms between Equity-like dummy and each certification test variable for pre-2008 tranche sample, while 
specifications (5) to (8) include the interaction terms between Equity-like dummy and each certification test variable. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent level, respectively. White’s (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Certification variables
Top 5 bank -0.163 -0.096 -0.132 -0.094 -2.401 *** -2.055 *** -1.542 *** -1.733 ***
(-0.84) (-0.54) (-0.72) (-0.53) (-5.19) (-4.95) (-3.87) (-4.40)
Top 5 Shariah advisor -0.154 -0.118 -0.132 -0.166 -2.752 *** -3.089 *** -2.371 *** -2.276 ***
(-0.96) (-0.67) (-0.81) (-1.04) (-4.03) (-4.08) (-3.65) (-3.45)
Shariah committee -0.801 *** -0.814 *** -0.759 *** -0.821 *** -0.863 *** -0.905 *** -1.412 *** -0.980 ***
(-4.58) (-4.66) (-4.10) (-4.77) (-3.44) (-3.55) (-3.82) (-3.67)
IFI arranger -0.134 -0.137 -0.154 0.0341 -0.481 * -0.426 -0.387 -0.297
(-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.71) (0.15) (-1.72) (-1.49) (-1.38) (-1.01)
Equity-like x Top 5 bank 0.573 -2.716 ***
(1.46) (4.21)
Equity-like x Top 5 advisor -0.387 -3.466 ***
(-0.82) (4.78)
Equity-like x Shariah committee -0.585 -2.032 ***
(-1.40) (5.10)
Equity-like x IFI arranger -1.497 *** -1.612 ***
(-2.72) (-2.94)
Pre-2008 Post-2008
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Table 6.11: OLS regression analysis of 2008 pronouncement effect (continued) 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the partitioned samples of sukuk tranches pre- and post-2008 periods. The dependent variable is Spread. 
Specifications (1) to (4) include the interaction terms between Equity-like dummy and each certification test variable for pre-2008 tranche sample, while 
specifications (5) to (8) include the interaction terms between Equity-like dummy and each certification test variable. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent level, respectively. White’s (1980) heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Issuance characteristics
Ln(Amount ) 0.044 0.040 0.075 0.022 0.329 0.357 * 0.187 0.180
(0.28) (0.25) (0.47) (0.14) (1.62) (1.73) (0.94) (0.90)
Maturity 0.055 *** 0.054 *** 0.055 *** 0.054 *** 0.0003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007
(3.36) (3.31) (3.36) (3.37) (0.02) (-0.38) (-0.24) (-0.45)
Investment grade rating -0.035 -0.039 -0.026 -0.067 -0.102 0.060 0.069 0.169
(-0.18) (-0.20) (-0.13) (-0.35) (-0.32) (0.18) (0.21) (0.52)
Syndicate size 0.080 0.093 0.0873 0.093 0.0813 0.045 -0.008 0.046
(1.02) (1.19) (1.12) (1.20) (1.13) (0.64) (-0.12) (0.59)
Secured 0.208 0.199 0.206 0.208 -1.694 *** -1.613 *** -1.611 *** -1.585 ***
(1.36) (1.29) (1.33) (1.35) (-5.30) (-5.17) (-5.09) (-4.80)
SPV 0.321 * 0.313 * 0.340 * 0.245 0.316 0.269 0.353 0.441
(1.74) (1.69) (1.83) (1.36) (1.17) (0.98) (1.32) (1.52)
Equity-like sukuk -0.659 ** -0.041 -0.038 -0.071 -5.527 *** -5.309 *** -1.765 *** -0.869 ***
(-2.02) (-0.10) (-0.12) (-0.33) (-4.71) (-5.09) (-4.26) (-3.75)
Constant -3.921 *** -4.066 *** -4.044 *** -3.909 *** -19.31 *** -18.47 *** -18.09 *** -18.67 ***
(-3.78) (-3.91) (-3.89) (-3.77) (-4.88) (-4.70) (-4.64) (-4.66)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.048 0.251 0.251 0.238 0.237
No. of observations 1634 1634 1634 1634 1291 1291 1291 1291
Pre-2008 Post-2008
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6.3 Chapter Summary 
The empirical analyses presented in this chapter highlight several key findings. First, 
the sukuk choice analysis reveals issuers’ motivation to mitigate agency costs associated with 
free cash flow and to reap the tax benefit of sukuk issuance at the same time. This evidence is 
consistent with the function of project finance, as illustrated by John and John (1991) among 
others, which is to improve the investment specific governance and thus to minimise agency 
costs. The ensuing increased debt capacity allows firms to increase debt tax shield.  
Second, agency costs of debt significantly explain the choice of sukuk structure: firms 
with higher leverage and which are more likely to go bankrupt are more likely to pledge 
collateral and create an SPV for sukuk issuance. This finding supports the governance 
benefits of collateral and securitisation (Stulz and Johnson, 1985; Esty, 2003). Adding to the 
debate on the departure of Islamic finance practice from its ideal, we provide empirical 
evidence showing that the preference for debt-like and collateralised sukuk structures is due to 
higher information costs faced by Islamic finance users. This evidence is consistent with 
Khan (2010) who postulates that the adverse selection and moral hazard problems lead the 
structuring of Islamic financial contracts to mimic conventional finance practice, which is 
predominantly based on risk transfer principle. 
Finally, this chapter revealed the significant role that reputable lead arrangers and 
Shariah advisors play in certifying the quality of sukuk issuance, both in terms of investment 
quality and Shariah compliance. Results for a full sample show that sukuk arranged by 
reputable banks and reputable Shariah advisors have lower yield spreads. We also document 
the certification effect of sukuk endorsement by a Shariah advisory committee. Further, the 
certification effect is greater for firms with high informational opacity. Bolstering Azmat et 
al.’s (2014b) proposition, we find that IFIs’ participation as an arranger in the sukuk contract 
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is associated with a significantly lower spread. Their certification remains intact when sukuk 
issuance and firm characteristics are controlled for. 
In an additional test, we exploited an exogenous force created by the controversial 
pronouncement on sukuk in early 2008 by the prominent Shariah standard setting body to 
examine whether there is a structural shift in the Shariah certification effect. Our results 
indicate that top Shariah advisors and Shariah advisory committees play a greater certification 
role in the post-2008 period, as reflected by their significant association with sukuk spreads. 
In other words, there appears to be increased awareness of Shariah non-compliance risk 
following the 2008 resolution on sukuk guidelines. In fact, the Central Bank of Malaysia 
introduced a new Shariah governance framework in 2009 with the aim to promote a strong 
culture of Shariah awareness and compliance. Under the new framework, the role of Shariah 
advisors, which is previously confined to advising and endorsing financial transactions, has 
been expanded to assume a higher degree of accountability.68  
                                                 
68 See http://www.bnm.gov.my/?ch=en_announcement&pg=en_announcement_all&ac=81&lang=en. 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
7.1     Introduction 
Operating within the well-entrenched interest-based conventional financial system, 
Islamic financial institutions have embarked on the innovation of sukuk as a financial security 
that replicates the risk and return profile of conventional bonds, and yet adheres to the 
principles of Islamic commercial law. Over the years, sukuk have evolved as a viable form of 
capital market-based Islamic financial instrument. However, empirical work that investigates 
the rationale for and risk mitigation of sukuk issuance in the context of structured finance has 
lagged rather behind. This thesis has sought to fill this gap in the literature.  
This final chapter provides a summary of the findings and implications of the empirical 
investigation in Section 7.2. This is followed by Section 7.3 which identifies the major 
contributions of the thesis to the literature. Finally, Section 7.4 outlines the limitations of this 
thesis and offers some avenues for future research.  
 
7.2.    Summary of Findings 
This thesis examines three related research questions concerning corporate sukuk 
issuance as a response to capital market imperfections. The first research question asks what 
motivates firms to use a highly structured financing instrument like sukuk? Our qualitative 
analysis of the theoretical and technical structures of sukuk establishes that sukuk fit the 
definition of project finance given by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) as a hybrid between a 
structured, asset-backed, and conventional corporate financing (S&P, 2007). Building on the 
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project finance literature, we test the agency cost argument for firms’ choice of sukuk versus 
conventional bonds. Our results are supportive of agency theory of project finance. In 
particular, for a sample of 230 corporate bond deals, the logistic regression results show that 
firms with higher agency cost of free cash flow and greater growth opportunities are more 
likely to issue sukuk than conventional bonds. The event study analysis further shows that 
sukuk issuance generates positive abnormal returns, which are concentrated in firms with 
higher underinvestment problem. Overall, the evidence presented by this analysis suggests 
that the mechanics of sukuk contracts allow firms to obtain the desired leverage to finance 
their investment opportunities by minimizing investors’ concern about agency problems. This 
implication points to the benefits of asset-backing and elaborate documentation prescribed by 
Shariah standards for sukuk structuring.   
Conditional on firms issuing sukuk, the second research inquiry is pursued to explain 
the determinants of issuers’ choice of sukuk structures. Results from logistic regressions do 
not support the prediction that sukuk issuers with higher agency cost of free cash flow prefer 
debt-like structure to equity-like ones. This finding corroborates the anecdotal claim that 
credit enhancements have been prevalently used in equity-like sukuk in order to secure a 
smooth and predictable cash flow to sukuk holders. There is, therefore, a conflict between the 
practitioners’ treatment of sukuk as a fixed income security and the ideal PLS financing 
structure proposed by the IBF advocates.  
Supporting agency cost of debt argument, firms with higher leverage, greater 
investment options, and a lower Z score are more likely to use a collateral provision and an 
SPV in their sukuk issuance. These findings practically suggest that pledging collateral and 
creating an SPV for sukuk issuance allow firms to pursue valuable investment opportunities at 
times of financial distress. In other words, collateral provisions and SPVs serve as effective 
contractual mechanisms to constrain underinvestment problem. In the context of structured 
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finance, we show that SPVs are especially useful for sukuk issuance when there is proper 
segregation of the pool of assets from the originator. This implication is in line with the ideal 
‘true sale’ of asset ownership in sukuk securitisation advocated by Shariah standard setting 
bodies, which has not yet been seriously practiced in the sukuk market. Bolstering the adverse 
selection and moral hazard concerns associated with Islamic financing, we show that sukuk 
issuers are more likely to use debt-like and collateralised sukuk structures when they have a 
higher degree of informational opacity. In sum, our structure choice analysis demonstrates 
that the design of sukuk contracts focuses on addressing potential moral hazard problems 
associated with investment decisions. Sukuk holders may thus infer issuers’ decision to 
pledge collateral and to use an SPV in sukuk issuance as an effort to improve the contract 
governance, hence a commitment to secure investors’ interest. 
In light of the increasing concern over the risks associated with asset-based financing 
and the practice of Shariah-questionable mechanisms in sukuk issuance, the final question we 
posed focuses on the role of key external issuance parties in certifying the investment quality 
and Shariah compliance of sukuk. Using a large sample of sukuk tranches issued by privately 
held and publicly listed firms, the certification effect of lead arrangers, Shariah advisors, and 
Shariah-regulated arrangers (IFIs) are examined. We present a rich set of results for the 
pricing effects of these certifying agents. Results for the full sample show that sukuk arranged 
by reputable banks, and those endorsed by Shariah advisors are associated with significantly 
lower spreads. The reputation effect of top banks and Shariah advisors is particularly stronger 
for sukuk issuers with greater moral hazard problem due to higher informational opacity. In 
economic terms, the involvement of top banks in sukuk issuance originated by private firms, 
on average, reduces the sukuk spread by an average of 1.335 percentage points – this 
translates to an annual financing cost savings of MYR0.396 million for an average issuance 
proceed of MYR19.9 million. Endorsement by a top Shariah advisor reduces the spread by 
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1.665 percentage points, which is equivalent to an average annual cost savings of MYR0.495 
million. These findings imply that sukuk issuers can borrow certifying agents’ reputation to 
signal their issuance quality, and that investors can infer issuers’ choice of reputable lead 
arrangers and Shariah advisors as a credible signal of lower credit and Shariah risks. 
There is also support for the certification effect of Shariah advisory committees. In light 
of the short supply of competent Shariah advisors (Najeeb and Ibrahim, 2014), our evidence 
implies the synergistic benefit gained from appointing a committee of Shariah advisors to 
certify the Shariah compliance of sukuk. In particular, the consensus pronouncement provided 
by a group of Shariah scholars credibly signals the Shariah compliance of sukuk issuance, 
hence mitigating investors’ concern about potential Shariah risk.  
Testing the implication of Azmat et al. (2014b) that the presence of Shariah conscious 
arrangers induces greater Shariah compliance of sukuk, we find sukuk issues with an IFI as 
the arranger are associated with a 2.368 percentage points lower spread. This translates into 
an average annual financing cost savings of MYR0.471 million. Their certification effect 
remains intact across alternative model specifications and when potential self-selection is 
controlled for. Therefore, owing to IFIs’ duty to abide by Shariah principles in financial 
operations, hiring them to arrange a sukuk issuance signals investors ongoing monitoring of 
Shariah compliance. From a policy perspective, this finding suggests that encouraging greater 
participation of IFIs – financial intermediaries that are highly averse to Shariah risk – in sukuk 
arrangements will help improve regulatory effort to promote a higher degree of Shariah 
compliance in sukuk. 
In a further test, we exploit the exogenous factor created by the controversial 
pronouncement on sukuk in early 2008 by the prominent Shariah standard setting body to 
examine whether there is a structural shift in the Shariah certification effect. We find this to 
be the case. Specifically, top Shariah advisors and Shariah advisory committees play a more 
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effective certification role in the post-2008 period as reflected by the significantly lower yield 
spread. This finding indicates that there is an increased awareness among sukuk investors on 
the importance of observing Shariah compliance of sukuk, in general, and on the certification 
role of Shariah advisors, in specific.  
Overall, our analysis of sukuk certification underscores the important role that certifying 
agents play in making sukuk issuance a successful deal in a complex and imperfect capital 
market. From the issuer’s perspective, as far as favourable contract terms are concerned, the 
evidence presented in this thesis highlights the importance of the choice of key external 
parties in sukuk issuance.  
 
7.3     Contributions 
The thesis makes several significant contributions to the extant literature. First, it sheds 
some new light on the underlying driving factors of corporate sukuk issuance. Importantly, 
this thesis helps to put together a major piece of the puzzle on why firms choose such a costly 
and complex financing structure by documenting agency cost mitigation as the important 
motivation for the corporate choice of sukuk. Our empirical analysis demonstrates the 
economic relevance of the complex structure of sukuk. Specifically, it implies that the 
requirement of asset backing and extensive documentation, as a corollary of riba and gharar 
prohibitions, renders a tightly enforced contract such that the costs of capital market 
imperfections, agency costs, in particular, are minimised. This evidence adds to the strand of 
extant literature that tests the determinants of sukuk issuance from the lenses of the pecking 
order and trade-off theories (Azmat et al., 2014a; Mohamed et al., 2015; Nagano, 2010; 
Shahida and Saharah, 2013).  
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Second, this thesis delves deeper to investigate the contractual design of sukuk as a 
response to market imperfections. In particular, we extend the scope of previous studies which 
focus on the choice between debt-like and equity-like sukuk structures (Azmat et al., 2014a; 
Mohamed et al., 2015), to include an analysis of issuers’ choice of offering collateral and of 
adopting SPV structures in sukuk issuance. In this regard, this thesis furthers our 
understanding of the strategies adopted by sukuk issuers to deal with agency problems 
associated with fixed income security issuance. The evidence we document suggests that 
collateral provisions and SPVs provide a cost-effective solution for sukuk issuers when they 
face higher agency cost of underinvestment.  
We also add to the debate on the departure of modern Islamic finance from the ideal 
PLS structure by showing that market imperfections motivate the use of contractual 
mechanisms that mitigate investors’ concerns about opportunistic behaviour of managers. In 
particular, our finding that firms with higher free cash flow are more likely to use equity-like 
sukuk structure suggests that equity-like sukuk also offer a predictable stream of cash flows, 
hence mitigating agency cost of free cash flow, as debt-like sukuk do. We attribute the 
deviation from the PLS principle in equity-like sukuk to the prevalent use of credit 
enhancement mechanisms. Further, issuers that are relatively more opaque rely more on debt-
like and collateralised sukuk structures. A normative implication follows that, to circumvent 
the impact of capital market imperfections, sukuk issuance should be accorded higher if not 
full security in cash flow claims such that firms are able to achieve the desired leverage. 
The third major contribution of this thesis lies in providing new insights into the role of 
key external issuance parties in sukuk certification. This research is timely amidst investors’ 
concerns over the complexities of sukuk contracts and the spectre of Shariah non-compliance 
risk. We show that hiring a reputable bank to advise and arrange a sukuk issuance is 
associated with a lower risk premium. The certification effect of top banks is particularly 
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advantageous for private firms. This evidence offers support to the important certification role 
played by banks in asset-based financing arrangements (Gatti et al. 2013). 
Adding to Azmat et al.’s (2014b) implication of post-issuance Shariah monitoring by 
Shariah conscious investors, we document the important role that IFIs play in mitigating 
investors’ concern about Shariah compliance risk associated with sukuk investment. Our 
evidence suggests that the identity of IFIs as a Shariah-regulated financial institution allows 
investors to distinguish them as intermediaries acting in good faith, thus perceiving their 
participation as the sukuk arranger as a credible signal of Shariah compliance. In the presence 
of fatwa shopping opportunity by profit-oriented firms, our results also suggest that hiring a 
Shariah advisory committee credibly certifies that the endorsement of sukuk contracts is 
based on a careful screening by and the consensus opinion of a group of Shariah advisors.  
This thesis provides a useful empirical framework for future investigation of the 
contractual structures and risk mitigation mechanisms of sukuk. First, our analysis has 
demonstrated the applicability of agency theory of project finance to sukuk. This finding 
reinforces our qualitative inference that sukuk are a type of pseudo project finance. Therefore, 
existing models developed to explain the contractual benefits or costs of structured asset-
based financing conceivably have relevant testable implications for sukuk issuance. Second, 
our certification analysis has depicted the advantage of using sukuk spread to test investors’ 
perception of risks associated with sukuk investments. Since the spread is issuance-specific, 
this solves the small sample size bias encountered in previous event studies on sukuk. Finally, 
by identifying IFIs as the observable and effective Shariah conscious investors, we are able to 
test Azmat et al.’s (2014b) proposition of the effectiveness of Shariah conscious investors in 
mitigating Shariah risk.  
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7.4     Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
The empirical analysis of the thesis is subject to several limitations. First, as with 
previous studies on corporate sukuk issuance, our sample is limited to sukuk issues domiciled 
in Malaysia, albeit the fact that Malaysia has the lion’s share of the global number and volume 
of sukuk issuance. Our analysis of the motivations for firms’ choice of sukuk is further 
challenged by the need for accounting data to construct agency cost proxies and other firm-
specific variables. Due to limited accounting data availability for private firms, our test of the 
agency cost motivation for sukuk issuance is confined to public listed firms. While the results 
may not be generalised to the wider market, they serve as preliminary evidence indicating that 
the innovation of sukuk is a response, hence a solution, to capital market imperfections – in 
particular, agency costs. With the increasing issuance of corporate sukuk around the world, 
future research could test the agency cost motivation of sukuk issuance across countries with 
different legal regimes. Different legal approaches to the protection of investors from 
expropriation may have implications for firms’ adoption and structuring of sukuk contracts.  
Our findings that the contractual structure of sukuk is designed to deal with agency 
problems also call for further investigation into the realised benefits of sukuk issuance other 
than shareholder wealth effects tested in this thesis. For example, future research could test 
whether the implied intense monitoring by sukuk holders influences the operational behaviour 
(i.e., operating expenses and asset utilisation) of the issuing firm, and how the association is 
different for firms with high and low agency costs.  
There is also scope for future research to provide a more extensive analysis of the 
certification effects of external parties involved in sukuk issuance. While we adopt the 
mainstream approach to measuring the certifiers’ certification effect, which is premised on 
Klein and Leffler’s (1981) reputational paradigm, future research may examine the identity of 
certifiers. In the case of Shariah advisors, for instance, whether they are affiliated with a 
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Shariah board of a standard setting body could provide a metric to capture the Shariah 
certification effect. A recent trend in the sukuk market which deserves the attention of future 
research is the increasing participation of independent Shariah consultancy firms and foreign 
financial institutions in the sukuk issuance process. It would be a fruitful exercise to examine 
the certification effects of these external parties on sukuk issuance.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Probit regression analysis of top banks’ self-selection 
 
This table presents the results of the probit regression model in equation (4). The dependent variable is a dummy 
for Top 5 bank and Top 3 bank in specifications (1) and (2), respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 
5, and 10 percent level, respectively. z-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 
for variable definitions. 
Ln(Assets ) 1.162 *** 0.562 ***
(11.15) (6.88)
Debt-to-asset -0.873 *** 0.399
(-2.85) (2.13)
Profitability 1.503 ** 6.357 ***
(1.40) (5.09)
Private firm 3.558 *** 0.239 *
(5.02) (1.07)
Issue frequency -0.046 0.286 ***
(-0.46) (3.49)
Proximity 0.411 *** 0.702 ***
(3.71) (6.21)
Constant -1.981 *** -1.367 ***
(-4.35) (-3.54)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Pseudo R-squared 33.87 21.29
No. of observations 1364 1364
(1) (2)
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Appendix 2: OLS regression analysis of the determinants of sukuk issuance 
 
This table presents the results of the OLS regression using the right hand side of equation (1). In specifications 
(1) and (2), the dependent variable is sukuk proceeds divided by total assets. In specifications (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable is sukuk proceeds divided by total liabilities. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level, respectively. t-statistics based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are in 
parentheses. See Table 5.3 for variable definitions. 
Agency variables
Free cash flow 1.131 *** 2.550 ***
(2.48) (3.82)
Profitability 0.426 0.706
(1.08) (0.59)
Market-to-book 0.0835 * 0.0779 0.137 0.0748
(1.79) (1.62) (1.29) (0.76)
Depreciation 0.0437 -0.0239 3.596 ** 0.358
(0.22) (-0.07) (2.19) (0.20)
Debt-to-asset 0.109 -1.072 ***
(0.76) (-2.86)
Z score -0.0032 0.0837 **
(-0.35) (2.22)
Control variables
Ln(Assets ) -0.307 *** -0.325 *** -0.651 *** -0.823 ***
(-3.59) (-3.42) (-3.44) (-3.90)
Ln(Age ) 0.118 0.0670 0.423 * 0.477 **
(1.35) (0.77) (1.92) (2.03)
Residual s.d. -3.297 ** -5.417
(-2.26) (-1.42)
Tangibility 0.179 0.260 0.346 0.571
(1.01) (1.26) (0.97) (1.36)
GLIC -0.0379 0.0134 -0.0826 0.0942
(-0.67) (0.25) (-0.68) (0.73)
Muslim directors 0.192 ** 0.162 0.274 0.363
(2.19) (1.60) (1.14) (1.40)
Shariah Index 0.0634 0.0312 0.0874 -0.0075
(0.82) (0.36) (0.48) (-0.04)
Constant 2.307 *** 2.578 *** 5.188 *** 6.179 ***
(4.21) (4.06) (4.02) (4.06)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 30.11 37.05 53.85 48.27
No. of observations 184 169 183 168
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Appendix 3: OLS regression analysis of sukuk spreads 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of sukuk tranches from 2001 to 2014. The 
dependent variable is Spread. Specification (2) includes firm-specific controls. Inverse Mills ratio, which is 
generated from the Top 3 bank selection model, is included in specification (3) to control for self-selection. 
Specifications (4) and (5) include the interaction terms between Private firm dummy and Top 3 bank and Top 3 
Shariah advisor. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. White’s (1980) 
heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
Certification variables
Top 3 bank -0.638 *** 0.667 * 0.784 ** 0.118 -0.644 ***
(-3.58) (1.76) (2.01) (0.41) (-3.60)
Top 3 Shariah advisor -0.492 ** -0.347 -0.494 -0.449 ** 0.150
(-2.24) (-1.12) (-1.56) (-2.12) (0.65)
Shariah committee -1.249 *** -0.813 ** -0.838 ** -1.296 *** -1.229 ***
(-5.80) (-1.96) (-2.04) (-5.92) (-5.82)
IFI arranger -0.436 *** -2.026 *** -2.378 *** -0.529 *** -0.442 ***
(-2.99) (-4.39) (-4.70) (-3.60) (-2.96)
Private x Top 3 bank -1.530 ***
(-4.69)
Private x Top 3 Shariah advisor -1.109 ***
(-4.16)
Issuance characteristics
Ln(Amount ) -0.210 * -0.213 -0.189 -0.243 ** -0.210 *
(-1.76) (-0.62) (-0.56) (-2.04) (-1.76)
Maturity 0.045 *** 0.082 *** 0.084 *** 0.052 *** 0.0478 ***
(4.56) (3.66) (3.80) (5.21) (4.78)
Investment grade rating 0.0091 -1.345 ** -1.392 ** 0.0246 0.0182
(0.06) (-2.30) (-2.40) (0.15) (0.11)
Syndicate size 0.0036 0.0134 0.0568 0.0297 -0.0327
(0.07) (0.06) (0.23) (0.60) (-0.63)
Secured -0.445 *** -0.584 * -0.644 * -0.449 *** -0.455 ***
(-3.01) (-1.72) (-1.90) (-3.01) (-3.05)
SPV 0.563 *** 1.075 ** 0.877 ** 0.479 *** 0.530 ***
(3.88) (2.67) (2.06) (3.33) (3.63)
Murabahah 0.224 -0.608 -0.460 0.120 0.130
(0.74) (-1.07) (-0.79) (0.40) (0.43)
Ijarah -0.540 ** -0.795 -0.806 -0.638 ** -0.531 **
(-2.02) (-1.51) (-1.53) (-2.39) (-1.99)
Istisna 1.013 *** -1.674 -1.537 0.861 *** 0.887 ***
(3.11) (-1.64) (-1.54) (2.71) (2.77)
Mudarabah -1.105 ** 0.234 0.111 -1.015 ** -1.008 **
(-2.74) (0.22) (0.11) (-2.54) (-2.44)
Musharakah -0.557 * -2.547 *** -2.431 *** -0.575 * -0.531 *
(-1.77) (-3.92) (-3.69) (-1.82) (-1.68)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Appendix 3 (continued) 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results for the sample of sukuk tranches from 2001 to 2014. The 
dependent variable is Spread. Specification (2) includes firm-specific controls. Inverse Mills ratio, which is 
generated from the Top 3 bank selection model, is included in specification (3) to control for self-selection. 
Specifications (4) and (5) include the interaction terms between Private firm dummy and Top 3 bank and Top 3 
Shariah advisor. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. White’s (1980) 
heteroscedastic-consistent t-statistics are in parentheses. See Table 5.4 for variable definitions. 
 
Firm characteristics
Private firm 0.214 -1.162 -0.623 0.909 *** 0.876 ***
(0.97) (-1.45) (-0.74) (2.86) (2.90)
Ln(Assets ) -1.136 *** -0.337
(-3.55) (-0.66)
Profitability -14.51 ** -2.727
(-2.49) (-0.34)
Debt-to-asset 1.070 0.917
(1.62) (1.35)
Z score 0.159 0.129
(1.37) (1.10)
Inverse Mills ratio 2.427 *
(1.85)
Constant -5.000 *** 1.732 -3.939 -6.884 *** -5.326 ***
(-3.71) (0.79) (-1.12) (-4.63) (-3.89)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 12.73 14.96 15.24 13.47 13.1
No. of observations 2941 1183 1183 2941 2941
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
